Accounting for the Role of the Public in Democratic States\u27 Counterterrorism Policies: A Comparative Case Study Analysis of Spain and the United Kingdom by Cronenwett, Megan R.
Wright State University 
CORE Scholar 
Browse all Theses and Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 
2011 
Accounting for the Role of the Public in Democratic States' 
Counterterrorism Policies: A Comparative Case Study Analysis of 
Spain and the United Kingdom 
Megan R. Cronenwett 
Wright State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/etd_all 
 Part of the International Relations Commons 
Repository Citation 
Cronenwett, Megan R., "Accounting for the Role of the Public in Democratic States' Counterterrorism 
Policies: A Comparative Case Study Analysis of Spain and the United Kingdom" (2011). Browse all Theses 
and Dissertations. 431. 
https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/etd_all/431 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at CORE Scholar. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Browse all Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of CORE 
Scholar. For more information, please contact library-corescholar@wright.edu. 
 
 
 
 
ACCOUNTING FOR THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC IN DEMOCRATIC STATES’ 
COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY 
ANALYSIS OF SPAIN AND THE UNITED KINGDOM  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
 
 
MEGAN R. CRONENWETT 
B.A. International Studies, Wright State University, 2007  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011 
Wright State University 
 
 
 
 
WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY 
 
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES 
            
10 March 2011 
            
 
  I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY 
SUPERVISION BY Megan Cronenwett ENTITLED Accounting for the Role of the 
Public in Democratic States’ Counterterrorism Policies: A Comparative Case Study 
Analysis of Spain and the United Kingdom BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL 
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts. 
 
 
        ______________________________ 
        Donna Schlagheck, Ph.D. 
        Thesis Director 
 
 
        ______________________________ 
        Laura M. Luehrmann, Ph.D. 
Director, Master of Arts 
Program in International 
and Comparative Politics 
 
Committee on Final Examination: 
 
 
___________________________________      
Donna Schlagheck, Ph.D.  
Department of Political Science 
             
___________________________________       
Liam Anderson, Ph.D. 
Department of Political Science             
 
___________________________________       
Vaughn Shannon, Ph.D. 
Department of Political Science      
 
___________________________________ 
Andrew T. Hsu, Ph.D. 
Dean, School of Graduate Studies 
 
iii 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Cronenwett, Megan, M.A., Department of Political Science, Wright State University, 
2011. “Accounting for the Role of the Public in Democratic States’ 
Counterterrorism Policies: A Comparative Case Study of Spain and the United 
Kingdom”.  
 
 
Democratic states are more susceptible to terrorist attacks and yet have the most 
responsibility to ensure their counterterrorism responses are in accordance with 
democratic principles. Respect for the rule of law and the freedoms of speech and press 
are just a few of the principles ingrained in democratic philosophy and likewise, by the 
very nature of a democracy, democratic states must be held accountable to their 
citizenries. These factors, however, can be a cause of dissention and can lead to a 
dangerous overreaction or a disproportionate response by democratic states in their 
counterterrorism policies, including leading to the very undemocratic response of 
restricting civil liberties. This thesis researches and analyzes the counterterrorism policies 
of Britain and Spain and applies the theory of Moral Panics to evaluate how Moral Panics 
has influenced their respective counterterrorism policies to account for the discrepancy 
found between the British and Spanish state responses to terrorism.  
 
 
 
Key Words: Terrorism, counterterrorism responses, fear and terrorism, disproportionate 
response, overreaction, terrorism and public opinion, Moral Panics theory 
 
iv 
 
 
Table of Contents: 
 
Introduction          1-26 
Chapter 1: Public Opinion Data       27-38 
Chapter 2: Action Group Data      39-55 
Chapter 3: Statements of Heads of Government and Opposition  56-69 
Chapter 4: Editorial Data       70-97 
Chapter 5: Security Forces Data      98-124 
Chapter 6: Legislation Data       125-143 
Conclusion         144-162 
Table 1: Moral Panic Indicators in Spanish Data Sources   163 
Table 2: Moral Panic Indicators in U.K. Data Sources   164 
Appendix I: List of Action Groups      165-168 
Appendix II: List of Counterterrorism Legislation    169-174 
Appendix III: Editorial Translations      175-257 
Bibliography         258-275 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Moral Panic Indicators in Spanish Data Sources   163 
Table 2: Moral Panic Indicators in U.K. Data Sources   164 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
Glossary/ List of Foreign Terms and Abbreviations 
 La Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos del País Vasco – The Pro Human Rights 
Association of the Basque Country 
 La Asociación del Víctimas del Terrorismo – The Association of Victims of Terrorism 
(AVT) 
 Audencia Nacional – Spanish National Court 
 Batallón Vasco-Español – Basque-Spanish Battalion (BVE) 
 Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas – Center of Sociological Investigations (CIS) 
 Cuerpo Nacional de Policía – National Police Force 
 Ertzaintza – Basque Police Force 
 Etarra – member of ETA 
 Euskadi – The Basque Country 
 Euskadi ta Askatasuna – Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) 
 La Federación Provincial de Asociaciones de Vecinos – The Provincial Federation of 
Neighborhood Associations 
 Fundación Colombia Herida – Wounded Colombia Foundation 
 Gesto por la Paz de Euskal Herria – Gesture for the Peace of the Basque Country 
 Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación – Anti-terrorist Liberation Groups (GAL)  
 Grupos Especiales de Operaciones – Special Operations Groups (GEO) 
 Guardia Civil – Civil Guard 
 Herri Batasuna – the so-called political wing of ETA (HB) 
 Instituto Opina – Opinion Institute  
 Partido Popular – Popular Party (PP) 
 Partido Socialista Obrero Español – Spanish Socialist Worker‘s Party (PSOE) 
 La Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas – The Spanish Magazine of 
Sociological Investigations 
 Sociedad Española de Radiodifusión – Spanish Society of Radio (SER) 
 Unidades Antiterroristas Rurales – Rural Antiterrorist Units  
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Introduction 
 
Section I: Statement of the Problem 
A. Introduction 
It is well known that terrorism is not a new concept, however, the ways in which 
democratic states deal with the threat of terrorism today and considerations of the 
implications of their counterterrorism policies are relatively new. Regarding a state‘s 
counterterrorism policies, democratic states face an important dilemma regarding how to 
find the right balance between maintaining state security and upholding civil liberties, 
and how to address any imbalances between the two. The focus and intent of this thesis is 
to explore how and attempt to explain why Britain and Spain, both being European 
democracies having had very similar experiences with both domestic and international 
incidents of terrorism, have enacted quite different counterterrorism measures. This thesis 
includes key concepts in the history of terrorism in both Britain and Spain, discusses the 
existing literature, and presents the research question and the methodology utilized to 
analyze this comparative case study through the application of the sociological concept of 
Moral Panics.  
The theory of Moral Panics is introduced below, and justification is given as to 
why this theory has been chosen in the attempt to explain the divergence in Britain and 
Spain‘s respective counterterrorism responses, but, first, a few alternative explanations 
are addressed that could explain this difference. Firstly, one could hypothesize that the 
difference between the British and Spanish counterterrorism responses could be 
explained through the nature of the most recent terrorist attacks committed in their 
respective states and the subsequent threat perception. In the Spanish case, the response 
2 
 
to the terrorist attacks of 11 March 2004 (11/M) was reactionary. After initially blaming 
the Spanish terrorist group ETA
1
 for the 11/M attacks, the Spanish public became aware 
that the attacks were perpetrated by Islamic terrorists and were related to the Spanish 
military‘s presence in Iraq. Consequently, in the 2004 Presidential elections that followed 
just days after the 11/M attacks, Spaniards voted the party they deemed responsible for 
11/M, the Popular Party, or PP, out of office and as such largely believed the terrorist 
threat to be over.
2
 Contrary to the Spanish reactionary response, the British response was 
largely forward looking; legislation was enacted that would, with any luck, prevent future 
terrorist attacks. This hypothesis can be ruled out due to the fact that one could attribute 
the (ir)rational response of the Spanish citizenry to vote the PP out of office to acting out 
of fear; fear for what might happen if the PP were to stay in office, which in turn, allows 
for the theory of Moral Panics to possibly explain the public‘s reaction.  
A second hypothesis one could offer as an alternate explanation to the theory of 
Moral Panics concerns the history of terrorism and democracy in the two countries. 
Whereas while the British Government did enact undemocratic policies against the Irish 
Republican Army, IRA, they were not as repressive as the Spanish policies, especially 
regarding the state-sponsored death squads used, unsuccessfully, during the Spanish dirty 
war to thwart ETA.
3
  Even if one were to argue that the Spanish tactics were less 
repressive than the British, this still does not account for the fact that the Spanish 
democracy is much younger than British democracy and, as such, confidence in the 
                                                        
1
 Euskadi ta Askatasuna or Basque Homeland and Freedom 
2
 Partido Popular or Popular Party; the PP led by José Maria Aznar was deemed responsible for 
the 11/M attacks and, therefore, in the 14 March 2004 elections, the PSOE, Partido Socialista 
Obrero Español or Spanish Socialist Workers‘ Party, led by José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, was 
elected to office.  
3
 The Spanish state-sponsored death squads were the Grupos Antiterrorista de Liberación, GAL, 
or Anti-Terrorist Liberation Groups 
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Spanish democracy is less stable, especially in the minds of older Spaniards who still 
remember well the times of General Francisco Franco‘s, former dictator of Spain, rule 
just over three decades ago.  
One could offer many different hypotheses as to why the British and Spanish state 
responses to terrorism have taken two very different courses. However, as should be 
evident, the public has some role to play in these competing explanations. It is for this 
reason that the theory of Moral Panics emerges as having strong prospects to explain how 
these two very similar liberal democratic states have taken two very dissimilar 
approaches to counterterrorism, especially in the post-9/11 world. Next, an overview of 
the theory of Moral Panics is given, and why it is this author‘s belief that the theory of 
Moral Panics can offer some insight into how democratic sates construct their 
counterterrorism policies.  
 
Moral Panics overview: 
The theory of Moral Panics is borrowed from Political Science‘s sister field of 
Sociology and adapted for purposes of this thesis to the study of terrorism, and, in 
particular, counterterrorism responses, in the attempt to explain the differences between 
the British and Spanish state responses to terrorism. The theory of Moral Panics is 
adapted in order for the theory to offer more insight into the study of terrorism and 
counterterrorism. These adaptations include excluding the aspect of morals and immoral 
behavior. While it is noted that morals may have an impact on the design of 
counterterrorism policies it is not within the scope of this thesis to address these potential 
impacts.  
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Moral Panics is a term that was coined by Stanley Cohen ―as a means of 
characterizing the reactions of the media, the public, and agents of social control on the 
youthful disturbances‖.
4
 According to Cohen, during a moral panic:  
A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become 
defined as a threat to societal values or interests; its nature is presented in 
a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral 
barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-
thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and 
solutions; ways of coping are evolved or … resorted to; the condition then 
disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. 
Sometimes the subject of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is 
something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears 
in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except 
in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and 
long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in 
legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives itself.
5
 
 
There are many reasons why the application of the theory of Moral Panics may be 
advantageous or beneficial to the study of terrorism and counterterrorism approaches.  
Firstly, as Goode and Ben-Yehuda state, ―an investigation of the moral panic emphasizes 
that social reactions to a new and seemingly threatening phenomenon arise as a 
consequence of that phenomenon‘s real or supposed threat to certain ‗positions, statuses, 
interests, ideologies, and values‘‖.
 6
 It is within this context that the author finds the 
application of Moral Panics to the study of terrorism and counterterrorism policies 
particularly promising. Secondly, 
[T]he question of the appropriate social and legal control of the 
responsible parties almost inevitably [author‘s emphasis] accompanies the 
moral panic. Moreover, legislation and its enforcement are usually seen as 
only one step; for those for whom the behavior in question is seen as a 
                                                        
4
 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 24 
5
 Ibid 
6
 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 30  
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threat, measures such as education, socialization, normative changes, 
prevention, ‗treatment‘ and ‗cures‘ will be suggested and debated.
7
  
 
Noting this, the application of Moral Panics appears even more beneficial to the study of 
counterterrorism responses to provide insight into why it is that democratic states enact 
certain acts of legislation.  
Thirdly, examining how the public responds to acts of terrorist violence, 
especially within their own state, can explain the very antagonistic feelings for the 
terrorists and their goals, and given that ―the key ingredient in the emergence of a moral 
panic is the creation or intensification of hostility toward and denunciation of a particular 
group, category, or cast of characters‖ the two coincide very well.
8
 Fourthly, given the 
fact that some countries treat terrorism as a crime in their counterterrorism approach (i.e. 
whereby the state ―only‖ charges a known or suspected terrorist with existing or newly 
drafted and implemented crimes, through what is known as the ―law enforcement 
approach‖ to counterterrorism), and one of the central features of a moral panic is the 
attempt to criminalize certain behaviors, again the two overlap and the study of both 
could be mutually beneficial.
9
 Lastly, and related to the previous, ―no examination of the 
moral panic is complete without a consideration of legislation and law enforcement‖, and 
this is due to the fact that ―legislation and law enforcement are two of the most obvious 
and widely resorted-to efforts to crush a putative threat during a moral panic‖.
10
 
Considering the extent to which counterterrorism approaches are related to legislation 
                                                        
7
 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 32 
8
 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 74 
9
 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 82 
10
 Ibid.  
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and law enforcement, it can be easily understood how this would apply to the study of 
terrorism and counterterrorism approaches. 
It is argued in this thesis that the difference between Britain‘s and Spain‘s 
respective counterterrorism policies can be, at least partially, explained using the theory 
of Moral Panics. Goode and Ben-Yehuda list five actors as parties who can attribute to a 
moral panic: the press, public, agents of social control or law enforcement, lawmakers 
and politicians, and action groups.
11
 This thesis shall look at how each of these five actors 
have or have not attributed to the creation of a moral panic in Spain and the United 
Kingdom. The indicators of a moral panic according to Goode and Ben-Yehuda are: a 
heightened level of concern, an increased level of hostility, substantial or widespread 
agreement or consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing 
group members and their behaviour, disproportionality, and volatility.
12
  
The intention of this thesis is to utilize the theory of Moral Panics in the attempt 
to fill a void in terrorism and counterterrorism literature by analyzing the role the public 
plays in a democratic state‘s counterterrorism policies. This is especially true noting the 
importance of the public in contemporary democracies, as the public is an essential 
component of a democratic government. The theory of Moral Panics affords the author 
the ability to analyze the differences between the British and Spanish states‘ responses to 
acts of terrorist violence and the theory will be used as a framework to help examine how 
these democracies construct their counterterrorism policies. 
 
 
                                                        
11
 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 24 
12
 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 33-41 
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B: The Research Question 
Why have Britain and Spain, while being relatively similar in their institutional 
and regulatory structure, taken such different approaches in their counterterrorism 
policies? While there are many factors, both internal and external, domestic and 
international, that help to shape a democratic state‘s counterterrorism policy, for purposes 
of this comparative case study the focus will be on the public and its effect on British and 
Spanish counterterrorism policies.  
This comparative case study employs John Stuart Mill‘s ―method of difference‖, 
otherwise known by Adam Przeworski as ―most similar systems‖, in the attempt to 
explain the divergence found between the British and Spanish counterterrorism 
responses. According to Van Evera, ―we pick similar cases to reduce the number of 
candidate causes or effects that emerge: the more similar the cases, the fewer the 
candidates, making real causes and effects easier to spot‖.
13
 Furthermore, ―if case 
conditions are uniform, we can discount third-variable influence as a cause of observed 
within-case covariance between values on IV [independent variable] and DV [dependent 
variable]‖.
14
 As stated by Przeworski and Tuene, ―it is anticipated that if some important 
differences are found among these otherwise similar countries, then the number of factors 
attributable to these differences will be sufficiently small to warrant explanation in terms 
of those differences alone‖.
15
 In other words, the logic behind applying Mill‘s ―method of 
difference‖ in this comparative case study is such that by comparing similar cases, one 
                                                        
13
 Van Evera, 23 
14
 Van Evera, 52 
15
 Przeworski and Tuene, 32 
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can control for a large number of variables and, therefore, be able to offer explanations 
based on the discrepancies found among the common variables.  
C. Sub-questions 
What role, and to what extent, do Moral Panics play in a democratic state‘s 
counterterrorism approaches? Will the theory of Moral Panics contribute to 
understanding public opinion and its effect on counterterrorism policies?  
 
D. Literature Review 
Introduction: 
The literature on British and Spanish counterterrorism responses demonstrates 
that there are a number of different options democratic states may utilize in their 
counterterrorism policies. While there are competing arguments put forth by various 
scholars regarding British and Spanish counterterrorism responses, there are several 
common themes in the literature. The themes in this literature review highlight the array 
of options available to democratic states when crafting their counterterrorism policies and 
responses, and focus on the role of the public in each of these different types of 
responses. This review organizes the spectrum of counterterrorism responses into the 
following: conciliatory options, legalistic options, repressive options, and warlike 
options.
16
 Each of these categories is subsequently addressed in this literature review. 
Additionally, alternative hypotheses regarding these types of responses are examined.  
 
                                                        
16
 While other scholars discuss these four categories Martin adequately names the different 
categories and therefore they are borrowed Martin, Gus Understanding Terrorism, Challenges, 
Perspectives, and Issues, pp. 478-479  
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Conciliatory Options  
Conciliatory options incorporate the ‗softest‘ available options a democratic state 
has the ability to apply in its counterterrorism initiatives. Conciliatory options include the 
following: diplomacy, concessions, and social reforms.
17
 Conciliatory options often 
appear to be the least desired alternative for democratic states to employ because it is 
often feared that if the country negotiates with terrorists, it will appear too ―soft‖, and, 
moreover, some countries follow an official [emphasis added] policy not to negotiate 
with terrorists, which consequently, makes this option very unlikely, if not impossible, to 
pursue, or at least openly pursue. Furthermore, as Nacos highlights, the public may also 
disapprove of negotiating with terrorists.
18
 However, not all countries are opposed to 
conciliatory options and several democratic states have engaged in concessions or 
negotiations with terrorist organizations either openly or secretly, disguising them as 
―talks‖ or ―dialogues‖ (e.g. Spain with the Basque terrorist organization, ETA).
19
  
A further complication with conciliatory options is that even if a democratic 
government is willing to talk and negotiate with a terrorist organization, the group itself 
may not be willing to negotiate, especially in the case of trying to negotiate peace deals. 
As Gross aptly writes, ―in the eyes of the terrorist organization, peace is a ‗death blow‘ 
that will lead to its disbanding, and therefore, no circumstances can exist that will cause 
the organization to enter into a peace treaty with its ‗democratic enemy‘ and cease 
fighting it‖.
20
  Likewise, ―a state organ that signs a peace treaty with a terrorist 
                                                        
17
 Martin, 478 
18
 Nacos 2008, 284 
19
 Shabad and Ramo, 463 
20
 Gross, 56 
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organization will be according recognition to that terrorist organization, an outcome that 
is inconceivable‖.
21
 
While terrorist groups are unlikely to negotiate a peace deal with a democratic 
state this does not necessarily imply that the organization will not try to get the state to 
concede or give in to its demands in other ways, such as through enacting societal 
reforms that grant the terrorist organization, or the interests of the group of persons it 
represents, greater political representation. This is due to the fact that ―it is thought by 
many terrorist organizations that democracies are ―more coercible and less resilient, 
making their capitulation to terrorists‘ demands more likely‖.
22
  
As a democratic government is held responsible to public opinion, conceding to a 
terrorist organization often takes some convincing. Hoffman and Morrison-Taw discuss 
how democratic governments can persuade the public through the use of ―legitimizing 
measures‖ which can be put in place in order to ―build public confidence in the 
government and support for the counterterrorist campaign‖.
23
 Hoffman and Morrison-
Taw assert that ―legitimizing measures can encompass a wide variety of actions and 
legislation: political concessions to ethnic or religious minorities; economic measures to 
ameliorate housing and employment inequities or deficiencies; defensive steps to protect 
the public from terrorist reprisals‖.
24
 Conceding to terrorist groups and affording them 
political concessions in the form of permitting them some (or more) political involvement 
allows the terrorist organization to actively take part in the government, which yeilds the 
added benefit that they are then less likely to use acts of violence or terrorism because 
                                                        
21
 Ibid.  
22
 Borer and Freeman, 66 
23
 Reinares 2000, 9  
24
 Ibid.  
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they then have something to lose. On the other side of public opinion, if a terrorist 
organization were to succeed in gaining sympathizers, or instilling enough fear in the 
general population, the populace might push the government to concede to the terrorist 
organization‘s demand(s).  
Under the umbrella of conciliatory options one could devise a hypothesis stating 
that the divergence found between the British and Spanish counterterrorism responses 
can be attributed to the governmental structure of federalism in Spain. It is true that the 
Spanish system of federalism affords its different regions a great level of autonomy such 
as the right to self-governance. As such, one could be led to believe that this could lead to 
stronger or more repressive regional counterterrorism measures especially noting the fact 
that ―the regional police authorities are competent for terrorist activities on the regional 
level,‖ however, it does not.
25
 This is due to the fact that the Spanish national government 
retains the authority to respond to terrorist threats on the national and international levels 
as Spanish criminal law grants the national government universal jurisdiction over 
terrorist offences.
26
  
One could argue that this competing authority and responsibility for 
counterterrorism measure could impede stronger counterterrorism approaches, and that 
the lack of any major new counterterrorism measures enacted by the Spanish government 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks is an example of such. This, however, is not the case, as the 
legislation that was previously enacted to counter the terrorist threat from ETA can also 
be used to counter the new terrorist threats Spain faces and, therefore, more restrictive 
counterterrorism measures were deemed unnecessary. This is especially true noting the 
                                                        
25
 Martínez, 534 
26
 Ibid.  
12 
 
fact that Spain‘s experience of ETA terrorism has a long history of being international in 
dimension, as parts of the Basque Country are found in France. In sum, the structure of 
federalism and the competing authority for counterterrorism measures found in Spain are 
not sufficient, or at least not in and of themselves, to explain the divergence between the 
British and Spanish counterterrorism responses.  
  
Legalistic Options 
One of the most discussed aspects of counterterrorism measures is the two-sided 
issue of how democratic states employ the rule of law. The literature addresses this issue 
firstly, by noting how democratic states have the obligation to counter terrorism through 
the rule of law, and secondly, how breaches of the rule of law cause more damage to the 
democratic system than the threat of terrorism itself does.  
One of the foremost principles of a democratic government is respect for the rule 
of law or following Gross‘ description, respect for the rule of law is ―a central and basic 
component of democratic society‖.
27
 Alonso and Reinares take this a step further in 
claiming, ―there is no other way for democratic institutions and collective actors than 
acting, in accordance with the rule of law, to guarantee fundamental rights and civil 
liberties‖.
28
 Nacos addresses the importance of ―decisive defensive and aggressive 
responses to terror‖ but highlights the fact that these responses shall not come ―at the 
expense of the moral high ground that belongs to those who respect the law and 
humanitarian principles‖.
29
   
                                                        
27
 Gross, 59 
28
 Alonso and Reinares 2005, 277 
29
 Nacos, 2008, 184 
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While it may appear contrary to democratic principles that a democratic state 
would ever violate the rule of law, the opposite is unfortunately true. Democratic 
governments have cited many different reasons as to why it was deemed necessary to act 
outside the rule of law. Jiménez offers the following list of justifications democratic 
states have given for breaching the rule of law: ―the processes of law are too 
cumbersome, that the normal safeguards in the law for the individual are not designed for 
an emergency and that, given the often indiscriminate violence perpetrated, the terrorist 
deserves to be treated outside normal law‖.
30
  
While this list of justifications may seem reasonable, or rational, as Schmid 
highlights, ―there are also practical considerations which make it very much more in the 
government interest to remain within the law in pursuing terrorism than going outside 
it‖.
31
 The most significant reason why a democratic state would not want to venture 
outside the rule of law in its counterterrorism measures, aside from the fact that this is 
highly undemocratic, is that by acting outside the rule of law, the democratic government 
is helping to justify the terrorist group‘s actions. This is especially true considering 
terrorist organizations often claim the repressive measures of a democratic state as 
justification for their actions. As Woodworth writes, ―one of its [terrorism‘s] greatest 
dangers lies in the way in which terrorism tempts democracies to take short cuts, to break 
their own best rules. Terrorists win when democracies become less democratic in 
response to the terrorist threat‖.
32
 There is much truth to this statement which is 
exemplified by the Spanish dirty war experience with ETA, in which Spain tried to 
                                                        
30
 Schmid, 129 
31
 Ibid.  
32
 Woodworth 2004, 169 
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combat ETA through dirty war tactics (i.e. the use of state-sponsored death squads) that, 
consequently, produced the reverse of the intended outcome; instead of stopping ETA, 
the Spanish state lost legitimacy and actually helped ETA to gain more legitimacy and 
increase its membership.
33
  
 In addressing why democratic states must continue to abide by the rules of law 
even when terrorist organizations do not, Gross writes: 
If we were to allow a democratic state in its war against terror to breach 
the laws of war on the grounds that the other side also breached them, we 
would not thereby be helping the state to defeat its enemy; we would be 
helping the enemy to defeat us. We would also undermine the rule of law 
and the stability of civilized society. We would cause democratic states to 
lose their character. We must avoid this result at all costs.
34
 
 
Another aspect of legalistic options addressed in the literature is the expansion 
of police and executive powers. Democratic states have expanded the powers of law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies both in an attempt to thwart terrorist attacks 
through preventative measures and also as lessons and consequence of their unfortunate 
experiences with terrorism. The broadening of police powers has taken many different 
forms. One example of such is exemplified by the fact that Spain and the U.K. both 
expanded ―powers to collect data from private companies … particularly with regard to 
telecommunication providers [who] are obliged to retain certain communication data‖.
35
 
Furthermore, in Britain‘s Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act of 2000 provisions 
were made ―for the enhancement and extension of police powers which are only loosely 
or not at all connected to terrorism. […] Even more far reaching are the provisions in 
                                                        
33
 Woodworth 2004,173-174 
34
 Gross, 59 
35
 Krieger, 59-60  
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Part 3 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act [ATCSA] 2001, which 
dramatically extend the disclosure powers available to public authorities‖.
36
  
While it may seem logical a state would expand its police force‘s powers in a time 
of emergency, such as during the threat of a terrorist attack, this expansion of police 
powers is a concern to some, including human rights advocates. Roth demonstrates this 
concern in the ―Human Rights Watch World Report 2004‖ by writing, ―enticing as such 
enhanced power might be in the face of the unpredictable and often lethal threat posed by 
terrorism, it threatens basic due process rights and the essential liberty such rights 
protect.‖
37
 While human rights advocates and others have criticized the expansion of 
police powers, the literature also emphasizes how these expansions, in some respects, 
have been made possible by the public‘s willingness to forgo privacy and other civil 
liberties in exchange for security. However, as Smith notes, ―it takes enormous political 
courage to resist being swept along the tides of populist sentiment that, if succumbed to, 
will risk trampling upon the very liberties that western democracies are seeking to 
protect‖.
38
 In other words, even though public opinion is an integral factor of a 
democracy, democratic states need to exercise caution when employing extreme 
counterterrorism methods even when public sentiment is in favor of seemingly Draconian 
counterterrorism methods. 
A state‘s domestic counterterrorism measures also have implications for domestic 
and international law. In order to implement many of the legalistic options discussed 
above and the repressive and warlike options that are addressed below, states have had to 
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modify their laws. This has occurred in a number of ways including revising old 
legislation, creating and passing new legislation, and the more extreme case of derogating 
from international treaties. A major source of contention regarding these laws is that the 
newly created or revised legislation, and especially the derogations from certain 
international treaties, have had severe implications for civil liberties.  
Under legalistic options one might design a number of hypotheses that could be 
used to explain the divergence found between the British and Spanish counterterrorism 
policies and responses. The first would be that the difference between the two countries‘ 
counterterrorism policies and responses could be attributed to the fact that Britain, unlike 
Spain, lacks a written Constitution and that it has functioned throughout most of its 
history without a Constitutional Court. While this may be true, it is not sufficient to 
explain the divergence. Britain has numerous domestic laws and is party to all of the 
international conventions related to terrorism, and, is a member of the European Union 
which, as such, suggests that there are various domestic and international laws and norms 
that the British state is held accountable to regardless of the fact that the British lack a 
written Constitution.  
Additionally, it could be argued that the lack of sufficient checks and balances 
within the British Government could explain this divergence, but as Britain has domestic 
courts and is also held accountable to a number of courts within the institutional 
framework of the European Union, the absence of a Constitutional Court does not explain 
the divergence either. This is especially true regarding the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) as any laws that may be deemed to violate human rights are subject to 
judicial review within the ECtHR. Moreover, with the enactment of the Human Rights 
17 
 
Act of 1998, the British ―courts were given … a power to declare that Acts of Parliament 
were incompatible with the Convention [European Convention on Human Rights or 
ECHR]‖, and this demonstrates that there is indeed a system of checks and balances that 
the British government is subject to.
39
   
It could also be hypothesized that the enactment of emergency powers such as the 
Prevention of Terrorism Acts used between 1974-1989 regarding Northern Ireland and 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005 could be used to explain the divergence in 
counterterrorism policies set forth by Spain and the U.K., but this claim would be invalid. 
Spain has also enacted emergency legislation and has counterterrorism legislation that 
can be utilized to suspend a person‘s fundamental rights if they are suspected of, or found 
guilty of, being involved in terrorist activities.
40
 Moreover, the ability to suspend a 
person‘s fundamental rights on an individual basis is found in Article 55 (2) of the 
Spanish Constitution.
41
  In sum, the absence of a Constitution or Constitutional Court, a 
system of checks and balance, and the enactment of emergency legislation are not 
sufficient, or at least not in and of themselves, to explain the difference between the 
British and Spanish counterterrorism responses.  
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Repressive Options 
Repressive options can coincide with the legalistic options available to democratic 
states in their counterterrorism measures, but they differ regarding the fact that the 
repressive options are designed to be more punitive than the legalistic options. Examples 
of repressive options include economic or political sanctions. One of the issues found in 
the implementation of sanctions is that ―imposing and enforcing such sanctions requires 
exceptional cooperation between the nations of the free world‖.
42
 In other words, these 
sanctions need to be enforced multilaterally, and not just unilaterally, in order for them to 
be truly effective. While unilateral sanctions can have some impact on a terrorist group, 
the terrorist group would be more likely to comply with the sanctions if they are 
implemented multilaterally.  
While the subject of the restriction of civil liberties has been previously discussed, 
it merits full attention under repressive options. A theme found in the literature of 
counterterrorism responses is related to how counterterrorism measures can adversely 
effect the rights of innocent civilians caught in the middle of the process of trying to 
capture suspected or known terrorists and prosecute them for their crimes. Some scholars 
maintain that there is a ―widespread view that the freedoms and liberties in democracies 
constrain how they fight terrorism‖.
43
 However, as Krieger expresses, this is not always 
the case: 
Privacy, press and protest are inherent characteristics of the liberal 
conception of freedom. In times of terrorist threats, limitations of these 
rights re-establish the balance between freedom and security in favor of 
more security. Thus, many observers fear that human rights might become 
a collateral damage of the war against terrorism. In order to prevent such a 
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collateral damage, legal systems restrict permissible limitations on human 
rights. Legislation must be foreseeable, proportionate and it must provide 
safeguards against possible abuses.
44
 
 
What is apparent from Krieger‘s statement is that, on one hand, security is of the 
utmost importance for a state when the threat of a terrorist attack is imminent but, on 
the other hand, in the state‘s attempt to maintain the security of their citizenry, it is 
inevitable that a certain amount of civil liberties and human rights will be abused. Many 
different types of civil liberties can be potentially abused in a democratic state‘s 
counterterrorism initiatives as evidenced by PoKempner‘s warning, ―one aspect of the 
social harm [of counterterrorism policies] is that many innocent people‘s rights are 
inevitably abrogated in the search for the real terrorist‖.
45
  The civil liberties abuses 
most likely to have an effect on the average citizen range in scope from unlawful search 
and seizure to recovering private telecommunication data to restricting speech.  
It is imperative that democratic states hold their democratic beliefs steadfast 
when combating terrorism because to otherwise do so, would render the state 
undemocratic. It is, however, possible for democratic states to temporarily modify or 
impose restrictions of civil liberties in order to combat a terrorist threat, but ―to keep 
these modifications of restrictions in place for too long would damage, not help, the 
democratic state‖.
46
 According to Hoffman and Morrison-Taw, ―there is a fine line 
between the imposition of emergency measures and the restriction of civil rights‖ and 
this is one aspect of counterterrorism measures that democratic states cannot afford to 
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not heed to.
47
 This is especially true when one takes into consideration the fact that, ―a 
democracy that permits itself to deviate from respect for these values [the rule of law, 
the separation of powers, the independence of the judicial authority, and recognition of 
principles of social morality and justice at the core of which lie human rights] – even for 
a limited period of time – is not a bad democracy, but from a substantive point of view, 
it is not a democracy at all‖.
48
  Again, as aforementioned, even if these restrictions are 
advocated for, or even just supported, by the public, the state must be vigilant and 
ensure they do not violate the democratic principles the state is built upon.  
 
Warlike Options 
The last, and most extreme, group of options democratic states have to combat 
terrorism are warlike options which include: war, covert operations and torture. One of 
the more prevalent themes present in the literature is the fact that democratic states have 
the ability, if not the right and obligation, to engage in military operations against 
terrorist organizations or other states, in order to protect their citizenry. One of the 
greatest rights afforded to sovereign states is the right to self-defense, and as Gross 
notes, ―we have seen that self-defense is an exception to the theory whereby disputes 
are resolved by the normative structures of the rule of law: either within the state, by the 
authorities responsible for the enforcement of the law between states; or on the 
international level, in accordance with the UN Charter‖.
49
 Gross additionally claims that 
for a state to protect its citizens by means of self-defense is ―a moral obligation‖ and 
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―that it is not only the right but also the legal and moral duty of the democratic state to 
use appropriate measures, including force, to thwart the dangers posed to the security of 
its citizens‖.
50
 
Furthermore, the right to self-defense against a terrorist threat is recognized and 
enshrined in domestic and international law. As Gross writes: 
A state threatened by a terrorist organization is entitled to act against the 
organization as such; a measure taken by the state will not be deemed to 
be a breach of Article 2(4)
51
 of the Charter [of the United Nations], since it 
will amount to the use of limited and temporary force directed solely at 
removing the terrorist threat. So long as the activity is not directed against 
the civilians or property of the state in which the terrorists are located, and 
it is not intended to conquer territory or achieve political gains, the use of 
force will not constitute a violation of territorial integrity of sovereignty 
and therefore will not be contrary to Article 2(4) of the Charter [of the 
United Nations].
52
    
  
Additionally, the Security Council ―has recognized the need to equate acts of terrorism in 
general – at least acts of terrorism of extensive force, quality, and scope – with armed 
attacks in the sense of Article 51
53
 of the Charter‖.
54
 However, even in light of 
international recognition of the right to self-defense, democratic states would still benefit 
from the exercising caution or being prudent in choosing any of the warlike options to 
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combat the threat of terrorism. As Nacos points out, ―overreaction undermines the moral 
fabric of a society that is victimized by terrorists and plays into the hands of terrorists and 
the assumptions central to their calculus of violence‖.
55
 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of a democratic state‘s response to the threat 
of terrorism is the use of torture. In the post-9/11 world, torture came to the forefront of 
the debate on appropriate counterterrorism measures. Some argue that torture is 
justifiable due to the fact that information to prevent future attacks can only be obtained 
through torture, while other experts and scholars, including legal expert Henry Mark 
Holzer, claim that ―torture of whatever kind, and no matter how brutal, in defense of 
human rights and legitimate self-preservation is not only immoral; it is a moral 
imperative‖.
56
 Furthermore, torture does not always yield useful information. As one of 
the head Investigating Judges of the Spanish National Court said, ―I come from the 
country of the Inquisition … we had to learn from experience that torture, and 
mistreatment and degradation, do not work‖.
57
 
Another controversial aspect of counterterrorism measures is that of indefinite 
detention. The greatest, and most frequent, argument in favor of indefinite detention is 
that known or suspected terrorists pose a security threat and they, therefore, cannot be 
afforded the luxury of freedom. Additionally, democratic states are unable to legally 
extradite known or suspected terrorists to countries where they could face persecution or 
the death penalty and, therefore, the state has no choice but to keep the terrorists in 
indefinite detention. As Brigitte L. Nacos notes, ―to defeat evil, we may have to traffic in 
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evils: indefinite detention of suspects, coercive interrogations, targeted assassinations, 
even pre-emptive war. These are evils because each strays from national and international 
law and because they kill people or deprive them of freedom without due process. They 
can be justified only if they prevent the greater evil‖.
58
 Nacos‘ argument, however, 
implies that these ―evils‖ are justifiable, as evidenced by the public support or at least 
toleration of places such as Guantanamo Bay in the post-9/11 world, but her argument, 
nonetheless, is a source of great contention. On the other side of the debate, human rights 
activists claim that indefinite detention goes against a person‘s rights, regardless if they 
are a terrorist or not, rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
 
Conclusion 
As evidenced in the preceding pages, democratic states have a wide range of 
options available to them when constructing their counterterrorism policies. Brigitte 
Nacos, in citing Paul R. Pillar, writes, ―‗whether one likes it or not, or thinks it should 
happen or not, public opinion affects policy decisions.‘ Conversely, governments, too, 
depend on propaganda and at times even on high fear appeals to enlist public support for 
anti- and counterterrorist initiatives‖.
59
 There is a significant void in the literature on 
democratic states‘ responses to terrorism that analyzes the role that the public has in 
determining which policies the democratic government should adopt to counter terrorism. 
This void is very important to address, especially considering the fact that by its very 
nature, a democratic state must be accountable to the public and its opinion. It would be 
advantageous to study and analyze what, and to how great an extent, the role the public 
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plays in how a democratic state implements counterterrorism measures in order to gain a 
better understanding as to how and why democratic governments choose the 
counterterrorism measures they do.  
 
Section II: Procedure 
E. Methodology/Research Design 
The operationalization of the research will include using Goode and Ben-
Yehuda‘s theory of moral panics as a framework or method to organize, test, and analyze 
state policies subsequent to the terrorist attacks of 11/M and 7/7 in the attempt to account 
for the missing piece in counterterrorism literature of the role of the public in democratic 
states‘ counterterrorism policies. For purposes of this thesis the dependent variable (DV) 
will be the British and Spanish state counterterrorism responses and the independent 
variable (IV) will be the indicators of a moral panic. The indicators of a moral panic 
according to Goode and Ben-Yehuda are:  
       A ―heightened level of concern over the behavior of a certain group or 
category and the consequences that that behavior presumably causes for the rest of 
the society. This concern should be manifested or measurable in concrete ways.‖; 
      An ―increased level of hostility toward the group or category regarded as 
engaging in the behavior in question … not only must the condition, phenomenon, 
or behavior be seen as threatening, but a clearly identifiable group in or segment of 
the society must be seen as responsible for the threat‖;  
      ―[S]ubstantial or widespread agreement or consensus … that the threat is real, 
serious, and caused by the wrongdoing group members and their behavior‖; 
      Disproportionality – ―there is a sense on the part of many members of society 
that a more sizeable number of individuals are engaged in the behavior in questions 
than actually are, and the threat, danger, or damage said to be caused by the 
25 
 
behavior is far more substantial than, is incommensurate with and in fact is ‗above 
and beyond that which a realistic appraisal could sustain‘‖; 
      Volatility – the moral panic ―erupt[s] fairly suddenly (although they may lie 
dormant or latent for long periods of time, and may reappear from time to time) 
and, nearly as suddenly, subside. Some moral panics may become routinized or 
institutionalized‖.
60
 
 
The following data sources will be used to evaluate whether Goode and Ben-
Yehuda‘s indicators of a moral panic were present in Britain and Spain: 
 Opinion polls to gauge public sentiment and reactions, 
 Information regarding Action Groups 
 Statements by British and Spanish heads of government, 
 Statements by British and Spanish heads of opposition, 
 Newspaper content (e.g. headlines, articles, editorials, etc.) 
o For the Spanish case, editorials are chosen from El País, the most 
widely read newspaper in Spain. The editorials for the British case 
are taken primarily from The Times, but supplementary articles also 
come from The Guardian, The Irish Times, and other newspapers.   
 Actions (or inactions) of the British and Spanish security forces 
 British and Spanish legislation related to terrorism 
 
Moreover, this thesis researches Britain and Spain‘s responses to domestic 
terrorism with the IRA and ETA, respectively, and then compares the countries‘ 
responses to domestic terrorist incidents with their responses to incidents of international 
terrorism. For the purpose of this thesis, the time period from which the British response 
to its problem with Irish Republican terrorism will be set as beginning with the Troubles 
and the Irish Republican Army/Provisional IRA (IRA/PIRA) split in 1969 and ending 
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with the Good Friday Accords in 1998; the time period from which the Spanish response 
to its problem with ETA will be set as starting with the beginning of democracy in Spain 
in 1978 and ending with ETA‘s declaration of a ―permanent‖ ceasefire in 2006. The 
findings are then used to compare Spain‘s response to the 11/M and Britain‘s response to 
the 7/7 and 21/7 terrorist attacks, and additionally highlight the role moral panics has or 
has not played in these states‘ counterterrorism policies. Lastly, the findings of this 
comparative case study are analyzed to offer suggestions for other democratic states and 
their counterterrorism initiatives.  
27 
 
Chapter 1: Public Opinion Data 
Spain
61
 
Looking at the case of Spain, throughout the time period of this thesis, terrorism 
was almost always listed as one of the top two priorities citizens felt the Spanish 
Government should tackle. One exception to this was in 1985 when terrorism fell behind 
not only unemployment but also concern for the necessity of ―a more effective fight 
against drugs‖.
62
 There were also exceptional cases in which terrorism took first place on 
the list of concerns of the Spanish people (i.e. ahead of the concern regarding 
unemployment). One such case was in 1997 when terrorism was the top concern for 
54.8%
63
 of the Spanish citizenry and again in 2000 when terrorism was considered the 
leading problem by 72.1%
64
 and 81.5%
65
 of Spaniards, in November and December of 
2000, respectively. What makes these last numbers even more interesting is that at the 
beginning of the new millennium, 53% of those surveyed also believed that Spain would 
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finally achieve an end to terrorism.
66
 In other words, even though Spaniards were 
concerned about the threat of terrorism, they were optimistic the threat of terrorism would 
soon end. This is true even in light of the fact that the Spanish public was often 
pessimistic when it came to ETA‘s various ceasefire declarations. For example in 
February 1999, after the 1998 ―indefinite truce‖, 71% of those Spaniards interviewed 
believed it was ―perfectly possible‖ for ETA to return to using arms.
67
 However, half of 
the Spanish citizenry believed that the Spanish Government had done more for the peace 
process than ETA.
68
 Therefore, even though the Spanish case demonstrates a large 
amount of pessimism toward the maintenance of ETA‘s ceasefires, at least half of the 
public believed that the Spanish government was doing its share, or more, in trying to 
achieve peace. 
In the post-9/11 world concern for terrorism within the Spanish society also 
exhibited some volatility. Much like with the pre-9/11 world, most of the data indicate 
that terrorism was second to unemployment for most of the research period, but a few 
months after the September 11
th
 attacks in New York and Washington D.C., in December 
2001, 74.2% of those surveyed believed the fight against terrorism should be ―the 
principle objective‖ of the Spanish society in the next five years.
69
 Terrorism again 
became the primary concern in Spain in the last months of 2002, at which time debate 
was raging as part of the larger decision to declare all political parties with terrorist ties 
illegal, which included Herri Batasuna, the so-called political wing of ETA. In October 
2002, 65.4% were ―in favor or very supportive‖ of ―criminalizing Batasuna‖, compared 
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with the 52% who believed similarly in 1992, 
70
 and 56.2% believed that the measure 
would be a ―very or fairly [important] advance‖ for the fight against terrorism.
71
 The 
degree of concern for terrorism then fell to its lowest percentage since September 2000 in 
January 2003. This was largely due to the Prestige oil spill off the coast of Spain which 
was viewed as an ―ecological disaster‖, and consequently, it seized some of the concern 
previously placed with terrorism as 28% of Spaniards identified the Prestige disaster as 
one of the main problems facing Spain.
72
  
Furthermore, while ―terrorism‖ (emphasis added) declined percentage-wise on 
the list of principle problems plaguing Spanish society, the 2003 Iraq War climbed the 
list of concerns, which has obvious links to the greater U.S. ―Global War on Terror‖. In 
fact, in March 2003, the war in Iraq constituted the second most serious problem for 
Spaniards with 35.7% of those surveyed stating so, ahead of terrorism at a close 35.5%.
73
 
Therefore, in total, it can be stated that over 70% of Spaniards were concerned with some 
aspect of terrorism. Moreover, it was very apparent that Spaniards opposed the Iraq War 
not only from the beginning, but from the first mentions of possible ―interventions‖ in 
Iraq. Interestingly, this could be considered the beginning of what was to come almost 
exactly one year in the future, as Spaniards tripled their support for the Spanish Socialist 
Workers‘ Party (PSOE) just days after the 2003 Iraq War began.
74
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The Iraq War was not the last time during the research period in which public 
opinion was markedly volatile. Polls done exactly one month before the 11 March 2004 
attacks in Madrid listed terrorism as the second most important problem in Spain for 
36.4% of those polled, after, unemployment for 57.3%. However, in an opinion poll done 
by SER, the Spanish Society of Radio, days after the 11/M attacks and the general 
election on 14 March 2004, terrorism was once again cited as the main problem afflicting 
Spanish society by 62.5% of those asked, compared to unemployment with ―only‖ 
46.1%.
75
 Furthermore, although immigration had been considered a problem, albeit 
minor, from time to time throughout the research period, after the 11/M terrorist attacks, 
immigration remained within the top four main problems afflicting Spanish society. Most 
of the time it was listed as a concern behind unemployment, terrorism, and the newly 
discovered Islamist terrorist threat, but it even topped the list in October 2005.
76
  
There is perhaps some just cause behind this concern, even if it does appear to 
have been somewhat late to occur. Several facts could have alerted the Spanish public to 
the increasing threat of extremist Islamic terrorism, but, for some reason, it did not appear 
to do so except on very rare occasions. According to Jordán and Horsburgh, for nearly 15 
years before the 11/M attacks, dating back to the early 1990s, there was a ―continued 
presence of individuals linked to jihadist groups in Spain‖.
77
 Additionally, many of the 
9/11 hijackers had ties to Spain and several studies, including one released by Europol in 
December 2003, declared Spain‘s involvement in the United States‘ invasion of Iraq as 
an additional risk for Spain. Moreover, Al Qaeda released the document, ―Jihadi Iraq, 
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Hopes and Dangers‖, in December 2003 and it listed Spain as the ―weakest link‖ in the 
U.S. Coalition Forces, claiming that the Spanish public would not tolerate more than two, 
maximum three, attacks before removing their troops from Iraq.  Furthermore, this 
document specifically mentions the Spanish election period as a good time to strike.  
Regardless of these facts, Spaniards were not very concerned about immigration from 
Islamic countries or Islamist terrorism, or terrorism at all, in the months leading up to 
11/M. This holds true even though those surveyed by the Center for Sociological 
Investigations, or CIS, in 2002 listed the ―political instability of North African countries‖ 
as the top ―focus of international conflict that could affect Spanish security‖.
78
 A CIS 
survey from November 2003 demonstrated that 40.6% of Spaniards believed that there 
were ―too many‖ Latin Americans in Spain while the second, behind unemployment with 
63.6%, most pressing problem for 40.7% of those surveyed was ETA terrorism.
79
 
80
 
Perhaps, even more telling is the fact that in February 2004, after the Al Qaeda and 
Europol publications, terrorism did not even figure into the main personal concerns of 
Spanish citizens.
81
  
It should go without saying, but is worth mentioning, that terrorism has had a 
fairly permanent place in Spain as one of the major problems plaguing Spanish society. 
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This is due to a number of factors, including not only the continued threat of terrorism, 
primarily from ETA but increasingly from international terrorist groups as well, but 
additionally from new laws and declarations passed through Parliament, including: the 
very controversial debate regarding whether to reinstate the death penalty for terrorists,
82
 
the quite controversial amnesty and reinsertion programs for repentant etarras, or 
members of ETA, the outlawing of political parties affiliated with terrorist groups, and 
the numerous ETA truces and ceasefires. Even with the permanence of terrorist violence 
and issues related to terrorism and terrorists, in the time frame of this research, there are 
some very noticeable highs and lows in Spanish public opinion regarding terrorism, 
which leads to the conclusion that the public in Spain has had, insofar as the public 
opinion data support, a quite volatile relationship with terrorism. It is also possible to 
state that the Spanish public opinion, at times, demonstrated an increased level of 
hostility, and disproportionality, especially regarding the debate surrounding and support 
for the possible reinstatement of the death penalty. Lastly, it is also true that throughout 
most of the research period, there was substantial agreement that the threat of terrorism 
was real, serious, and cause by the wrongdoing members and their behavior, which at 
times, especially in the aftermath of major terrorist attacks, was heightened. 
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United Kingdom 
For most of the research period, the United Kingdom, much like Spain, had a 
much higher level of concern for unemployment, and also taxes, than for terrorism. This 
does not, however, mean that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was not an issue for the 
British, because it, indeed, was. Concern for the IRA and its activities, however, was not 
viewed as a major threat, unlike unemployment, until it (re-)emerged as the ―predominant 
issue in British politics‖ in 1982.
83
 One of the main additional reasons why the IRA never 
seemed to quite top the charts of public concern is because in 1988 two things happened. 
Firstly, the National Health Services started to be ―consider[ed] [as] the most urgent 
problem facing the nation‖,
84
 and secondly, British officials acknowledged that 
―terrorism is no longer a national problem‖.
85
 Lastly, as in Spain, concern for the 
environment, second only to the poll tax, also topped the list of concerns facing British 
society for a brief time.  
Perhaps what really sets British sentiment regarding terrorism apart from Spanish 
sentiment is that the IRA enjoyed a fairly decent amount of public support, much more so 
than ETA, especially in the beginning. It must be noted, however, that most of this 
support was directed toward the IRA‘s ―idealism‖, 32% in 1978, and not a general 
approval or support which was only 2% in 1978.
86
 Furthermore, the British public has 
fairly consistently supported talks between the British Government and the IRA, 
including, at times, Sinn Fein. Moreover, public support for talks between the parties 
                                                        
83
 Simpson, Jeffrey; GAM, ―Unemployment top concern, U.K. poll finds‖, The Globe and Mail, 
24 September 1982 
84
 DeYoung, Karen, ―The British Love Their National Health Service; But Can It Survive?‖, The 
Washington Post 15 March 1988  
85
 ―Bruges to Rhodes‖, The Times, 26 September 1988 
86
―Provisional IRA warning of 10-year Ulster War‖, The Times, 9 May 1978  
34 
 
steadily increased over time, from 43% in 1984, in favor of direct talks with Sinn Fein, to 
51% supporting the inclusion of Sinn Fein in 1991, to 59%, of either party or both, in 
1993, to 85% in the Republic and 56% in Northern Ireland in 1996 without a ceasefire, 
and 94% and 80%, respectively, with a ceasefire in place.
87
  
The apparent overwhelming support for talks should not be taken as is and 
without further consideration. It must be noted that the reason there existed so much 
support for talks between the British Government and the IRA, and later Sinn Fein, is 
because more than half of those who supported talks believed that they would lead to 
peace. Furthermore, the research also makes it apparent that the British society was not 
averse to the idea of using harsher methods in the pursuit of peace. Similar to the case of 
Spain, the British public largely supported reinstating the death penalty for terrorists, 
which is evident by the fact that support for reinstating the death penalty for terrorists 
stood at 70% in 1982, and at 93% in 1983.
88
 
No analysis of British public opinion would be complete without mentioning the 
withdrawal of British forces from Northern Ireland. According to The Times, ―every 
opinion poll taken in Britain since the present troubles has shown a majority in favour of 
withdrawal from the province‖.
89
 While this quote is from 1986, it completely captures 
the public‘s sentiment in favor of the withdrawal of British forces from Northern Ireland, 
                                                        
87
Johnson, Paul, ―Support in poll for talks with IRA/Opinion poll on British attitudes to Ulster‖, 
The Guardian (London), 27 August 1984; ―Poll calls for return of internment to halt sectarian 
killings‖, The Observer, 20 October 1991; ―Poll Questions Ulster Link: Most want talks with 
Sinn Fein if violence renounced – Major tells Unionists he will not accept joint sovereignty‖, The 
Guardian (London), 10 November 1993; ―Momentum for talks builds as Major joins ‗right‘ side; 
Irish peace process: PM makes IRA an offer it will find hard to refuse‖, The Independent 
(London), 1 March 1996 
88
―Police drop plan to issue IRA Photofit picture‖, The Times, 26 July 1982; ―Retributive Justice‖, 
The Times, 20 June 1983 
89
―After Brighton what next for Belfast?‖, The Times, 16 October 1986 
35 
 
which only increased with the passage of time. Another example of the attitude most in 
the U.K. held toward Northern Ireland is the following excerpt:  
―We‘ve done 10 polls over the last 15 years.‖ Said Mr. Worcester [of the 
polling firm Market & Opinion Research International]. ―They show that 
the British public don‘t lay awake nights worrying about Northern Ireland. 
They lay awake worrying about their jobs, whether their car will be stolen, 
or about the National Health Service.‖ After 25 years of bloodshed, in 
which hundreds of British soldiers lost their lives, polls indicate most 
people in Britain would be happy if Northern Ireland drifted away across 
the Atlantic. ―They seem more concerned about it in Boston than in 
Britain,‖ Mr. Worcester said of Northern Ireland.
90
 
 
Another noticeable aspect of public opinion data in the U.K. regarding the IRA is 
that there is a definite link between governmental policies and views and the public‘s 
opinion or view of the IRA and levels of violence. For example, in 1985, when asked, ―If 
present policies continue unchanged, do you think people will become more attracted or 
less attracted to revolutionary violence?‖ 62% replied ―more‖, and to the question ―Do 
you think acts of political terrorism in Britain will be more or less common?‖ 52% 
replied ―more‖.
91
 Additionally, when the August 1994 ceasefire broke down, an opinion 
poll ―indicated that more than 70% of people in the [Irish] Republic held the British 
government responsible for the collapse of the ceasefire‖.
92
  
In the aftermath of the 7 July 2005 (7/7) and 21 July 2005 attacks in London, 
opinion polls found a large majority of citizens in favor of Britain‘s new or updated 
counterterrorism measures, including the proposed 90-day detention for suspected 
terrorists. This, however, is only one example of the long ―habit of home secretaries (of 
                                                        
90
―Truce unlikely to benefit Major Britain/IRA‘s ceasefire announcement probably won‘t help 
PM‘s low popularity rating because, pollster says, the British public doesn‘t care deeply about 
events in Northern Ireland‖, The Globe and Mail, 2 September 1994   
91
―Now the rifts appear in the Tory ranks‖, The Times, 2 March 1985   
92
―Momentum for talks builds as Major joins ‗right‘ side; Irish peace process: PM makes IRA an 
offer it will find hard to refuse‖, The Independent (London) , 1 March 1996 
36 
 
both parties) to use the results of public opinion polls … to ease the passing of 
controversial decisions and legislation, especially when their intent is to diminish rights 
and civil liberties‖.
93
  
Quotes such as ―terrorism is no longer a national problem‖ 
94
 compared with ones 
such as ―the Northern Ireland problem is clearly the most serious human problem facing 
the British Government‖,
95
 demonstrate that the public opinion regarding IRA terrorism 
has been quite volatile. In the British experience, moreover, if a comparison is made 
between what the public has to say about governmental policies both before and after the 
7/7 attacks in London, it would appear as if there may be a disproportionate response to 
the 7/7 attacks, even though public opinion polls were used to pass legislation both before 
and after the attacks. 
In concluding this section, an examination of the data is necessary to help 
determine if the theory of moral panics will be useful in explaining the divergence 
between the British and Spanish state responses to incidents of terrorism in their 
respective countries.
96
 From the examination of Spanish public opinion data, it is quite 
obvious that terrorism has been one of the top, and most widespread, concerns for the 
Spanish citizenry throughout the research period. There have also been some very 
noticeable increases and decreases regarding the concern for terrorism, reflecting 
volatility. The unwillingness of the Spanish public to re-integrate terrorists into society, 
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without them having completed their full prison sentences, and moreover, the vast 
support at times for arguably disproportionate counterterrorism measures such as the 
reinstatement of the death penalty demonstrate that there was, at various points during the 
research period, an increased level of hostility toward the terrorists. An additional 
example of this is the vast public support for criminalizing the Basque political party and 
so-called political wing of ETA, Herri Batasuna. Public opinion in Spain, therefore, 
reflects all five indicators of a moral panic.  
Turning now to the British public opinion data, it must first be stated that the 
British citizenry appears to have had a lesser amount of concern for terrorism than their 
Spanish counterparts, although terrorism is still a notable concern for the British public, 
at times even becoming volatile. Moreover, much like the Spanish case, this concern, at 
times, reveals the presence of an increased level of hostility toward terrorists regarding 
policies such as detention or imprisonment and the death penalty. Although the IRA 
terrorists enjoyed a higher level of public support for their cause than their ETA 
counterparts did, making it appear as if the criterion of ―substantial or widespread 
agreement or consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing 
group members and their behaviour‖ is not met, the converse is actually true. This is due 
to the fact that although the IRA enjoyed a higher level of public support than ETA, a 
significantly larger percentage of the British populace still disapproved of the IRA and its 
actions. Lastly, there is some evidence of disproportionality present in the British public 
opinion data on terrorism, especially regarding the consideration of measures such as the 
reintroduction of the death penalty. 
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In summary, evidence from public opinion data, especially regarding the support 
for the reinstatement of the death penalty and the criminalization of certain political 
parties offers support for the argument that moral panics were present in both of the case 
studies.  
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Chapter 2: Action Groups Data 
 
 
While it is true that a democratic government must be held responsible to its 
citizenry, it is also true that many citizens of democratic countries do not participate in 
government, or at least not directly, and even those who do directly participate (e.g. by 
voting in elections) can have their voices fade without the right amount of pressure. As a 
collective voice is louder than an individual voice, action groups can serve as a means to 
ensure that the voice of the public is heard.
97
 For this reason, an examination of action 
groups in both Spain and the United Kingdom is included in the attempt to further 
understand the role that the public plays in shaping democratic states‘ counterterrorism 
policies. Much like in any democratic country, British and Spanish action groups are 
vastly diverse and advocate for a variety of different causes; however, for purposes of 
this thesis only those actions groups related to the British and Spanish battles against 
terrorism are discussed. As examined below, these groups have voiced their opinions, in a 
variety of ways, on many of the prominent issues found in the research on British and 
Spanish counterterrorism responses. Furthermore, and while it should go without saying 
that no action group can be successful in all of its endeavors, some action groups have 
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had or contributed to considerable success in aiding victims of terrorism and, overall, 
helping their societies to overcome the threat of terrorism.  
 
Spain 
As mentioned above, Spanish action groups have expressed their views and 
voiced their opinions on many of the topics found in the research of the Spanish state 
response to terrorism that were previously discussed. These topics include: the possible 
reintroduction of the death penalty, hosting dialogues with ETA, the Spanish policy of 
reinsertion, and criminalizing Herri Batasuna (HB). Each of these topics is addressed 
below.  
As discussed above, the potential reinstatement of the death penalty was a quite 
controversial or polemical topic. Not unsurprisingly, many of the associations in favor of 
the protection of human rights, including Amnesty International, were strongly opposed 
to the possible reinstatement of the death penalty. What is perhaps more surprising is the 
fact that many of the victims of terrorism and family members of the victims were 
opposed to the death penalty as well.
98
 This is important to note because not only are the 
action groups supposed to be the voice of the victims but, moreover, due to the fact that 
some of the victims of terrorism became involved in the action groups only after their 
personal experiences with terrorist violence, and hence, brought their beliefs and 
sentiments along with them, they could, therefore, easily influence the different action 
groups.  A similar situation is found regarding the case of holding a dialogue or 
negotiating with ETA. For example, a father whose son was an ETA militant killed in a 
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confrontation with the Spanish Guardia Civil, said regarding holding a dialogue with 
ETA, ―I am against ETA, but a supporter of anything before they continue killing‖.
99
  
Turning now to the criminalization of Herri Batasuna, many of the action groups, 
especially the Associación de Víctimas del Terrorismo, the Association of Victims of 
Terrorism or AVT, were very much in favor criminalizing ETA‘s alleged political wing. 
In fact, the Associación de Víctimas del Terrorismo requested the criminalization of HB 
through a complaint to Judge Baltasar Garzón.
100
 More importantly, two of AVT‘s 
lawyers at the time stated to Ismael Moreno, a judge in the Audencia Nacional, the 
Spanish National Court, that ―it would be difficult to establish a direct connection 
between ETA and HB, for which legal rodeos [stretches of the truth]
101
 would have to be 
devised to demonstrate this possible link‖.
102
 This quote illustrates the Association‘s 
determination to outlaw HB, even if it meant using questionably legal loopholes or 
maneuvers. It should be noted that some of the action groups were not only concerned 
with the criminalization of Herri Batasuna, but instead, some groups, such as La 
Federación Provincial de Asociaciones de Vecinos or the Provincial Federation of 
Neighborhood Associations, advocated for the criminalization of all political parties of 
the extreme right.
103
 This reflects what can, perhaps, be considered a disproportionate 
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response, or at least the attempt of such, given the fact that not all of the political parties 
of the extreme right had any affiliation, alleged or otherwise, to any terrorist organization.  
 The last issue to discuss here concerns the reinsertion of prisoners convicted of 
terrorist offenses. This topic also offers one of the best examples of how different action 
groups held competing beliefs on a number of topics, including that of the reinsertion 
policy. Javier Concuera Atienza, a member of La Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos del 
País Vasco, the Pro Human Rights Association of the Basque Country, perhaps not 
surprisingly, voiced the belief that reinsertion ―had been demonstrated to be one of the 
appropriate measures‖ to obtain a ―democratic and peaceful coexistence‖.
104
 On the other 
hand, members of the Associación del Víctimas del Terrorismo stood firm in their 
conviction that the reinsertion of prisoners should not happen, which they believed for a 
number of reasons, including as according to Paulino Baena, former spokesman of the 
AVT, that ―the policy of reinsertion of etarras is a response in an attempt to justify the 
movement of Amedo and Domínguez to third grade to avoid ‗possible revelations‘‖.
105
 
106
  
 One of the principle reasons why action groups such as the AVT were so 
adamantly opposed to the policy of reinsertion was because they were against the 
reduction of prison sentences that accompanied the reinsertion. To illustrate, the AVT 
rejected ―any measure that ‗benefit[ed]‘ the etarras, and ask[ed] for the complete 
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fulfillment of the convictions given by the Audencia Nacional‖.
107
 Additionally, as stated 
by an AVT Catalonian delegate, ―it is incomprehensible that a terrorist is condemned to a 
sentence of including hundreds of years and after seven or eight years they are already 
out on the streets‖.
108
 Perhaps the best way to demonstrate how vehemently opposed the 
AVT was to the policy of reinsertion is the fact that they were able to collect nearly 
1,100,000 signatures asking ―for the complete fulfillment of the sentences, so that 
terrorists fulfill their sentences and with the constitutional limit of 30 years of prison‖.
109
 
 While the collection of more than a million signatures in favor of their position 
regarding the policy of reinsertion was a huge accomplishment for the AVT, as it would 
be for any action group, perhaps the best evaluation of the role played by Spanish action 
groups in influencing public opinion is through the numerous demonstrations they 
organized. These demonstrations largely occurred in the main Spanish cities (e.g. 
Barcelona, Madrid, Pamplona, etc.) but were also present throughout the country, and 
were held in support of, or against, a number of different issues related to terrorism. A 
few examples of these demonstrations include: demonstrations against certain proposed 
pieces of legislation, against terrorist attacks on businesses and the revolutionary tax, and 
general demonstrations in favor of peace. Looking first at demonstrations against 
proposed legislation, when ―la Ley de Seguridad Cuidadana‖, the Law and Order Act, 
was proposed, between 7,000-15,000 people in Madrid demonstrated against the 
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proposed law due to it being ―the most serious attack against the Constitution since its 
birth‖.
110
  
 While it may seem unusual for businesses to organize demonstrations against 
terrorism, in Spain they have a vested interest in doing so given the fact that ETA has 
repeatedly targeted them in at least two ways. The first way is through the imposition of 
the ―revolutionary tax‖, which ETA would demand from business owners to help fund 
their operations, and any refusal to pay this ―tax‖ could lead to kidnapping, and 
subsequently, ransom demands, or even to the threat of their murder or that of a family 
member. It is important to note that this ―revolutionary tax‖ is unlike any other tax in 
which small denominations are usually taken, because, on the contrary, ETA earned a 
substantial amount of money via their ―revolutionary tax‖ revenues. For example, in only 
two of the numerous examples of ―tax collections‖, ETA demanded that Miguel 
Juareguiberri pay 30 million pesetas ($258,501.53), and that a further two entrepreneurs, 
Fransico Irazusta and Jacinto Irogoyen, pay 25 million pesetas ($215,417.94).
111
 
112
 The 
second way in which ETA targeted businesses was by directing their attacks against 
specific sectors, namely the tourism industry. Consequently, this hurt businesses 
economically, if not also physically, aggravating, for example, ―even more so the difficult 
situation of unemployment in Andalucía‖, a major tourist destination.
113
 An additional 
example of a demonstration held, at least in part, by businesses is that of a demonstration 
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held in the aftermath of an ETA attack against a commercial center in Barcelona, in 
which some 70,000 people participated.
114
  
 Perhaps the action group most involved in hosting demonstrations is Gesto por la 
Paz de Euskal Herria or Gesture for the Peace of the Basque Country. This action group 
is responsible for organizing numerous demonstrations including a memorable three-
kilometer (1.86 mile) human chain in Pamplona in which some 7,000 people attended to 
―Join the peace‖.
115
 An additional example of their demonstrations is one that was held 
annually to commemorate the anniversary of Gandhi‘s death in which between 40,000-
150,000 people participated.
116
  
 To conclude this discussion of demonstrations, it is imperative that what is 
perhaps the most well-known demonstration in Spanish history be addressed, that of the 
demonstration held in the aftermath of the 11/M terrorist attacks in Madrid. Given the 
fact that a mere three days after the attacks elections were to be held, an additional sense 
of urgency existed to discover the perpetrators of the attacks, and for this reason on the 
13
 
March 2004, ―after 6pm, some 5,000 people, convened via mobile messages [SMS or 
text messages], concentrated before the PP headquarters [in Madrid] … shouting: ‗Before 
voting, we want the truth‘‖.
117
 While perhaps in light of some of the other demonstrations 
discussed above 5,000 attendees does not appear to be a large number, given the facts 
that this demonstration was truly publically driven via text messages, that demonstrations 
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against the 11/M attacks were held the day before, and that it was indeed illegal for the 
demonstration to take place, this demonstration is all the more significant.
118
  
 The last aspect of action groups to be discussed is that of their successes. As 
mentioned above, Spanish action groups have not been successful in all of their attempts, 
often because many of the action groups had opposing views on many of the topics 
discussed. However, Spanish action groups have had a number of significant 
achievements, some of the most important of which include: working with universities to 
offer scholarships to victims of terrorism, influencing the establishment of a 
governmental office for the assistance of victims of terrorism, and advocating for the 
collection and distribution of indemnifications for the victims of terrorism or their family 
members.  Regarding offering university scholarships to victims of terrorism, the AVT 
and the Universidad Complutense de Madrid created a special statute to offer, inter alia, 
free tuition, scholarships, and psychological care to those affected by terrorism.
119
   
 Perhaps the action groups‘ most important successes were those that led to the 
disbursement of millions of dollars worth of indemnifications to victims of terrorism or 
their family members. It should be noted that the AVT and other action groups were not 
solely responsible for the collections of indemnifications and that the Spanish 
government, and later the Council of Europe, also required indemnifications but, 
nonetheless, the AVT and other action groups were instrumental in a number of ways in 
obtaining these collections.
120
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 One of the principle ways in which the AVT in particular was able to help victims 
of terrorism and their families collect indemnifications was by beginning ―legal actions to 
make freed terrorists have to start compensating for the economic debt that they have 
with their victims‖ in which they asked the Prosecutor of the Audencia Nacional to 
garnish the wages of freed etarras that had a paying job.
121
 
122
 However, perhaps none of 
these recouped indemnifications would have been possible without the AVT‘s creation of 
a foundation, under their same name, that had the specific aim to seek funds for the 
―moral and economic help‖ of the victims of terrorism and their families.
123
 In many 
ways this office was the precursor to the Spanish Minister of Interior‘s creation of the 
Office of Assistance to Victims of Terrorism. The AVT had much to do with the 
establishment of this Spanish government level office dedicated to victims of terrorism 
considering they had advocated for indemnifications for nearly 15 years before its 
establishment and the fact that ―the creation of this center occurred after the Ombudsman, 
Fernando Álvarez de Miranda, recommended, in his annual report before the Courts the 
19
th
 of June, a revision of the existing legislation on state indemnifications for acts of 
terrorism‖.
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 To conclude, from the review of the data regarding Spanish action groups, it can 
be stated with certainty that they were able to influence not only public opinion, by 
collecting petition signatures and organizing demonstrations or marches, but also policy 
making, especially that of collecting indemnifications for the victims of terrorism. It is 
also apparent that with the case of the criminalization of Herri Batasuna, for example, the 
action groups themselves did, at times, use or support questionably legal means to 
achieve their goals, which is, perhaps, explainable, however, not justifiable, due to the 
fact that many of the members of the action groups had been victims of terrorism 
themselves. Regardless of the logic behind their methods, while the action groups did not 
exhibit much volatility, which is perhaps due to the fact that a large number of action 
groups, representing different views were present in Spain, it is evident that a number of 
action groups did express a heightened level of concern, an increased level of hostility, 
and, again, although there was some contention among the different action groups, 
substantial or widespread agreement or consensus that the threat is real, serious, and 
caused by the wrongdoing group members and their behavior, and disproportionality, 
especially with regard to criminalizing political parties, or aiming to do so. In other 
words, the examination of the data on Spanish action groups shows some evidence of 
four of the five indicators of a moral panic. 
 
United Kingdom 
 British action groups have expressed their views and voiced their opinions on 
many of the same topics found in the research of the British state response to terrorism 
that were previously discussed. The following focuses, however, on some additional 
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aspects of the topics previously addressed such as the numerous examples of legislative 
and security measures that were introduced to help combat the threat of terrorism and the 
importance of international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Additionally, topics 
not previously discussed such as advocating for victims of terrorism to receive monetary 
or other support, demonstrations or protests, and prisoners‘ rights are discussed.  
Much like in the case of Spain, and other democratic countries, one of the 
principal ways in which action groups in the United Kingdom expressed their beliefs was 
through organizing demonstrations or protests. These demonstrations were held for a 
number of reasons, but a primary reason was to express dissatisfaction with the different 
legislative and security measures that the government was debating or enforcing, 
especially regarding internment and the lack of inquiry, or independent inquiry, into 
alleged ill treatment, or even torture, of prisoners. It must be noted that in the case of the 
United Kingdom, organizing, or even attending, protests is especially important due to 
the fact that emergency legislation regarding the situation in Northern Ireland had made 
marches illegal and, therefore, attendees or organizers could be, and at times were, 
arrested and prosecuted which, furthermore, even extended to a number of members of 
Parliament.
125
 Moreover, the protests were significant because they did contribute to a 
number of successes such as getting the British and Irish governments to abandon a plan 
―to introduce legislation allowing on-the-run (OTR) terrorists to return to Ireland and 
benefit from an amnesty‖.
126
 
127
 It is also worthwhile to mention that just as action groups 
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in the U.K. organized a number of marches, they also were responsible for cancelling 
them. For example, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) successfully 
pled for the cancelation of a civil rights march that was planned against the sending of 
additional British troops into Northern Ireland in the aftermath of a terrorist attack.
128
  
To further examine the responses of British action groups to proposed or enacted 
legislative or security measures the topics of internment or detention without trial and 
allegations of ill treatment or torture and how they relate to violations of civil liberties are 
reviewed. Many of Britain‘s action groups were founded solely to protect civil liberties 
(e.g. the British Irish Rights Watch, the National Council for Civil Liberties, Northern 
Ireland Civil Liberties Association, etc.), and while other groups advocated for the 
protection of civil liberties as well, these associations in particular questioned and 
condemned the practice of internment. Much like in the Spanish case in which a number 
of the members of different associations had been personally affected by terrorist 
violence, a number of these civil liberties advocates personally experienced internment 
and, therefore, knew what the conditions were like which, perhaps, caused them to be 
more critical than they might otherwise have been.
129
  
 Action groups were also passionate about attempting to condemn the government 
for its actions or inactions regarding allegations of torture. They were not, however, 
always successful in achieving this at a governmental level, which led some U.K. action 
groups to take their cases to the European level. One such example was when the 
Relatives of Bloody Sunday Victims and the British Irish Rights Watch took their case to 
―the European Commission on Human Rights [ECoHR], after the British government‘s 
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refusal to reopen inquiries into the [Bloody Sunday] killings‖.
130
 An additional example 
regards British Irish Rights Watch, the Committee on the Administration of Justice 
(CAJ), Inquest, and Liberty (previously the National Council for Civil Liberties) taking 
the case of the 1988 killings in Gibraltar to the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) to determine if the shooting ―breached Article Two of the European Convention 
on Human Rights [ECHR] which guarantees the right to life‖.
131
 It is worthwhile to 
mention that some of the action groups were not satisfied with trying individual soldiers 
for their actions and instead called for the government to be condemned for its actions. 
For example, according to NICRA, ―individual soldiers who carried out their orders are 
not to blame, but rather the Prime Minister of the day and his Cabinet who took the 
decision to use torture. These are the guilty men who must be punished.‖
132
 In sum, while 
only a small amount of action groups took cases to the European level, it does attest to 
the fact that these associations were not going to stop until they had done all they 
possibly could have to get justice for the victims and, more importantly, that they had the 
support to do so.  
It should also be mentioned that a number of U.K. action groups, were adamant in 
their belief that civil rights applied to all, and as such, should be protected for all, which 
included prisoners. One of the reasons why some action groups advocated for the 
protection of civil liberties of prisoners is because according to them, ―the real victims… 
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have been the families and relatives of the prisoners‖.
133
 This statement was made 
regarding the use of the ―Special Secure Units‖ which ―provide a very restricted setting in 
which prisoners often remain confined for many years‖, and demonstrates that however 
much the families of prisoners grieved over knowing their loved one was in such a cell, 
that the action groups were also concerned about how the prisoners were housed and their 
overall well-being.
134
 Organizations such as Relatives for Justice were especially 
concerned for the well-being of prisoners during the hunger strikes of the 1980s which 
was attributed to the fact that some of the prisoners‘ convictions were based on 
―uncorroborated testimony‖, and called ―for emergency legislation to ensure there are no 
further convictions on uncorroborated testimony‖ which they hoped could be passed and 
then applied retroactively.
135
 Lastly, it must be noted that one of the principle reasons 
why the action groups advocated for the rights of prisoners is due to the fact that a report 
published by numerous groups including: British Irish Rights Watch, the Committee on 
the Administration of Justice, the Irish Council for Civil Liberties, and Liberty (National 
Council for Civil Liberties) claimed, ―the prisoners‘ issue … must be central to the peace 
process‖, and that ―the current Home Office treatment of prisoners is actually damaging 
and destabilising the peace process‖.
136
 In other words, some action groups believed the 
fate of the peace process rested on the treatment of the prisoners and, therefore, they took 
the conditions of their treatment quite seriously.  
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One of the other main concerns of many of the action groups in the U.K. was to 
improve the lives of the victims of terrorism. This was done in a variety of ways 
including providing housing and campaigning or lobbying to receive aid, monetary and 
otherwise, to help the victims. One of the major action groups committed to obtaining the 
funds necessary to help victims of terrorism is the National Association of Victims 
Support Schemes.
137
 This association has arguably been quite successful at lobbying for 
additional funds, or at least not a reduction in funds, and the fact that ―Labour would 
discuss with the National Association of Victim Support Schemes what sums they needed 
to provide services they regarded as essential‖ demonstrates the influence the Association 
could, and often did, exert.
138
 An additional example of the influence the National 
Association of Victim Support Schemes could exert is demonstrated by the fact that it 
was recognized that ―victim support schemes were ‗one of the most helpful developments 
of recent years‘‖.
139
 Moreover, much like in the Spanish case, in the U.K. convicted 
terrorist offenders are liable for having to pay indemnifications to their victims. However, 
this would not entirely ease the financial burden of assisting the victims, due to the fact 
that, as Martin Wright, of the National Association of Victim Support Schemes, noted, 
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―the problem is that offenders sometimes cannot pay‖ and as such the Association would 
continue to lobby for government support.
140
  
While the topic of international cooperation has been previously discussed, it also 
merits exploration in the discussion of action groups. While it is true that cooperation 
among democratic governments is commonplace, the notion of action groups actively 
seeking to achieve its aims by cooperating with other action groups is not as common. 
However uncommon it may be, the logic behind their desire for collaboration was such 
that ―if you have an international network of [terrorists] exchanging training and 
expertise [then] why can‘t you have an international network of victims working to help 
each other?‖.
141
 As such, the Families Acting for Innocent Relatives (FAIR) partnered 
with Fundación Colombia Herida, Wounded Colombia Foundation, to petition the 
Colombian government to extradite the ―Colombian three‖ and to ―lobby for the 
Colombian government to fund members of Colombia Herida to visit Ireland so that they 
can lobby the Irish government‖.
142
 
143
  
In conclusion, British action groups, have been successful in achieving an 
improvement in the lives of victims of terrorism through economic and other forms of 
aid, and in assisting and maintaining the integrity of the democratic system by protesting 
against legislative or security measures that could curtail civil liberties, and by ensuring 
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that those who used these questionable or illegal methods or those who were responsible 
for others using them, faced the consequences of their actions or inactions. Furthermore, 
from the review of the data regarding the British action groups, it can be stated with 
certainty that they were able to influence not only public opinion, by, for example, 
organizing or calling for the cancelation of demonstrations or marches, but also policy 
making, especially with regard to collecting indemnifications for the victims of terrorism. 
While British actions groups did not exhibit much volatility, it is evident that a number of 
action groups did express a heightened level of concern, an increased level of hostility, 
and, although there was some contention among the different action groups, substantial or 
widespread agreement or consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the 
wrongdoing group members and their behavior and disproportionality. In other words, 
the examination of the data on British action groups shows evidence of four of the five 
indicators of a moral panic. 
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Chapter 3: Statements of Heads of Government and Opposition 
 
  
As evident by the countless definitions proposed by scholars, democracy can be a 
difficult concept to define. Larry Diamond, for example, defines a liberal democracy as 
―a political system in which individual and group liberties are well protected and in 
which there exist autonomous spheres of civil society and private life, insulated from 
state control‖.
144
 Adam Przeworski alternatively defines an electoral democracy as ―a 
civilian, constitutional system in which the legislative and chief executive offices are 
filled through regular, competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage‖.
145
 
These definitions of democracy are included to stress the importance of the public in 
democratic states. For purposes of this thesis a democracy is defined as including the 
following: free, fair, and contestable elections with universal suffrage; the freedom of 
expression and representation regardless of ethnicity, gender, age, occupation, sexual 
orientation, religion or any other factor; freedom of speech, belief, and opinion and the 
right to legally voice opposition through individual or collective action, and to have it 
heard through multiple channels; respect for civil liberties, and equality and protection 
under the law. Furthermore, many scholars consider a parliamentary system of 
government, the system in both Britain and Spain, the preferential form of governance 
because, compared to presidential systems, it is believed to be more stable and to offer ―a
                                                        
144
 Diamond, 7 
145
 Diamond, 10  
57 
 
better hope of preserving democracy‖.
146,147
 If counterterrorism policies are alleged to be 
in contrast with democratic principles this could severely damage the reputation 
parliamentary governments have earned.  
Lawmakers and politicians have fairly self-explanatory roles to fulfill in a 
democracy; those of creating laws and of implementing policy. According to Goode and 
Ben-Yehuda, both lawmakers and politicians, however, can play an additional role, that 
of creating a moral panic.
148
 This section reviews statements made by members of 
government, from both the ruling and opposition parties, in an attempt to account for 
what role, if any, lawmakers and politicians have played in creating a moral panic in 
Spain and the United Kingdom.
149
 As the previous section on public opinion makes 
apparent, both ETA and the IRA have enjoyed varying levels of public support. For the 
purpose of this section, it is necessary to focus on the role played by lawmakers and 
politicians in recognizing this public support and the greater role of the public and how it 
affects lawmakers and politicians and their actions.  
 
Spain 
One of the most dominant themes found in the research of statements from 
Spanish heads of government and opposition regarding terrorism refers to democracy and 
the affects terrorism has, or could have, on democracy, most notably, the fear that 
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terrorism is going to, or could, overthrow the democratic system in Spain. Statements 
expressing this concern are just as common in the first years of the new democracy in 
Spain as they are into the 21st century.  Statements such as, ―it is classic to give in 
situations of political impotency legal draconian answers that imply the amputation of a 
part of democracy itself‖,
150
 and ―ETA is the worst enemy of the liberties of the Spanish 
people and of the Basque people‖
151
 are quite common in the research. Statements such 
as these imply, or overtly claim, that terrorism is a threat to Spanish democracy, and 
given the fact that concern for terrorism was a primary concern for Spaniards, perhaps, 
the heads of government and opposition made statements such as these so that they 
appeared to acknowledge this concern. However, although much is said that appears to 
try to invoke a panic in the Spanish public about the strength of their democracy, Spanish 
politicians seem to have balanced this panic with statements such as: ―regardless of 
terrorism, democracy has continued settling itself in Spain‖.
152
 
It should be noted that the terrorist organization ETA was not viewed as the only 
threat to Spanish democracy. In much of the research, the mere attempt or willingness to 
negotiate with ETA was portrayed as being enormously destructive to Spanish 
democracy. This held true even in light of the fact that Javier Solano, Minister of Culture 
at the time, recognized that ―there has been, there are, and there will be contacts‖ between 
governmental representatives and leaders of the military faction of the terrorist 
                                                        
150
 Gor, Francisco, ―La ley de Defensa de la Constitución, ‗una ley de Prensa camuflada‘‖, El 
País, 27 June 1981  
151
―El Gobierno descarta la censura de opiniones de los terroristas como en el Reino Unido‖, El 
País, 24 October 1988 
152
 Moreno, Marifé, ―Benegas afirma que votar al CDS es dar votos a Fraga‖, El País, 29 May 
1989 
59 
 
organization, ETA.
153
 For example, even though Adolfo Suárez, President of the Union 
of the Democratic Center (UCD) party at the time, believed it was ―logical‖ to take 
advantage of ―an opportunity of dialogue‖ if it presented itself, and the Basque Provincial 
Government agreed, a spokesperson for the Minister of Interior said that it would be 
―politically rude‖ and ―an absolute depreciation to those who have been victims of 
terrorism‖ to hold negotiations between the Spanish Government and ETA.
154
 An even 
more illustrative example of the catastrophic effects negotiating with ETA was thought to 
bring Spain is the following quote from a delegate of the Basque Government: 
―negotiating now with ETA not only would lay the groundwork for the collapse of the 
democratic State but moreover would be an example of an unspeakable strategic 
blunder‖.
155
 Regardless of the aforementioned remarks regarding how negotiating with 
ETA would damage Spanish democracy, negotiations or ―talks‖ or ―dialogues‖ 
continued. Perhaps the reason for continuing to hold the dialogues was best stated by 
Mariano Rajoy, Minister of Government at the time: ―we have to do the impossible so 
that it becomes possible‖.
156
 
As the implementation of new legislation, or the modification of existing 
legislation, is one of the factors in determining whether a moral panic is present, and 
heads of government are responsible for initiating and carrying out modified or new 
policies, a brief mention of such is necessary at this point, but is addressed in greater 
detail later in this thesis. Regardless of the fact that throughout the research period many 
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different modifications of existing counterterrorism laws or new counterterrorism laws 
were implemented, for the most part, Spanish politicians appeared averse to overstepping 
their boundaries and were willing to work within the constraints of the democratic system 
to achieve their counterterrorism objectives. For example, Manual Fraga, President of the 
Popular Alliance, stated that a ―priority has to be given to the problem [of terrorism] 
utilizing normal, legal means including states of exception, to combat it‖.
157
  
On the other hand, however, the statements clearly reflect how this was not 
always the case. For example, when José Maria Aznar was first running for election, he 
stated that if he ―made it to govern [won the election], he would modify the penal code so 
that terrorists would rot in jail‖.
158
 This statement produced backlash, including from 
Felipe González, Prime Minister at the time, who replied to Aznar‘s statement by stating, 
―the Constitution is a text passed by referendum by the immense majority of the Spanish 
people and although it is not written in stone‖ he predicted that this modification to the 
penal code ―would have some type of problem‖.
159
 González additionally stated that it 
was one thing to know that terrorists deserved the maximum sentence and the maximum 
amount of contempt but that it was another to ―play with such important pieces as the 
Constitution and its purposes‖.
160
  
The last factor that needs to be examined here is that the research demonstrates 
that politicians often had to try to convince the Spanish public that the means taken in the 
counterterrorism fight were necessary and proportionate. For example, when the Egin 
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newspaper, a Basque newspaper believed to be promoting ETA‘s goals, was closed due 
to the fact that it was often supportive of the terrorist group, many members of the 
Basque and Spanish governments had to defend this decision as it was widely viewed by 
the public as an infringement of the freedom of the press. An example of this is the 
statement by a spokeswoman for the Basque Government who claimed that even though 
the closing of Egin was ―an unusual measure‖, she had ―confidence in the prosecution 
and the proportionality of the measure‖.
161
 It is well known that when certain things must 
be said aloud that they are, more often than not, contrary to what they are claimed to be, 
and as such, it must be mentioned that Article 571 of the Spanish Penal Code makes it an 
offense to work ―in the service of an armed band, organization, or group‖, and 
demonstrating support for a terrorist organization could very well be considered to be 
working in the service of the group.  
As one might presume, and as the research demonstrates, the relationship between 
the public and politicians is not always the easiest, and in fact, it can be quite contentious 
at times, and, occasionally, even outright adversarial. There are times in which the 
government will heed what the public believes or says, other times in which it attempts to 
keep the public ―under control‖, and lastly, further occasions when politicians blatantly 
ignore the public or appear to simply be unconcerned about what the public believes. The 
following statements offer some illustration. Regarding heeding what the public says, 
politicians have ―manifested concern that polls reveal a certain loss of image as a 
consequence of … uncertain results in the areas of the exterior and terrorism‖.
162
 It is 
noteworthy to mention that this specific quote comes from an election period and, 
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therefore, the ruling party was concerned about not being re-elected due to their ―loss of 
image‖. Additional examples were found that refer to trying to keep the public ―under 
control‖ or, in other words, there are numerous examples of statements in which Spanish 
politicians appear to be trying to prevent the Spanish public from overreacting to various 
circumstances. For example, regarding the potential reinstatement of the death penalty, 
Miguel Boyer, Minister of Economy and Finance at the time, believed it was possible to 
eradicate terrorism working within the constraints of the democratic system, and he tried 
to avoid the arguably disproportionate response of reinstating the death penalty by 
stating, ―it is possible to defend society against terrorism without violence, without 
resorting to torture and without reinstating the death penalty‖.
163
  
Lastly, as aforementioned, at times it was quite evident that Spanish politicians 
did not care about or heed to what the public thought. Quotes such as ―to govern based on 
surveys is an error of the highest caliber‖,
164
 ―the Government and the Popular Party do 
not act thinking in the next elections, but instead of the next generations‖, and ―we [the 
Spanish government] are not willing to trade votes for security‖
165
 all demonstrate that 
the Spanish government did not always pay attention to what the Spanish populace 
wanted, and instead did what it believed to be in the best interest of its citizenry even 
when it contradicted what the citizens wanted. An example of such would be when Spain 
sent troops to Iraq in 2003 when 91% of Spaniards were against doing so.
166
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In conclusion, while it is absolutely true that at times Spanish politicians appeared 
to be inciting fear or panic, especially regarding the affect terrorism has, or could have, 
on Spanish democracy, it is also true that Spanish politicians were at times very 
cognizant of how their words would resonate with the Spanish public and, as such, they 
attempted to ease fears that could have led to a panic. With that being said, it is possible 
to say that Spanish heads of government and opposition exhibited a number of the 
different indicators of a moral panic to a small extent. In other words, the data concerning 
Spanish heads of government and opposition demonstrate a heightened level of concern 
and substantial or widespread agreement that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the 
wrongdoing group members and their behavior, and to a lesser extent, or by a small 
number of politicians, an increased level of hostility, disproportionality, and volatility.   
 
United Kingdom 
Turning now to the case of the United Kingdom, the following examination of the 
role played by British politicians in the creation of a moral panic, or lack thereof, 
demonstrates that British politicians have often behaved very similarly to their Spanish 
counterparts, especially with regard to British politicians‘ sentiments toward the public, 
mainly concerning opinion polls, and also the seeming contradictions found between 
public sentiment and governmental actions or policies. However, some differences 
between the British and Spanish politicians are also evident. 
As was demonstrated with the public opinion poll data, the IRA enjoyed a higher 
level of support among the British public than ETA did among the Spanish public. This is 
important to recall because the research reveals a link between the British government‘s 
64 
 
policies and support for the IRA. For example, Conor Cruise O‘Brien, a Labour Member 
of Parliament (MP) at the time, wrote, ―if London is asking Dublin to discountenance and 
discourage the IRA, it should try itself to refrain from acts and omissions which are likely 
to spread sympathy for the IRA‖.
167
 Another example of a statement that reflects the 
relationship between the British government‘s policies and support for the IRA comes 
from Danny Morrison, an ex-Sinn Fein spokesman, in the aftermath of an attempt on the 
life of former Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, and multiple members of her cabinet, 
in which he recognized that had the bombing resulted in their deaths that ―it would 
probably have led to Draconian security measures in Northern Ireland [and] past 
experience has shown that this always leads to increased support for the terrorists‖.
168
 It 
should be noted that even though the IRA enjoyed more public support than ETA did in 
Spain, British politicians, not unlike their Spanish counterparts, were quite averse to 
granting concessions to the IRA or holding negotiations or talks with them, or at least 
publicly doing so. As the General Secretary of the Ulster Unionist Party at the time, Mr. 
Jim Wilson, stated, ―it would certainly strain relations if it emerged that senior civil 
servants, some of whom may have been talking to us, had been talking to representatives 
of the IRA‖.
169
 
Another noticeable commonality between the British and Spanish politicians is 
the description of terrorist attacks as attacks against their respective democracies. 
Regarding the same attacks on the former Prime Minister and members of her cabinet, 
Mr. Brittan, the Home Secretary at the time, stated that the purpose of the attack was ―no 
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less than to strike a blow at the heart of our democracy‖.
170
 Even though Mr. Brittan was 
stressing the importance of the terrorist attack and the disastrous consequences it could 
have led to, he also made the following statement declaring to the British public that, 
―those who believe that terror can prevail against democracy understand neither the 
members of this House – nor the British people‖.
171
  Similar statements were also made 
in the aftermath of the 7/7 attacks in London by former Prime Minister Tony Blair such 
as the following stated just days after the London attacks: ―[this country] will not be 
defeated by such terror, but will defeat it and emerge from this horror with our values, 
our way of life, tolerance and respect for others undiminished‖.
172
 The former Prime 
Minister Tony Blair stated this even though he ―promised there would be the ‗most 
intense police and security service action to make sure we bring those responsible to 
justice‘‖
173
 and emphasized that, ―it is important that we respond by keeping to our 
normal lives and doing what we want to do because to do otherwise is in a sense to give 
them [the terrorists] the very thing they are looking for‖.
174
   
It must be mentioned that while terrorist attacks could not destroy British 
democracy, British politicians at times appeared to be headed down that road themselves. 
This is especially true regarding the proposals and implementation of new security 
measures. Statements reflecting the need for expanded or new counterterrorism measures 
are present throughout the research period. For example, Francis Pym wrote in 1974, ―the 
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need for a vigorous security campaign against terrorism remains a high priority‖ and this 
sentiment only continued to repeat itself in the aftermath of the July 2005 attacks in 
London.
175
 
Even though the introduction of arguably disproportionate measures (e.g. 
internment, the creation of a national identity card, etc.) was considered necessary prior 
to the July 2005 attacks, after the attacks it became evident that the counterterrorism 
measures were becoming increasingly extreme in nature, or even disproportionate, 
especially for a democratic state. For example, even though Western liberal democracies 
are thought to be ―beacons of liberty‖, in the aftermath of the London attacks, the British 
government established a ―hierarchy of freedoms‖ in which, for example, ―the freedom 
not to be filmed by a camera is not as great as the freedom to have a fair trial‖.
176
 Before 
jumping too quickly to any conclusions regarding the potential disproportionality of the 
British government‘s counterterrorism measures, it must be noted that much of what the 
British government did regarding its counterterrorism or security measures, had the 
backing of the public. For example, returning to the example of the creation of a national 
identity card, it was stated that ―public opinion overwhelmingly supports the principle of 
identity cards‖ and, moreover, that the government had been elected on a manifesto that 
included identity cards.
177
 It is, however, necessary to remember that as previously 
mentioned in the public opinion poll data section, ―it ha[d] long been the habit of home 
secretaries (of both parties) to use the results of public opinion polls … to ease the 
passing of controversial decisions and legislation, especially when their intent is to 
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diminish rights and civil liberties‖.
178
 While some British politicians did indeed use 
public opinion to support their arguably disproportionate counterterrorism measures, 
there were also British politicians who cautioned against the use of these disproportionate 
measures and emphasized the importance of staying within the confines of the democratic 
system when combating terrorism. For example, David Cameron stated that there should 
be ―rigorous implementation of existing powers. And nothing which undermines that 
which we are trying to defend: our shared values of freedom under the rule of law. 
Everything we do should be consistent with the rule of law‖.
179
  
It is of equal importance that British politicians, not unlike their Spanish 
counterparts, do not always appear to be concerned about what the British populace has 
to say or think. In fact, British politicians have at times even contradicted themselves on 
their views of public opinion. For example, Margaret Thatcher said, ―the heart of politics 
is not political theory, it is people and how they want to live their lives‖
180
 and then a few 
years later said, ―she took no notice of opinion polls. ‗There‘s only one poll I‘m 
interested in, and that‘s the one on election day.‘‖
181
 Therefore, even though the public 
has a vastly important role to play in a democratic state, it can be stated that when the 
public is in agreement, British politicians will surely emphasize this fact in order to 
accomplish their objectives, and when the public opposes them, they carry on with the 
intent of realizing their predetermined goals, seemingly oblivious to public opinion. One 
could also argue that the British politicians, at least once elected, do not let the opposing 
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public opinion concern them. This can be illustrated with the following quote from Mr. 
Britton, ―let it be said in the plainest terms – the only way to get rid of a government is by 
the ballot box‖.
182
  
In conclusion, British politicians are in many ways very much like their Spanish 
counterparts, especially with regard to the apparent disinterest in public opinion even 
though both are considered to be democratic states. British politicians have used some 
fairly extreme language to refer to their counterterrorism endeavors and the threat 
terrorists pose to the democratic state, but this language has often been balanced out with 
statements referring to the strength and integrity of British democracy. One important 
contrast found in the British case is the prevalence of exceptional measures in the 
aftermath of the July 2005 terrorist attacks in London. Furthermore, as previously noted, 
British politicians and the British public appeared, more often than not, to have had a 
very contentious relationship, in the aftermath of the July 2005 terrorist attacks. It 
became more apparent that the British government would do anything it deemed 
necessary to eradicate the terrorist threat and prevent more terrorist attacks from 
occurring, regardless of the effect this would have on civil liberties or human rights. The 
example of the ―hierarchy of liberties‖ above offers a compelling illustration of this. An 
additional example is that of a statement by Sir John Weston, a British diplomat, who 
believed that Parliament should endorse any necessary measures to curb the domestic 
terrorist threat brought on, in part, by ―Labour‘s hasty importation into British statute law 
of the European Convention on Human Rights‖, and invited those who wished to 
challenge the U.K. to do so ―if they dare‖.
183
  Statements such as the previous one that 
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illustrate that in the aftermath of the July 2005 attacks the British Government was 
willing to take whatever counterterrorism or security measures it deemed necessary to 
protect the U.K. from another terrorist attack. It is also due to statements such as this that 
evidence supports the involvement of British politicians in creating a moral panic in the 
aftermath of the July 2005 terrorist attacks. In sum, the data concerning British heads of 
government and opposition demonstrate a heightened level of concern and substantial or 
widespread agreement that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing 
group members and their behavior, and an increased level of hostility, disproportionality, 
and volatility.    
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Chapter 4: Editorial Data 
 
  
Liberal, western democracies are well known for providing and safeguarding a 
number of different liberties and freedoms, including the freedom of the press, which has 
direct links to freedom of speech. While it must be noted that some newspapers may 
choose to self-censor, or even apologize for publishing certain information, by and large, 
newspapers are deemed free to publish the information they choose, which includes 
information that the democratic government would rather it not publish.
184
 Furthermore, 
and more importantly, this freedom to publish what the individual writers or editors 
decide can grant the newspaper an incredible ability to influence public opinion. This 
influence on public opinion, as it regards terrorism and the states‘ counterterrorism 
responses, is analyzed in the cases of Spain and the United Kingdom below. This section 
reviews editorials published in both Spain and the United Kingdom and discusses the 
most important and prevalent trends found in the research. For the Spanish case, 
editorials are chosen from El País, the most widely read newspaper in Spain. The 
editorials for the British case are taken primarily from The Times, but supplementary 
articles also come from The Guardian, The Irish Times, and other newspapers. These 
newspapers were chosen due to the facts that they are widely read in their countries and 
for reasons of accessibility.   
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Spain 
Many of the same topics discussed in the previous sections regarding public 
opinion and statements of heads of government and opposition are also present in 
editorial content. One topic examined in the previous sections was how politicians relied 
upon the notion of democracy as a sort of rallying cry to combat terrorism, which was 
evident in statements such as those that called terrorist groups and their actions ―threats to 
the fabric of a democratic society‖. The research demonstrates that editorials reflect a 
similar situation. In fact, the threat terrorism poses to the democratic system in Spain is 
one of the most prominent themes found throughout the research of Spanish editorials. 
The most notable aspect of the research on Spanish editorials is that they express great 
concern for maintaining the integrity of the democratic system. This concern is expressed 
through a number of different ways including: their remarks as to how the Spanish 
government has gone against, or is not acting in accordance with, the Spanish 
Constitution and other laws, editorials regarding the reinstatement of the death penalty, 
the pardoning and reinsertion of terrorists, and overall, any attempt by the Spanish, or any 
other democratic government, to step outside the confines of the democratic system to 
fight terrorism.  
For a fledgling democracy perhaps it is self-evident that editorials would express 
great concern for maintaining the integrity of the state‘s democratic institutions, including 
such integral parts as its constitution. It is, however, not insignificant that this theme 
continuously appears throughout the research period. One such aspect found in the 
literature is that of ensuring that the provision for extraordinary measures is implemented 
72 
 
only in the case of extraordinary situations. As noted, the Spanish editorials express great 
concern over the implementation of extraordinary measures, such as prolonged detention 
or violations of habeas corpus, to combat terrorism. One editorial, for example, stated, ―it 
is also incomprehensible that this same tribunal [of the Spanish National Court] was able 
to keep for almost two years in provisional prison the accused of a crime that was later 
considered unfounded.‖
185
 What is perhaps even more important is the fact that the 
editorials suggest that these extraordinary measures are useless in the fight against 
terrorism. The following excerpt offers one example of how the extraordinary measures 
are inefficient:   
Predictably, the Antiterrorism Law has been of no use when fighting 
political violence in this country. Article 86 of the Constitution conditions 
[in original] the use of decree-laws in cases of ‗extraordinary and urgent 
need‘ and explicitly and expressly prohibits [in original] enactment when 
it affects ‗the rights, duties, and freedoms regulated under Title I‘.
186
 The 
new decree-law extends the validity of a law that establishes substantial 
cuts to habeas corpus, the inviolability of the home, and secrecy of postal, 
telephone, and telegraph communications guaranteed by articles 17 and 18 
of the Constitution.
187
  
 
A further example is the following in which an editorial claimed, ―the proven inefficiency 
of the antiterrorist law – unconstitutional for many reasons – to fight against terrorism 
only, will be comparable to its patent utility to frighten the population.‖
 188
   
One of the central reasons why the editorials reflect the ineffectiveness of the 
extraordinary measures is that they express the belief that the democratic system is 
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already powerful enough to combat terrorism without implementing exceptional 
measures, which may, perhaps, be a reason why Spain has not implemented many 
extraordinary counterterrorism laws or policies, especially in the aftermath of the GAL 
fiasco.
189
  
The reality is that, ultimately, the Government finds itself with the fact 
that there exist laws that are more than powerful – and some that are 
doubtfully constitutional to fight against terrorism. … But it would be a 
dangerous error if the Government were to walk the slope of panic on this 
issue. …  Moreover, the experience of the so-called Law of the Defense of 
Democracy teaches that these types of threats are not those that succeed in 
defeating terrorism, but rather those that stir its waters. The Government is 
not obliged to offer miracles in its fight against ETA, but it is, in 
exchange, obliged to not make mistakes in its repressive response.
190
 
 
Additionally, ―operations such as that culminated by the Guardia Civil with the 
disarticulation of the Araba command [a faction of ETA responsible for 39 deaths] show 
that the democratic State has the capacity and legal means to face the challenge of 
terrorists so that their criminal activity does not go unpunished.‖
191
 This theme is also 
present in the aftermath of the 11/M attacks. For example, one editorial, written a few 
months after the 11/M terrorist attacks stated, ―experience indicates that more efficient 
than changing legislation is to apply with tenacity and [use] existing legislative 
means‖.
192
 
One interesting aspect of the editorial research is that they express concern that 
perhaps the divergence from the democratic constitutional system is not necessarily 
intentional, but instead, that it is to some extent derived from the assumption of power. 
For example, ―this legal withdrawal is, however, a worrisome manifestation that the 
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heights of power can dizzy those who occupy the positions to the point of temporarily 
forgetting their own past and to jeopardize its credibility‖.
193
 This is important because, 
again, for much of the research period Spain had not been a consolidated democracy for a 
very long time, and consequently, it is easy to see why concern for maintaining its 
democratic stability is repeatedly raised in the editorials, especially, when this can lead to 
the slippery slope of the erosion of civil liberties and other non-democratic methods of 
counterterrorism.   
An additional aspect of the research to be addressed regarding the editorial 
viewpoint on the government going against the Spanish Constitution is that the editorial 
research reflects the fact that constitutional freedoms, liberties, and rights are applicable 
to all Spanish citizens, including alleged or convicted terrorists, but that they are useless 
when there is no confidence that the state will protect and respect them. An example of 
such is the following: ―Guarantees that, obviously, protect all, including terrorists, but 
taking care of its inaccurate or inexperienced legal formation and routine in its 
application does not serve the purposes of those who do not believe in them and combats 
with fury the institutions that endorse them.‖
194
 This belief is also apparent in the 
aftermath of the 11/M attacks in Madrid, especially regarding combating the threat of 
Islamic terrorism.  
The last aspect of the research to be addressed here focuses on the importance of 
staying within the confines of the Spanish Constitution and not using exceptional 
measures in the battle against Islamic terrorism. Here, two aspects are significant. First, 
the editorials explain that changing the existing counterterrorism legislation, specifically 
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the Antiterrorism Pact, would not help defend or protect Spain from the threat of Islamic 
terrorism because Islamic terrorists are not interested in taking part in Spanish 
democracy. For example: 
It would be unrealistic to pretend to go further and convert the agreement 
[the Antiterrorism Pact] in the framework for eventual shared initiatives 
against Islamic terrorism. The pact, and its specific content, only makes 
sense against ETA. … It is artificial to try to apply these principles to Al 
Qaeda, that neither intends to change the Spanish Constitution to include 
self-determination, nor negotiate political accords with legal 
organizations, nor pretends to negotiate anything with the Government. It 
would trivialize the pact to pretend that, since it is called antiterrorist, [that 
it] provides guidance to deal with any terrorism.
195
 
 
The second aspect of importance here is that the editorials caution that focusing 
too much attention on the threat of Islamic terrorism, as real as it is, could lead to the 
egregious error of not continuing to focus on the threat posed by ETA. For example, in 
one editorial it is argued, ―one last consideration is that it would be an error that this 
reinforcement of the fight against Islamic terrorism was made at the cost of the fight 
against ETA‖, and that, moreover, ―maintaining political efficiency and judicial firmness, 
as well as democratic unity, against this group [ETA] is now the essential condition so 
that it does not blight the (realistic) expectation of its final defeat.‖
196
 
As should now be apparent, Spanish editorials overwhelmingly stress the 
importance of staying within the democratic system (i.e. by using measures true to a 
democracy) in the counterterrorism fight and, moreover, this theme is clearly 
demonstrated throughout the entirety of the research period. Moreover, the Spanish 
editorials do not hesitate to question the Spanish Government when the press believes it 
is stepping outside the boundaries of the democratic system. One example of an editorial 
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expressing the belief that the Spanish Government should stay within the confines of the 
democratic system is the following:  
Many times we have had the opportunity to note that together with the 
destruction and damage directly caused by the criminal barbarity of ETA 
should also account for the moral damages in the social body, the discredit 
of democracy and its methods, the perversion of authority or the leniency 
before the violation of the basic values of the rule of law. The inadmissible 
and cruel torture … by ETA mobsters cannot be pretext or reason for the 
State apparatus to lose its nerve. The maxim that against terrorism 
anything goes is unworthy of any democratic sensibility, but is moreover, 
and as verified, stupid.
197
  
 
An additional emphasis in the editorial research is that no individual falls outside the rule 
of law.  For example, ―in the rule of law, no violent death – not even those produced by 
security forces in the legitimate fight against terrorism – falls outside the scope of 
investigation by an independent and impartial body such as the judicial.‖
198
  
It should not be surprising that the editorials address issues that were 
demonstrated to be of great concern in the previous sections. Controversial issues such as 
the possible reinstatement of the death penalty, the possibility of negotiating with 
terrorists, and granting them amnesty or pardons are all discussed in the editorials. 
Regarding the death penalty, the editorials clearly reflect the notion that the potential 
reinstatement of the death penalty is not something that should be considered, especially 
not given the justification for the reinstatement. In discussing how the death penalty was 
abolished not only from many European countries‘ ―penal legislations, but also [in the] 
public opinion in almost all of Europe‖, one editorial explains how the case has changed 
so that ―today [written in 1978] the people of the West are shown favorable to the death 
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penalty for a pure and terrible reflection of what has been called legitimate defense.‖
199
 
The controversial topic of negotiating, or ―talking‖, with terrorists is also addressed in the 
editorials and it is blatantly obvious that the editorials express an opinion in favor 
negotiation. In fact, one editorial states, ―dialogue is a path that no civilized Government 
can renounce, especially if from the dialogue the eradication of violence could be 
derived.‖
200
  
The editorial research regarding the pardoning of terrorists is multifaceted. On the 
one hand, the editorials highlight the fact that the pardoning could be taken advantage of, 
while on the other hand, they express a belief that the pardoning can be beneficial to 
ending the terrorist threat from ETA.  An excerpt demonstrating the first aspect is the 
following:  
Because no sane [person] could honestly ask for pardons for those who, 
the day after leaving prison, were ready to commit [atrocious] murder … 
And only the disappearance of violence in the Basque Country would 
make a change in the prisoner‘s situation imaginable. But this is well 
known by those who obscenely manipulate the mobilizations in favor of 
amnesty as one more piece of a strategy of provocation and death.
201
 
 
Turning now to the second aspect, editorial statements such as ―any attitude that 
could put a definite end to the violence and facilitate coexistence within our rule of law 
could only be well received by the lovers of peace and progress. To feed the fighting 
inexorably leads to catalyze the tensions and play [into] the violence‖ clearly demonstrate 
how the pardoning of terrorists could be advantageous in winning the counterterrorism 
fight against ETA.
202
 An additional example is as follows:  
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It is surprising – although the data had already been revealed by other 
previous studies – that there are more Basques willing to accept a change 
to the Constitution and the Statute [of Guernica] than granting amnesty to 
ETA prisoners.
203
 Surprising, because without a doubt it would be more 
viable to [with]draw the prisoners than undertake legal reforms of doubtful 
democratic legitimacy – in the measure that a minority [were to] impose 
their points of view to the majority – and that would require a difficultly 
attainable consensus.
204
 
 
The previous statement is of extreme significance not only because it demonstrates how 
the editorials remain true to their steadfast belief in the necessity of staying within the 
democratic system, but more importantly, it also makes a very powerful statement in that 
even though a greater percentage of Basques are willing to accept changing the 
Constitution and the Statute of Guernica than granting amnesty to imprisoned etarras, 
that these legal reforms would not likely be very democratically legitimate, and, 
therefore, this excerpt can conceivably be viewed as a plea to politicians to resist popular 
will for the sake of the integrity of Spanish democracy.   
The topic of reinsertion is also discussed in the editorial research. It is important 
to note that the editorials discuss not only the reinsertion of convicted etarras but also 
that of officials convicted for their role in the GAL and Spain‘s Dirty War. The topic of 
reinsertion is also multifaceted. Editorials acknowledge the hesitation many had toward 
reinsertion but maintained:  
[I]f the gradual reinsertion of Amedo and Domínguez serves to make it 
understandable to the enemies of this policy toward the etarras that the 
best way to end almost three decades of deaths and pain caused by 
terrorism, then it is worthwhile to bear the malaise caused to many 
Spaniards [because of] the certainty that they will not finish the sentences 
they deserve.
205
 
206
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Another important aspect of reinsertion present in the editorials, both before and after the 
terrorist attacks of 11/M, is that reinsertion may help to alleviate some of the 
radicalization of terrorists. For example, one editorial states, ―to close the ways of 
incorporation into society of these ex-terrorists that have abdicated violence not only 
would foment the irrationality of the groups of prisoners already committed to crime. It 
would feed also the numantinismo of terrorists already in freedom and of their political 
environment.‖
207
 An example from after the attacks of 11/M is an editorial that discusses 
the radicalization of the prison population, especially of those of Maghreb origin. While 
it is not within the scope of this thesis to address in detail the aspects of radicalization, it 
is, nonetheless, worth highlighting that the presence of a large number, more than 10% of 
those imprisoned in Spain, of Arabs in Spanish prisons ―favors the psychological 
influence of radical leaders that offer the small-time offenders to continue doing what 
they were doing – for example, falsifying mobile phone [SIM] cards – but now to the 
service of a greater cause‖.
208
 Considering the ties the terrorists responsible for the 
attacks of 9/11 in New York and Washington, D.C. had to Spain, and the 11/M train 
bombings in Madrid, this process of radicalization in Spanish prisons is not anything to 
be taken lightly.  
Perhaps one of the more significant aspects of the research is that the editorials 
rightfully continue to note that the counterterrorism struggle is a long-term battle and 
advise that terrorism cannot and will not be easily or quickly eradicated. Furthermore, the 
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editorials express the opinion that not only is full domestic governmental cooperation and 
action necessary to combat terrorism, but also that multilateral action (i.e. collaboration 
among local and state, Spanish and European Union or other international or 
multinational institutions) is essential to eliminating the threat of terrorism.  
The inevitability that the terrorist fight will be a long-term battle is present 
throughout the research period. While it is noted that the ―problems of social coexistence 
in the Basque Country are quite older than the actual political regime of freedoms‖, and 
that ―a good part of their roots [are found] in the blind politics of the dictatorship, that, 
with its simplicity and lack of historical vision, was the most valuable ally of the 
flourishing of the armed groups‖, editorials explicitly explain that the counterterrorism 
battle is a long-term battle.
209
  For example, an editorial from 1978 states, ―we will have 
terrorism with democracy as we had it with the dictatorship. There will always be 
marginal groups that include in their analysis the factor of ‗the worse, the better‘‖.
210
 
Another example is the following in which the editorial writers claim, ―the Prime 
Minister rightfully asks for ‗tenacity‘ and ‗perseverance‘ in the counterterrorism fight and 
encourages social mobilization against the outrage.‖
211
 
The importance of full government cooperation and support in the fight against 
terrorism is demonstrated by the following example: ―if there is a terrain in which all 
parties should avoid conflict it is that of the antiterrorist fight.  … Terrorism has lost the 
battle in Euskadi and in all of Spain, and what is needed now is that all those who have 
been its activists or defenders realize it. Conflicts between democrats in this terrain only 
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grant balls of oxygen to those that deny this reality.‖
212
 The editorials also highlight how 
Spanish politicians have almost an obligation to work together to put an end to the threat 
of terrorism to avenge the deaths of all those who saw their demise in terrorist attacks. 
The following, written about a dialogue with ETA, offers an example:  
The moment could have arrived to open the process of dialogue 
contemplated in article 10 of the Pact of Ajuria Enea [because] for the 
moment there exists an ―unequivocal will‖ from ETA to renounce 
violence.
213
 But this very text established the rule of democratic majority 
for any accord of a political nature. It would be unacceptable for those 
who carry the precedent of more than 800 deaths on their backs.
214
 
 
The necessity of governmental cooperation as an integral part to combating 
Islamic terrorism is also made apparent in the aftermath of the 11/M attacks in assertions 
such as, ―in any case, it will be essential that the measures [to combat Islamic terrorism] 
adopted by the Government have the maximum parliamentary support.‖
215
 Or when the 
editorials claim, ―it is justified that the King continue to insist in the necessity of calming 
the political life and that [political] parties work with an integrative spirit. … the concern 
that this partisan confrontation produces [is] far removed from the willingness to 
compromise that made the transition [to democracy] possible‖.
216
 
 Related to the topic of full domestic governmental cooperation is the imperative 
aspect of multinational action and collaboration in the counterterrorism fight. The 
importance of collective action in combating terrorism is of significant relevance not only 
because the editorial research demonstrates multilateral action is necessary to combat 
terrorism in Spain, but additionally because it reflects the view that this is the model for 
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the democratic world to combat terrorism and, furthermore, the Spanish editorials after 
the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., the 11/M attacks in Madrid, and the 
7/7 attacks in London, are steadfast in their belief that multilateral action is the only way 
to combat international terrorism. For example, even though the following statement was 
written with regard to former U.S. President Clinton‘s actions in Sudan, it demonstrates 
the Spanish view, or at least that depicted in the editorials, of the importance of 
multilateral collaboration, ―to rush is not good advice in the fight against terrorism. 
Unilateral actions, omitting international rules also is not the way‖.
217
 The editorials, 
moreover, reflect the belief that the necessity of multilateral action or collaboration 
should be quite obvious. For example, regarding how Britain and France alerted Spain to 
sleeper cells operating in Spain, an editorial asserted that this ―demonstrates once more, 
as if it were necessary, the importance of the collaboration or even of joint police action 
between countries that face a terrorist threat that does not have borders and that can be 
felt anywhere‖.
218
 
 In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks Spanish editorials promptly noted that attacks 
of this magnitude were not just an attack against the United States for its past misdeeds or 
mistakes even though it was ―the biggest attack ever suffered by the United States on 
their own territory‖, but that ―above all it is an integral aggression against its political 
system, against democracy, and the free market. In short, against everyone with whom 
we share the same democratic principles that were so costly to obtain in our country.‖
219
 
Moreover, the editorials quickly noted ―Spain is one of the United States‘ allies in the 
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Atlantic system of defense [NATO] and should act as such.‖
220
 The editorials, 
furthermore, affirmed that although ―this indiscriminate terrorism, fruit of the most 
evident fanaticism, is the new central threat that to which democracies should face‖, that 
they must do so ―with methods specific to their values.‖
221
 The Spanish editorials 
additionally expressed the duty of allies to help one another in the counterterrorism fight, 
in that the international character of terrorism ―favors the concerted action of all 
nations‖.
222
 Lastly, editorials showed how the nature of the terrorist threat can serve as a 
mechanism for politicians to overcome their differences and work together. One such 
example is the following editorial published three weeks after the 7/7 attacks in London: 
―the generalized threat of Islamic terrorism has made Blair and Zapatero put away their 
differences. Pragmatism unites a lot, above all in times of crisis. [Even] more [so] when it 
represents parties of the same family [i.e. political parties in democratic states]‖.
223
 
What is, however, perhaps even more significant is that the Spanish editorials do 
not shy away from addressing other democratic states‘ counterterrorism policies when 
they believe they are dangerously close to falling, or have fallen, outside of the 
democratic framework in an attempt to hold them accountable for their questionably 
democratic methods. This is especially true regarding the United States in the aftermath 
of the 9/11 attacks and regarding Britain after the 7/7 attacks in London. The most 
worrisome aspect concerning both Britain and the U.S. is the possibility of indefinite 
detention of suspected or known terrorists which is made blatantly apparent from the 
manner in which the Spanish editorials address Guantanamo Bay. Perhaps of greater 
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importance to the editorial writers, is their certainty that Guantanamo Bay serves only as 
a threat to democratic societies, especially through the way in which it serves as a means 
of fomenting hatred. For example, one editorial claimed, ―Guantanamo has converted 
into a lighthouse of shame … Guantanamo is not an isolated case. Its existence feeds the 
hatred that feeds violent fanatics as a horrendous showcase of the excesses of the so-
called ‗war against terrorism‘‖.
224
 Or, how it is moreover claimed, ―legal arguments 
aside, we are before an immoral act by a superpower that extends the extraterritoriality of 
its laws in an almost universal form to protect their own citizens and soldiers. … Acting 
in this way takes away all credibility of the alleged policy of promoting democracy and 
human rights in the entire globe‖.
225
 Of no less significance, the Spanish editorials even 
assert their responsibility in holding their democratic allies accountable. For example, 
one editorial declared, ―it would be lamentable if in defense of the ‗strategic partner and 
ally‘ [the United States], the Spanish Government did not insist in bringing light to on the 
shameful CIA flights for the capture and illegal delivery of prisoners.‖
226
  
To summarize this section, while the Spanish editorials reflect a concern for the 
sanctity of not only their democratic system but also that of their democratic allies, the 
editorials also clearly reflect a belief that the democratic system is strong enough to 
withstand and win the war against terrorism as long as it is fought with means true to the 
system, which is reflected in excerpts such as the following: ―the danger is that a party or 
a ruler is considered in a situation that some sociologists call post-democratic, in which 
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they feel authorized to do whatever they please once they have obtained power the polls. 
Fortunately, there are still counterweights in democracies.‖
227
  
  
United Kingdom  
Many of the same issues discussed in the previous sections regarding public 
opinion and statements by heads of government and opposition are also present in the 
research on British editorials. In the case of the United Kingdom, these include the 
following: democratic constraints, concessions to terrorist organizations, the possible 
reinstatement of the death penalty, the need for collaboration in the fight against 
terrorism, and that the fight against terrorism will not be easily or quickly won. As will be 
demonstrated, the most striking aspect of the research is that the editorials continuously 
express the belief that a steady hand in counterterrorism policy is what is viewed as being 
imperative to winning this battle and not necessarily the protection of democratic 
principles which is markedly different from the Spanish case. Of special relevance is the 
opinion expressed in the editorials that terrorists are not worthy of any special privileges 
or rights conferred upon political prisoners by international law. Some editorials refer to 
political leaders or public figures, namely religious authority figures, who often reflect 
the belief that terrorists should indeed be granted special political status because they are 
treated differently than other criminals. For example:  
The demand is for political status, a recognition reflected in the nature of 
the regime to which they are subjected, that they are not as common 
criminals are. Some concession in that direction would not only be likely 
to be reciprocated by the better behaviour of the prisoners says Dr O 
Fiaich: it is in fact their due. They are [in original] in a different category 
from common prisoners. They have been convicted by courts which have 
no juries, usually on the basis of a type of evidence which has been shown 
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to be unsafe by the Amnesty [International] report on police interrogation 
in Northern Ireland.
228
 
 
Excerpts, however, such as ―the terrorist chooses violence as the instrument of first 
resort. Yet for some reason we have come to distinguish terrorism from violent crime 
when we should not make such a distinction. The act is the same. It is criminal violence 
against people who are not at war‖ are illustrative of the opinion that terrorists are 
unworthy of any special treatment due to the political aspects of their fight.
229
   
The editorial research reveals that editorial writers had few qualms about even the 
more extreme measures Britain implemented to combat terrorism which included: 
internment, prolonged detention, and the potential reinstatement of the death penalty. 
Furthermore, the editorials also discuss certain violations of civil liberties as being 
imperative to counterterrorism efforts and, as such, imply that some violations are to be 
viewed as unimportant, or at least not as important as others, as they contribute to a 
greater good. For example, in discussing the possible introduction of a national identity 
card to help monitor border crossing between Britain and Ireland, one editorial claimed, 
―many of us do already carry several different forms of identification for financial or 
security purposes. It cannot be said that adding a national identity card would greatly 
reduce our freedoms‖.
230
 While perhaps there is some truth to that statement as 
theoretically a national identity card would not reduce freedoms, it becomes a 
questionable measure when it is to be implemented to monitor the movement of peoples.  
The editorials do, however, express concern over some counterterrorism measures 
and suggest that if they were not justifiably used, then criminal charges should be brought 
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against those who implemented them. The following excerpt is quoted at length because 
it offers a good example of the view expressed in the editorials: 
The Times believes that internment was justified when first used and that it 
continues to be an essential part of the struggle against the IRA. But it 
believes also that if such [a] drastic measure is to be used, and in particular 
if it is to be maintained, it should be free from criticism on the grounds of 
inadequacy of safeguards or the ill-treatment of detainees by those 
responsible for custody. It is of the utmost importance that detainees and 
internees be treated according to the law, strict as that law may be. The 
Special Powers Act (Northern Ireland), which has been referred to as the 
most powerful anti-terrorist legislative measure in the Western world, 
contains disturbingly few safeguards … If, as appears to be the case, there 
was no legal justification for the methods of interrogation used, it could 
render some interrogators liable to a criminal charge of assault, for there is 
little doubt that some, possibly all, [of] the actions found to constitute 
physical ill-treatment would prima facie amount to that offence. … But 
the importance of the interrogation issue is not so much whether or not it 
will lead to consequences in the courts, but that as grave a matter as the 
treatment of detainees must be government by law, and by specific 
statutory authority for what is done. In our view it is absolutely necessary 
to combat terrorism in Northern Ireland by imprisonment without trial. We 
do not believe that this harsh but necessary policy can be maintained 
without public support, unless the legal and administrative safeguards 
provided are rigorously adhered to.
231
  
 
As the excerpt illustrates, the editorials do express concern for staying within the 
constraints of the democratic system, as they argue that the more extreme measures need 
to be justified through laws or other legislative measures. It is interesting to note, 
however, that when proper legislative measures were found to be lacking, some editorials 
advocated for tougher counterterrorism measures and even proposed the means for the 
new measures. For example one editorial claimed, ―an intensification of the military 
effort is now the only way of achieving the necessary success‖, and further proposed a 
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―new Government of Ireland Act‖, which included a number of suggestions as to how 
their institutions should be modified and powers redistributed.
232
 
A further example as to how the editorials demonstrate both their belief that 
extreme measures are imperative to winning the battle against terrorism and how this 
battle must be fought within the democratic framework regards how legislation created to 
be permissible in times of emergency, should be used only during those emergency times, 
regardless of how effective the legislation may have been. The following excerpt 
demonstrates this belief:  
The Home Secretary is on record as saying that the law on the prevention 
of terrorism … has resulted in a diminution of terrorist activities in 
England. The police believe it too. … Exactly what contribution the law 
has made is unquantifiable and for that reason there have been calls for the 
law to be abolished, on the grounds that any Act which so interferes with 
normal civil liberties should only be permitted if there is proof positive 
that it is achieving the object for which it was designed. It is also 
understandable that during a period of relative quiet, an Act which was 
originally passed in an atmosphere of considerable tension, in 
circumstances approaching an emergency, should be regarded with some 
suspicion. … It is difficult to see how the Act can be applied without there 
being an attendant derogation from the rights to which persons held under 
the normal criminal law are entitled. … For the time being, at least, 
continued trust must be placed in the opinion of the authorities who say 
that the Act is having some effect in combating terrorism. There is no 
evidence the other way, nor is it being suggested too strongly that the 
police are abusing the powers given to them. Nevertheless the operation of 
the Act must be carefully monitored, and scrutinized and debated by 
Parliament at regular intervals. It must not become a permanent part of our 
statute book through default or be nodded through year by year through 
apathy. … Care must be taken that the Act does not outlive the emergency 
for which it is intended, or stand to be used, without express parliamentary 
procedure, against a threat of a different kind.
 233
 
 
This editorial, moreover, offers the example of the old Alien Act as proof that legislation 
intended to be used only for emergencies can outlive its usefulness or value and, 
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furthermore, as a sort of warning that if it has happened in the past, it could happen again, 
and to warn of the possible ramifications that could follow when emergency legislation is 
kept active longer than necessary.   
An additional aspect of the research present throughout the entirety of the 
research period is that of concessions to terrorists, which are described in the editorials as 
something to be avoided. In other words, the editorial research demonstrates that editorial 
writers hold the belief that granting concessions to terrorists is not an option that should 
be explored by the British Government, and fully support their official position not to 
negotiate with, or offer concessions, to terrorists. Simply put, ―there are no concessions to 
be given to violence‖, and ―negotiations under duress simply will not take place‖, 
especially not when they have been demonstrated not to work.
234
 Therefore, to answer the 
question ―whether to resort to concession or coercion‖ the editorials support the latter 
option.
235
  
The most coercive policy adopted by the British Government to combat terrorism 
is arguably that of internment without trial. The editorials reflect a belief that internment 
may not be the best, or most democratic, strategy but that it is necessary under the 
circumstances. The following excerpt offers an example:  
Internment without trial, or detention as it is now officially called, is 
running sore in the province. … It is of great propaganda value to Irish 
nationalists and Britain‘s enemies, and since it is an undoubted derogation 
from standard conventions on human rights it is an embarrassment to 
Britain among her friends. Also, the internment question stands, or is 
repeatedly said to stand, in the way of political reconciliation in the 
province. There is a lot to be said for getting rid of it. But not as things 
now are.
236
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On the other hand, however, editorials also exhibit concern for how these coercive 
measures are implemented. For example, as the following excerpt demonstrates, even 
though certain policies adopted by Britain to combat the threat of IRA terrorism were 
deemed lawful, the editorials still plea for prudence in their application.  
The treatment of these prisoners is fully justified in law and custom. It is 
justified also in the new case law of international human rights. The 
European Commission of Human Rights found that the convention which 
it interprets gives the prisoners no right to special status or to the main 
concessions they are claiming in respect of clothing, work, free 
association, visits and lost remission[s]. The commission enjoined the 
British authorities to be more flexible in the face of persistent breaches of 
prison discipline. They have responded to that injunction. It is not enough 
that a government has justification for its policies; it must choose them 
prudently; and the test of prudence is found in their consequences.
237
 
 
In sum, although the editorials stress the importance of prudence in applying 
coercive counterterrorism measures, they still overwhelmingly support the British 
Government‘s policy of not granting concessions to terrorists, especially when it is found 
to be justifiable or lawful. Furthermore, and as discussed below, the editorial plea for 
prudence is also evident in the debate surrounding the potential reinstatement of the death 
penalty. 
One of the more controversial topics regarding Britain‘s counterterrorism policies 
is the debate that surrounded the potential reinstatement of the death penalty. As 
discussed below, the editorial remarks regarding the death penalty are multifaceted in that 
they debate how the reinstatement of the death penalty would be within Britain‘s legal 
and moral ability, the extremely high level of public support for the reinstatement, and, 
lastly, how the reinstatement would not be beneficial for a number a reasons.  
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As the following statement illustrates, the main reason why the editorials reflect a 
belief that the reinstatement of the death penalty is within Britain‘s legal and moral 
ability is that the editorials argue that combating terrorism is similar to fighting soldiers 
on the battlefield. For example, one editorial states, ―we believe, therefore, that the 
morality of capital punishment in terrorist cases is at one with the morality of killing 
enemy soldiers in the conduct of justifiable and defensive war‖.
238
 While, however, the 
editorials state the reinstatement would be permissible, they also explicitly express the 
strong conviction that the death penalty should only apply to those convicted of terrorist 
offenses and not to other (i.e. common) criminals. To illustrate, one editorial claimed:  
We do not believe that there is any case for reintroducing the death 
penalty for ordinary murders.  … Here we have a situation which is 
deliberately made into one of war against innocent civilians. At present the 
war is carried on by the IRA with security against any worse penalty than 
imprisonment, except for those who blow themselves up with their own 
bombs.
239
 
 
It is important to recall that public opinion also strongly approved of the reinstatement of 
the death penalty in Britain, which is also addressed in the editorials. For example, 
editorials noted, ―there will also be widespread public demand for the reintroduction of 
the death penalty‖
 
,
240
 and also discussed public opinion poll results such as one which 
reflected an overwhelming majority [93%] of men and women in favor of ―the execution 
of terrorists convicted of murder‖. 
241
 In short, while the editorials expressed the belief 
that ―capital punishment for terrorist offences is both morally permissible, and feasible‖, 
they also thought that ―it would be strategically damaging‖.
242
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There are two main reasons why the reinstatement of the death penalty for 
persons convicted of terrorist offenses would be ―strategically damaging‖, or, in other 
words, a disadvantage to the overall counterterrorism battle. Firstly, as demonstrated by 
the following excerpt, it is argued that the reinstatement of the death penalty would not 
deter dedicated terrorists from carrying out further attacks and that it may, instead, even 
contribute to their commitment to their cause. 
The availability of the death sentence on conviction of murder would add 
to that risk [i.e. add to the terrorists‘ existing risk of being killed in the 
‗course of their operations‘] but not so decisively as to drive away many 
of those who had already accepted the risk. Some might drop out, some 
potential recruits might fade away, but for the secret armies quality 
matters more than numbers, and the average quality, if fanaticism is a 
measure, would not fall. If the understanding of deterrence is widened to 
include the defeat of terrorism among its objects, then the argument 
against executing convicted Irish republican terrorists gathers pace. It is 
not possible to conceive of circumstances in which the execution of death 
sentences imposed by British courts under normal safeguards provided by 
law would weaken the will or capacity of Irish republican organization 
committed to subversive violence. It is only too easy to imagine how 
judicial executions would harden their will and enhance their capacity to 
rebel. Modern Irish-British history tells the tale.
 243
 
 
While touched upon in the last excerpt, the second reason why the reinstatement 
of the death penalty would be a disadvantage to Britain is that it could serve as a means 
of recruitment or support for the terrorists. The following excerpt discusses exactly how 
that could happen: 
It is clear that capital punishment for terrorists would lead to further 
terrorist outrages of one sort or another … obviously if it cannot be shown 
that capital punishment will help in the main campaign these 
consequential casualties are merely a waste of lives. … One only has to 
ask whether executions would or would not tend to isolate the IRA still 
further from their Irish Catholic communities to see that they could not do 
good. Therefore, it would be contrary to the major strategy of defeating 
the IRA to reintroduce capital punishment. That must be the conclusion. 
Capital punishment for terrorist offences is both morally permissible, and 
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feasible, though it would cause causalities on our side, but it would be 
strategically damaging. It would give the IRA an advantage which it is not 
in our interests to give them. They would lose a comparatively small 
number of active men who, having been caught, would in any case be 
subject to long-term imprisonment but they would gain support that they 
could not otherwise gain. That is why most senior policemen and most 
senior Army officers and civil officials in Northern Ireland, and most 
senior policemen and the judges in England do not want capital 
punishment for these terrorists. Those who command the fight against the 
IRA believe that it would make the fight more difficult for them. … The 
ability to catch them is more important than the punishment which is 
inflicted on them after they have been convicted. It would certainly be 
wrong to punish those we catch in such a way as to win support for their 
movement.
244
 
 
In sum, while the editorials affirm that the British government would have had the 
ability to reinstate the death penalty, they stand firm in their belief that the disadvantages 
far outweigh the advantages, and hence, regardless of the feasibility of the reinstatement 
and the overwhelming public support in its favor, that it should not be considered because 
to enact such measures would only be detrimental to Britain‘s counterterrorism fight.  
Turning now to an imperative facet of the counterterrorism fight, the British 
editorials also stress the importance of collaboration in combating terrorism. One, if not 
the main, reason why transnational cooperation is absolutely necessary to combat 
terrorism is the transnational nature of terrorism itself. One example of how this necessity 
was exhibited was in a discussion of the existing ―high level of cooperation between the 
member-states of the [European] Community on the subject [of combating terrorism]‖ in 
the statement that ―the relative ease with which political criminals can cross frontiers and 
the contacts which terrorist groups have with each other make it imperative that terrorism 
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be treated not as [a] national but as a European and international issue, and that the fight 
against it should be coordinated in every effective way‖.
245
 
A notable aspect of cooperation examined in the editorials is that coordination in 
counterterrorism efforts, especially between Britain and Ireland, is perhaps best done 
covertly which is demonstrated by the following statement: ―The two governments 
should consult and if possible concert their plans, though it is better for the health of Dr 
FitzGerald that they not be seen to do so. It was over-evident cooperation with the British 
in a matter of security that was part of Mr Jack Lynch‘s [former Taoiseach] undoing‖.
246
 
This holds true even given the fact that editorials claim, ―the effectiveness of any 
counter-terrorist policy in its security aspect depends crucially on Anglo-Irish 
cooperation, which in turn depends on how Britain deals with the unsettled minority in 
the North‖.
247
  The last, and perhaps most important, aspect of cooperation addressed in 
the British editorials is that they describe terrorism as being a threat to the democratic 
system and democracies throughout the world, and as such, state their belief on the 
importance of cooperation to combat this threat against democracy in statements such as, 
―[it] is hard to see how democratic states can justify any cant which inhibits cooperation 
against so-called ‗transnational terrorism‘‖.
248
  
One of the last aspects of the editorial response to Britain‘s counterterrorism 
policies is that they caution that the counterterrorism battle will not be easily or quickly 
won, and as such, called for patience and unity in vigilance ―if terrorism of this kind [in 
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reference to IRA terrorism] is to be contained and in due time defeated‖.
249
 This aspect of 
the fight against terrorism is also present even when discussing the successes of 
counterterrorism measures.  
Even though the security forces have generally been successful in recent 
years in containing IRA terrorism on the mainland, it is no surprise that 
the organization retains the ability to make occasional attacks. They prove 
that vigilance is still necessary – though even then skilled terrorists will 
always find opportunities unless the whole country is to be turned into an 
armed camp.
250
 
 
It is worth noting that even though the previous excerpt stresses the need for ongoing 
vigilance, it also highlights the fact that ―skilled terrorists‖ will always have the ability to 
attack unless drastic measures are adopted by Britain, which illustrates the fact that 
Britons will have to decide between liberty and security if they ever want to completely 
eradicate the terrorist threat. This is remarkable especially due to the fact that even after 
the 7/7 attacks in London, ―almost three-quarters of the public [73%] believe[d] that it is 
right to give up civil liberties to improve our security against terrorist attacks‖.
251
 This 
demonstrates that much of the British public agreed or believed that perhaps the best way 
to ensure liberty is through greater security measures.  
The last aspect of counterterrorism addressed by the British editorials to be 
discussed here is that they call for the importance of not veering off track in the 
counterterrorism battle. In other words, they reflect the necessity of continuing to combat 
terrorism on all levels and from all terrorist organizations and not to lose the headway 
gained against one group due to an over-emphasis on another. For example, with regard 
to Catholic and Protestant terrorism, one editorial stated, ―it should be possible to 
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condemn one without in any way minimising the other‖.
252
 Moreover, in the aftermath of 
the 7/7 attacks, the editorials reflected great concern for the stress placed on countering 
radical Islamic terrorism in exchange for continuing to combat IRA terrorism. One 
example making this evident is one in which how funds for the British intelligence 
agency, or MI5, are distributed is discussed, and it is mentioned that ―since the [7/7] 
bombings, MI5 has been trying to divert as much of its resources towards countering the 
threat from radical Islamic terrorism‖, and is called upon to redirect some of their efforts 
back to combating the IRA.
253
 
In sum, as it has been made evident, the editorials reflect an agreement with 
Britain‘s tough, seemingly legitimate, however questionable, counterterrorism measures. 
Although the editorials suggest that a hard-line approach to terrorism is necessary, they 
do, however, largely support these measures because they have been deemed lawful. 
Moreover, the editorials also express the need for caution or prudence in the application 
of counterterrorism measures so that they do not backfire and end up causing more 
detriment than benefit. This reflects, to some extent, that the editorials are fairly balanced 
when discussing counterterrorism measures and the threat terrorism poses, at least when 
the measures fall under, or are covered by, existing laws or when new legislation can be 
created to make them lawful. 
To conclude this section, a review of how the data on editorials fit into the moral 
panics model needs to be examined. While it is true that the editorials do acknowledge 
the substantial threat of terrorism, meeting the criterion of a heightened level of concern, 
they also overwhelmingly emphasize the importance of staying within the framework of 
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the Spanish democratic system to combat this threat which does not reflect an increased 
level of hostility, disproportionality, or volatility. In other words, the data from the 
Spanish editorials largely does not appear to fit the moral panics model. The case of the 
United Kingdom reflects the opposite. While it is true that some of the U.K. editorial data 
reflect the need for prudence in the counterterrorism battle, the data express a larger 
amount of support for controversial measures, including those that could potentially 
violate civil liberties, if they are included in the British counterterrorism legislation. This 
reflects an increased level of hostility, a heightened level of concern, volatility, 
widespread agreement that the threat is real, and disproportionality, or, in other words, all 
of the indicators of a moral panic.  
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Chapter 5: Security Forces Data 
 
This section reviews the role of ―agents of social control or law enforcement‖ in 
creating a moral panic. According to Rothe and Muzzatti:  
As those responsible for the enforcement of norms, codes of conduct, and 
law, rule enforcers are a vital part of the moral panic. These 
groups/organizations, particularly the police, prosecutors, and the judiciary 
are expected to detect, apprehend and punish the folk devils. These agents 
present the social situation as one that teeters on the brink of chaos if it 
were not for them, deviance/crime and all that it entails would abound. 
They present themselves as the ‗thin blue line‘, which separates order and 
civilization from mayhem and anarchy. Depending upon the content and 
strength of the discourse, it often includes calls for increased numbers of 
rule enforcers and more extensive authority (i.e., greater power) for 
them.
254
 
 
While in the literature on moral panics, ―law enforcement‖ refers to members of 
non-military security forces (e.g. police forces) and members of the judiciary who create 
laws to support these forces, due to the fact that both Spain and the United Kingdom 
have, at least on occasion, used their military forces as a part of their counterterrorism 
approaches, their military forces are also included in this discussion. This inclusion is 
especially necessary given the fact that the military forces were utilized when the, actual 
or perceived, threat of terrorism was considered exceptionally severe that additional 
force, if only to the extent of joint operations, was deemed necessary.  Moreover, this 
inclusion is warranted given the fact that ―the creation of a moral panic can assist ‗in the 
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development of special squads and task forces‘‖.
255
  Additionally, much like a number of 
other democratic countries, there is no doubt that security forces within Spain and the 
United Kingdom have used extralegal or extreme, however, legal, measures in the fight 
against terrorism.
256
 Scholars of the theory of moral panics offer various suggestions 
concerning the security forces that are useful to help account for the use of extralegal or 
extreme, however, legal counterterrorism measures. For example, Cohen writes, ―the 
police, because of public support for the use of violence against criminals ... can use an 
audience to legitimize illegal forms of violence‖.
257
 Goode and Ben-Yehuda additionally 
write: 
Efforts are made by officers to broaden the scope of law enforcement and 
increase its intensity; punitive and overly zealous actions already taken are 
justified on the basis of the enormity of the threat the society faces ... the 
thinking among agents of social control is that ‗new situations need new 
remedies‘; a natural problem called for a drastic solution and often this 
entailed suspending rights and liberties previously enjoyed.
258
 
 
Spain 
The research on Spanish security forces and their role in counterterrorism reveals 
a number of common themes. These include: support for the security forces, allegations 
of misconduct or of operating outside of the rule of law, and how security forces were 
often targeted by terrorists.  
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Before discussing the data on Spanish security forces, it is advantageous to give a 
brief overview of the organization and structure of the Spanish security forces.
259
 It is 
―only with regard to the competent police authorities [that] Spanish law makes a 
difference between international and national/regional terrorism. The regional police 
authorities are competent for terrorist activities on the regional level, while the struggle 
against terrorism on the national and international level is the task of the national police 
authorities (El Cuerpo Nacional de Policía) or the Guardia Civil‖.
260
 Furthermore, 
―security on a national level in Spain is planned via the Ministry of the Interior and the 
Ministry of Justice‖.
261
 The Municipal police are ―responsible for local maintenance of 
public order [in] towns of over 20,000 population‖.
262
 It is worth mentioning that Organic 
Law 2/1981, ―on Defense of Democracy‖, makes ―the crime of rebellion equivalent to a 
crime of terrorism, given that both cases [have their] aim as the destruction of the 
constitutional order‖.
263
 As a final note, the Guardia Civil can legally act as a military 
force in ―determinated circumstances‖, and is ―administratively part of the Army but ... 
placed in the Ministry of the Interior‘s chain of command‖.
264
   
Before discussing how the Spanish security forces were publically supported it is 
important to note that the security forces encountered numerous problems during the first 
years of Spain‘s transition to democracy. Due to these problems, which largely consisted 
of issues or problems of command and organization, in 1981, ―a single centralized 
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command for the fight against terrorism, known as Mando Unico para la Lucha 
Contraterrorrista [sic] was created‖.
265
 It merits mention that this command was 
originally created in 1977 by former Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez due, in part, to the 
assassination of Carrero Blanco, Franco‘s presumed successor.
266
  
To look first at how Spanish security forces were supported in their 
counterterrorism initiatives, the research demonstrates that they were supported in a 
number of ways including: by discussing and publishing their successful operations, 
especially when they are able to overcome obstacles to achieve these successes, 
establishing a culture of support, and by justifying their actions, legal or otherwise, 
through the demonization of the terrorist attacks and the terrorists themselves. To begin 
the discussion as to how the security forces‘ successes were utilized to garner support, the 
following examples are illustrative: ―The police in many occasions have dismantled 
ETA‖;
267
 ―The disarticulation of the Araba command of ETA – which has been attributed 
to 39 murders in the last years – the detention of practically all of its collaborators and the 
seizure of an abundant arsenal of arms and other materials that serve to carry out and 
camouflage their criminal acts constitutes a priceless and brave police success‖;
268
 
―Nearly 200 terrorists or collaborators have fallen in clashes with security forces or have 
died when the bombs they prepared for others exploded in their own hands or in attacks 
of the terrorist group GAL, that acted in the second half of the 80s‖.
269
 As the examples 
demonstrate, the successes achieved by the Spanish security forces in combating 
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terrorism were a key part in determining their support as they appeared to be making 
strides in combating and eradicating the threat of terrorism. Moreover, highlighting their 
successes in light of the difficulties they encountered also generated support for the 
security forces. For example, ―the Armed Forces have advanced a lot in all these years. 
Probably, keeping in mind the circumstances that the Executive had to face before and in 
the first years of the democracy, few Spanish institutions have advanced so much in so 
little time‖.
270
 
Another way in which support for the Spanish security forces was acquired was 
through the attempt to create a ―culture of defense‖,
271
 in which Spaniards would 
―achieve the love, the affection, the fraternal attention of the Spanish public toward its 
soldiers‖.
272
 Moreover, clear guidelines on how to achieve this ―culture of defense‖ were 
given. For example, General Ascanio recommended that the military could ―achieve this 
… [by having] an attitude above any policy, its identification as a guarantor of 
constitutional order and the profession of honor in each and every one of its actions‖.
273
 
Furthermore, high ranking members of the security forces recognized the fact ―that it is 
very difficult for citizens to accept military costs if they do not know what [purpose] they 
serve‖, and others cautioned that ―if we want to have Armed Forces equal to our 
economic potential, demographic and the weight of Spain in the European Union, we will 
have to dedicate more to the Defense budget‖.
274
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An additional significant aspect of how Spanish security forces were supported 
regards the support for their questionable, even extralegal, actions. For example, some 
contended ―what is qualified as political repression [emphasis in original] is simply 
persecution of the delinquents in the search for terrorists‖, which was supported by 
stating that ―the police have reached a degree of efficiency in the persecution of terrorism 
that had never been reached in previous years‖.
275
 An additional example is that ―the only 
real trap is not understanding that against such an enemy [one who uses ―terrorism as an 
instrument of revolutionary war‖] there is not more than one answer: defeat it as soon as 
possible and by all means‖.
276
 Furthermore, it was even contended, ―the best tribute to 
their [members of the Armed Forces who have lost their lives in the fight against 
terrorism] memory and sacrifice is the compact, decided, and seamless union of all 
Spaniards, without distinction of groups, associations, institutions or parties, to achieve 
the isolation of terrorism and its total elimination‖.
277
 
As previously mentioned, Spanish security forces were often the targets of 
terrorist violence. Moreover, given that the security forces have the duty to protect 
civilians, just the nature of the terrorist attacks against the security forces themselves was 
a means to generate support. This is due to the fact that if the terrorists could attack the 
security personnel that could translate into the belief, not uncommon in terrorist strategy, 
that all were vulnerable to a potential terrorist attack. This appears especially true in the 
case of Spain due to the large number of deaths of Spanish security forces attributable to 
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ETA terrorist attacks. Or as phrased in one article, ―another large group of deaths [due to 
ETA terrorist attacks] are the members of the Guardia Civil and police‖.
278
 It must be 
mentioned that not only were Spanish security forces targeted by ETA, but Basque 
security forces, the Ertzaintza, were as well. Moreover, it was originally believed that 
―the killing of members of law enforcement [would] be more difficult when the Basque 
autonomous police [took] over missions that … the National Police or the Guardia Civil 
[were] assigned‖.
279
 Even though ―various senior police [officers] stationed in the Basque 
Country ha[d] been victims of terrorism‖ before, this belief changed with the first murder 
of a member of the Basque autonomous police force as it was quickly realized that the 
threat of terrorism would not quickly disappear even with the creation of a Basque police 
force.
280
 
One of the reasons why Spanish security forces were the victims of terrorist 
violence is due to the fact that they were, in some respects, an easy mark. For example, 
members of the Spanish security forces were targeted in restaurants ―because they still 
went there to eat in uniform‖ which made them very easy targets to spot.
281
 Moreover, 
the previous quote illustrates how security forces were forced to alter their habits or 
lifestyles in order to lower the possibility that they would become a victim of terrorist 
violence. It should be mentioned, however, that even in light of the fact that ETA was 
successful in carrying out some terrorist attacks against members of the security forces, 
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the security forces did have a number of successes in foiling several terrorist attacks 
planned against them. 
282
 
In sum, there were a variety of ways in which Spanish security forces were 
supported including: through the publication of their accomplishments, in the 
establishment and support of a ―culture of support‖ for the security forces, and due to the 
fact that the security forces themselves were targets of terrorist violence. 
Turning now to how Spanish security forces were not supported in their 
counterterrorism initiatives, a number of significant aspects are present in the research. 
These include: allegations that the Spanish security forces operated outside of the rule of 
law, which included engaging in a dirty war, and holding them accountable for their 
actions. To address the allegations that the Spanish security forces operated outside of the 
rule of law in at least some of their counterterrorism operations, the following two 
subjects are discussed: violations of civil liberties or constitutionally protected rights and 
questionable deaths perpetrated by the security forces.    
Spanish security forces engaged in actions that violated a number of different 
rights protected in the Spanish Constitution or by other Spanish laws. The most extreme 
cases of these violations include: infringing upon the right of the inviolability of the home 
and interfering with protected communications. Looking first at the cases in which 
Spanish security forces violated the right of the inviolability of the home, protected by 
Article 18(2) of the Spanish Constitution, there were multiple cases in which this right 
was infringed upon due to searches carried out under the Antiterrorism Law which 
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―effectively suspends the inviolability of the home‖,
283
 as its Article 16 ―permits security 
bodies and forces to detain alleged terrorists without previous judicial authorization‖.
284
 
The other example of violations of rights is that of interfering with protected 
communications, specifically those between a prisoner and their lawyer. The 
confidentiality of these communications was debated a number of times in the Spanish 
Constitutional Court which ruled, ―article 51.2 of the General Penitentiary Organic Law 
authorizes only the judicial authority to suspend or intervene, in a reasonable and 
proportionate way, the communications of the intern with their lawyer without any 
authorization in any case to the penitentiary Administration to interfere with these 
communications‖.
285
 Furthermore, the same court ruled that not even the communications 
of terrorists, a significant source of contention, could be interfered with ―without 
expressed mandate from the judge ever again‖.
286
 
Turning now to other serious allegations of misconduct committed by the Spanish 
security forces, the questionable deaths the security forces were involved in and their 
dirty war tactics,
 
including the actions of the Antiterrorist Groups of Liberation (GAL) 
are addressed.
 287
  A number of allegations were made against members of the Spanish 
security forces for the use of excessive force, including the wrongful deaths of a number 
of people. Just one example of such is how in 1988, ―a plain-clothed member of the Civil 
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Guard, in a trivial discussion, killed a youth, Miguel Ángel Aguilar, and seriously injured 
another, Felipe Martín‖.
288
 Highlighting the fact that these wrongful deaths were not 
isolated cases is the fact that there is even an association comprised of ―members [who 
all] have in common the death of some family member or friend by the disproportionate 
reaction of some member of the police, Civil Guard or security guard‖.
289
 
The actions of the GAL include some of the better-known cases of misconduct, 
which are even tantamount to actions of state-sponsored terrorism or dirty war actions, 
carried out by some members of the Spanish security forces on Spanish and French 
territory in the 1980s.
290
 The actions of the GAL were reprehensible not only because 
they constituted a dirty war, or because it took nearly a decade for the Spanish 
Government to admit its actions, but also because the actions taken by the GAL only 
supported ETA and its ambitions. To illustrate, an El País editorial claimed, ―the matter 
of the GAL ha[d] not been unearthed because it was never buried. And it was not because 
no one, of power, ever recognized [at least not until 1994] that the GAL were a 
tremendous political error, moreover a criminal botched job‖.
291
 Which, furthermore, led 
to the fact that ―ETA was never closer to triumph than in those years of the GAL … [and] 
the only thing one can claim from the Government is justly that the GAL disappeared, 
while ETA has continued killing‖.
292
  
The members of the GAL, however, were not able to escape impunity. While it 
did take a substantial amount of time, those accused of collaborating with, or taking part 
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in, the GAL were held accountable for their actions, at least for the most part, albeit there 
were some who claimed that they did not receive sufficient punishment. It must be noted 
that not many were safe from prosecution if they had been involved in the GAL 
controversy. Police officers, the former Director General of State Security, Julián 
Sancristóbal, and the Minister of Justice and of the Interior, Juan Alberto Belloch, all 
were ordered detained and had to appear in court and some were even convicted for their 
affiliation to, or involvement with, the GAL.
293
 As aforementioned, there was some 
contention regarding the convictions of those connected to the GAL. For example, Sabin 
Intxaurraga, Minister of Justice of the Basque Government, ―reminded that those 
‗implicated in the GAL have been indicted and condemned for direct participation in 
crimes of the State and should carry out their sentences‘ [and furthermore] … added that 
the treatment that those accused of actions of the GAL ‗should be the same that persons 
implicated in the terrorism of ETA receive‘‖.
294
 On the other hand, however, there were 
those who believed the members of the security forces should receive harsher 
punishments than convicted terrorists.
295
 Importantly, there were also accusations that 
convicted members of the security forces had not served their time in jail. For example, a 
―member of the Civil Guard that fired [his gun and killed a youth] was condemned to five 
years [in jail]‖, but was known to be continuing his military service in Guadalajara 
instead of serving his prison sentence.
296
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The GAL were by no means the only groups to use dirty war tactics against ETA. 
An additional example of a group that utilized dirty war tactics used against ETA is that 
of the Basque-Spanish Battalion (Batallón Vasco – Español or BVE) that operated from 
1975-1981. The BVE ―targeted ETA members and many ordinary Basque citizens as 
well. Its death squads were largely made up of mercenaries, directed by members of the 
security forces‖.
297
 Furthermore, some argue, ―in every sense, the BVE was the prototype 
for the GAL‖.
298
 Additional examples of groups that engaged in dirty war tactics include: 
―special operations groups and antiterrorist units from both the National Police (Grupos 
Especiales de Operaciones), [the Special Operations Groups] and the Guardia Civil (the 
Unidades Antiterroristas Rurales) [the Rural Antiterrorist Units], [that] were deployed in 
the Basque Country‖ in 1980.
299
 
To conclude this section, it is important to recall that it is in fact the case that 
Spanish security forces have, on numerous occasions, operated outside of the rule of law 
or used questionable, albeit legal, measures to combat the terrorist threat. It is, moreover, 
equally important to highlight the fact that these situations occurred either during the 
transition to democracy or in the early years of Spanish democracy, and ―that during the 
immediate post-Franco and the democratic transition periods, security agencies and 
security agents were those of the previous authoritarian regime‖.
300
 With that being said, 
it is possible to state that there is some evidence that the Spanish security forces have, 
perhaps, learned from their past lessons and have made an effort to work within the 
framework of a democratic society. For example, the Spanish Government itself was 
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condemned to paying indemnifications to the victims of a terrorist attack because ―it was 
said in this case the negligence of the State Security Forces‘ actions was the 
responsibility of the Administration‖.
301
 Furthermore, regarding how certain actions were 
kept secret (e.g. the GAL operations) an accord was signed ―that would guarantee that 
possible criminal acts or excesses of injuring people would not go unpunished not even at 
the margin of the acts of the judges‖, however, this ―accord [was] not retroactive and, 
therefore, it [did] not affect the actions of the dirty war [emphasis in original] against 
ETA, such as the GAL and others, … under judicial investigation‖.
302
 One last example 
regards ―flights investigated by the Guardia Civil in Palma de Mallorca, allegedly used 
by the CIA to transfer prisoners related to terrorism of Islamic origin‖ in which it was 
stated, ―these activities are declared illegal in our legal system and therefore the Spanish 
authorities do not accept that they are carried out in its territory‖.
303
 Lastly, one editorial 
claimed, ―the only way to prevent the occurrence of the deterioration of the morale of the 
law enforcement, with its negative repercussions for the democratic institutions, is 
precisely that light is shed over the darkness, that to many seem artificial, that surrounds 
this unpunished criminality‖.
304
 In other words, while the Spanish had long reminded 
security forces to remain within the democratic system, perhaps after confronting their 
own demons, they were able to realize the importance of doing so.  
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United Kingdom  
Before discussing the actions and support for the U.K. security forces, a brief 
overview of how counterterrorism in the U.K. works is given. ―In the United Kingdom, 
the home secretary is responsible for all security and counterterrorism issues. ... 
[Moreover,] even though Scotland and Northern Ireland have independent police forces 
... they are subordinate to the home secretary on terrorism policy‖.
305
 Furthermore,  
[W]ithin the Home Office, responsibility for terrorism police falls under 
the Organized and International Crime Directorate. Within.... [which] is 
the Terrorism Protection Unit (TPU), which is itself split into different 
sections dealing with, inter alia, Irish terrorism, international terrorism, 
contingency planning, and domestic terrorism.... In line with Britain‘s 
consideration of terrorism as a criminal act, responsibility on the ground 
for responding to a terrorist act within the United Kingdom falls to the 
chief constable of the relevant fifty or so police authorities. The police 
may then call in whatever additional resources they deem necessary, be it 
fire department, ambulance, ... local and national government, 
intelligence, ... or military. However, any decision to launch an assault 
against terrorists requires ministerial approval. .... Within the United 
Kingdom, it is the FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office] and its 
Counter Terrorism Policy Department that have the lead role on 
international aspects of terrorism.
306
  
 
Turning now to the data on U.K. security forces, similar to the case of Spain, 
there is no doubt that security forces within the United Kingdom have used extralegal or 
extreme, however, legal, measures in the fight against terrorism. The research on security 
forces identifies a number of different themes which can be broken down into two main 
categories: support for the security forces and their actions and the lack of support for the 
security forces and their actions or inactions.  
Before reviewing how security forces were or were not supported in their fight 
against terrorism, a brief discussion of actions taken and the situation in which these 
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actions were taken is necessary. These include: the legal, political, and security measures 
taken by the security forces or put in place to aid the security forces in the fight against 
terrorism, increasing troop numbers, the security forces‘ relationship with the public and 
media, and lastly, structural or organizational problems with the security forces. 
Throughout the course of the fight against terrorism in Britain a number of different legal 
and political measures have been instated to aid the security forces against terrorist 
threats. A more comprehensive examination of these measures is discussed in the chapter 
on legislative data, but a brief review is discussed here, which includes the use of 
internment and corresponding interrogation tactics, and increasing the number of security 
forces, including the use of special forces.   
The use of internment is perhaps the most well known extreme measure employed 
by the British in the fight against terrorism and while the use of internment can be, and 
often is, considered deplorable in retrospect, at the time of its implementation it was 
viewed to be essential to combating terrorism. Even more appalling are some of the 
measures used against suspected terrorists which included: employing extreme 
interrogation methods such as sensory deprivation to extract confessions or information 
from suspected terrorists which were later ―condemned as torture by the European 
Commission of Human Rights.‖
307
 However, some claim that the ―principles governing 
interrogation‖, which was the responsibility of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), 
were never ―more than guidelines. They have never had and do not have the force of 
law‖, which would, therefore, make the use of them against the law.
308
 Lastly, these 
measures and others were periodically reviewed to ensure that they continued to meet the 
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needs of the security forces or, in other words, as phrased by The Times, ―present 
procedures … [were] examined to see whether they [the powers of the security forces 
provided under the law] could be amended or improved to assist the security forces‖.
309
  
A discussion of troop numbers also provides insight into how security forces were 
employed in the fight against terrorism. The number of troops often varied and was 
increased numerous times to support counterterrorism initiatives. Security forces were 
also called to help rebuild other forces‘ stations when they were attacked by terrorists and 
troops were additionally used to guard ―essential services‖, or critical structures, such as 
waterways or treatment plants, especially those in rural areas, from terrorist attacks.
310
 
Given the previous discussion as to the importance of unemployment as a concern of the 
British, it is noteworthy to mention that the rate of unemployment served as a significant 
factor for bolstering the number of security forces as it made recruitment efforts easier.
311
 
To better understand the situation security forces in Britain at times found 
themselves in, a brief review of their relationship with the media is addressed. Though 
security forces throughout the democratic world would perhaps prefer to have their 
actions hidden from public scrutiny, if only for purposes of gathering and maintaining 
classified intelligence, with the possible exception of ―matters of national security‖ in 
Western democracies, with their freedoms of press and speech, this is extremely difficult, 
if not impossible, to do. Complicating security forces‘ legitimate operations further is the 
fact that the media and the military often do not have each other‘s best interests at heart 
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which can, and often does, lead to deception or manipulation by one or both parties. This 
can be especially detrimental to the security forces when they are trying to win ―the 
hearts and minds‖ of the public and the media turns public support against them. 
Examples of how the media assailed the security forces vary from engaging in 
―psychological warfare‖ in which ―the Army regard[ed] the work of the British press in 
Northern Ireland as actively destructive of the military campaign‖,
312
 to allegations that 
some media outlets paid ―youngsters to throw stones at the security forces and then 
televis[ed] them‖, which would make it appear as if the security forces were disliked or 
even hated.
313
 It should be noted that while the police were targeted by youth, especially 
in the early 1970s when, ―the army was clashing regularly with Catholic youths‖, the 
point here is to highlight the fact that the media fabricated some stories to the detriment 
of the security forces.
314
 It must also be mentioned that the media were also criticized for 
their failure to report attacks against security forces, especially when more ―newsworthy‖ 
stories were available. For example, a bombing, in which six persons were killed and 90 
were injured, at the London department store, Harrods, received international publicity 
while news of a murdered solider and policeman in the Irish Republic, not unlike most 
other murders there, did not.
315
 Lastly, security forces were often present at marches and 
protests in which they used a number of different methods of policing, including flying 
military helicopters over the marches, and while the security forces themselves were 
responsible for their actions, the media did not hesitate to exploit them. 
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In addition to the apparent lack of support often depicted by the media toward the 
security forces, they also encountered a number of organizational or structural problems. 
These problems largely include, inter alia, how troops were mobilized and the number of 
troops available. To illustrate, the ―apparent lack of control by police during … riots was 
caused largely by their being outnumbered‖, and while it would be near impossible to 
have a larger number of security forces than civilians except in an extreme police state, 
the fact that only about one-seventh of the ―force … [could] be mobilized at any one time 
in a trouble spot‖ only exacerbated this problem.
316
  Another problem is the fact that 
security forces were often stretched too thin, or as described by The Times, they had 
―other things to do‖. As noted above, the security forces were at times employed in non-
counterterrorism missions which meant they often did have ―other things to do‖, and as 
such their overall ability to combat terrorism was hindered.
317
 Lastly, in addition to the 
aforementioned problems, security forces also experienced problems such as jailbreaks, 
in which suspected or known terrorists were able to escape from jail due to ―deficiencies 
in the physical security of the prison‖, which meant that their efforts had essentially been 
wasted, not to mention the fact that this meant their resources would have to be divided 
up in order to not only capture terrorists who had not been jailed but also to re-capture 
those who escaped.
318
  
As should now be apparent, security forces, regardless of their actions, did face a 
number of problems that were, or would have been, quite difficult, if not nearly 
impossible, to overcome. This, however, is not meant to condone their actions but rather 
to highlight some of the problems they were faced with in order to help put the following 
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examination of their support, or lack thereof, into perspective. The lack of support for 
security forces is largely due to their misconduct, or allegations of such, the fact that 
many members of the security forces were not charged for their extralegal actions, and 
other general examples of lack of support for the security forces. 
One of the major reasons why security forces were not supported in the fight 
against terrorism was because they were deemed to be transgressing the confines of their 
normal duties and, moreover, there was wide-spread perception, correct or not, that the 
security forces were not being held accountable or liable for their actions. The allegations 
of misconduct were extensive, and it is worth noting that according to some opinion 
polls, over a quarter of those polled ―declared the British Army to be ‗generally cruel and 
brutal‘‖.
319
  Furthermore, it was widely perceived that the British Government 
ignored these allegations of misconduct due to the lack of serious inquiry into the security 
forces' actions. Some of the allegations were, however, investigated by Amnesty 
International which claimed, ―most allegations [of abuse] were against detectives. A few 
allegations were against the Army but hardly any were against uniformed members of the 
RUC‖, and, moreover, they did find some evidence to substantiate the claims.
320
 
In addition to the claims of misconduct, security forces were also condemned for 
what appeared to be apparent, or blatant, amnesty for their actions. Even in the cases in 
which inquests into security forces' actions were held, their legitimacy, and 
proportionality, remained questionable.  For example, an inquest into the death of "a 
loyalists shot by the Royal Ulster Constabulary in 1981", held a decade after the incident, 
"did not remove suspicion that the RUC had without reasonable cause killed a young 
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man", and furthermore, "'the cloud of suspicion, as in the cases of other loyalists killed by 
security forces, will never be cleared unless there are full and frank inquiries into the 
whole ‗shoot-to-kill‘ operations‘‖.
321
 One example of how these inquests were often 
questionable is exemplified through the use of "public interest immunity certificates", 
which permitted "coroners to allow members of the security forces to give written 
statements rather than attend inquests".
322
 While the ―shoot-to-kill‖ operations are 
controversial, it is argued that, ―‗snatch squads‘ were developed to arrest instigators, and 
the army warned that it might have to shoot to kill in order to defend itself from attacks 
[launched by Catholic youths] with firebombs and bricks‖.
323
  
While there are many examples of police brutality or misconduct, the most well 
known example is perhaps that of Bloody Sunday in which 13 civilians lost their lives 
due to an overreaction by the military at a march in 1972. Further exacerbating the 
perception of the security forces is the fact that ―the soldiers who fired or might have 
fired the shots were exculpated‖.
324
  It merits mention that the events of Bloody Sunday 
did not constitute the only time in which security forces were viewed to engage in 
misconduct or appear overbearing in their actions or presence at marches and, in fact, on 
numerous occasions security forces were present at marches to ―deter any active trouble-
maker from trying to exploit the situation‖.
 325
 Furthermore, military helicopters were 
often used to keep an eye on the marches and to ―take pictures of the event which … 
[were] later … scrutinized by intelligence officers‖, which was done in part due to the 
                                                        
321
 Bowcott, Owen, ―Redress sought for army killings‖, The Guardian (London), 22 April 1991 
322
 Ibid. 
323
 Taylor, 217 
324
 Editorial, ―Temporary lull‖, The Times, 21 December 1974 
325
 Chartres, John, ―Ulster demonstrators plan further civil rights marches‖, The Times,  30 
November 1970 
118 
 
fact that in 1984, ―a man died as they [the police and Army] charged through the crowd 
in a vain effort to arrest Mr Martin Galvin of Noraid‖.
326
 It is worth mentioning that 
military helicopters ―were present‖ at the march that it now known as Bloody Sunday.
327
 
The second most well known example of misconduct is perhaps the shooting in Gibraltar 
which ―led to the deaths of three unarmed IRA members, shot by the SAS [Special Air 
Services, a component of the U.K. Special Forces] under MI5 control‖.
328
 The Gibraltar 
killings were considered controversial and the British Government was even accused ―of 
violating the right to life when [the] three unarmed members of the IRA were shot dead 
by the SAS in Gibraltar‖.
329
 
An additional example of how the police engaged in misconduct regards how the 
police fabricated terrorist threats. One example of such is that of the Old Trafford threat. 
In this case, ―400 officers from over four police forces ... raided half a dozen houses, 
flats, and businesses in and around Manchester‖, and due to various Manchester United 
paraphernalia, including past tickets to games, the police unofficially leaked to the press 
that there was a plan to ―launch an audacious bomb attack on Old Trafford stadium on 
match day‖.
330
 While this story was leaked to the media by unofficial police sources, ―the 
Manchester police ... encouraged the story to run by issuing public statements that ... 
could be read as corroborating the story‖.
331
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The last aspect to be discussed here is the perception that perhaps the security 
forces were not committed to achieving an end to the threat of terrorism due to the fact 
that in situations in which the IRA had declared ceasefires, they [the IRA] ―required a 
cessation of aggressive military activity by Crown forces‖.
332
 Additionally, while during 
peace negotiations a United Nation‘s panel concluded that ―significant improvements 
ha[d] been made in police treatment of suspects detained in Northern Ireland‘s 
paramilitary holding centres‖, ―the Committee for the Administration of Justice 
submission observe[d] that ‗even in the wake of the ceasefire … [omission in original] 
complaints have included personal abuse, threats to (suspects) and their families, tactics 
such as deprivation of sleep and slaps and blows to the body‘‖.
333
  
In sum, there are many examples of how the security forces used questionable 
methods and for the most part it appears as if their actions went unpunished. It is, 
however, also true that their actions were condemned, just not by the U.K., but rather also 
by various international organizations, governmental and non-governmental 
organizations, or NGOs, such as Amnesty International, the European Commission on 
Human Rights, and the United Nations.  
Turning now to how the security forces were supported in their actions, it must be 
noted that there were a variety of ways in which they and their ―extralegal‖ or 
questionable actions were supported. Examples of this support include: boosting the 
security forces‘ morale or justifying their actions in the fight against terrorism through 
the use of fear, especially in referencing the fight against terrorism as being equivalent to 
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a battle in war, and the fact that security forces often were specifically targeted by 
terrorists.  
As mentioned above, one of the most common ways in which support for security 
forces and their actions was expressed was through the use of fear, especially by equating 
the fight against terrorism as a battle in war. Before examining this in further detail, it is 
important to note that not all of the support for the security forces and their actions 
arose from the use of scare tactics, warning of the horrors that would await Britain if the 
security forces were not successful in their counterterrorism efforts. For example, quotes 
such as there was ―wilfil [sic] ignorance in Northern Ireland by some people of what was 
being achieved on security‖, and that ―the successes of the RUC and the Army, aided by 
the significantly growing number of people who voluntarily give information to the 
police, provide hope for the future‖,
334
 or ―the Irish security forces have scored some 
significant successes against the Real IRA this year, arresting scores of their members in 
the Republic and foiling several high-profile attacks‖
335
 exemplify the fact that the 
security forces were able to achieve success which correlated well to their support levels, 
without having to resort to fear tactics, albeit they were often used. 
As the following demonstrates, fear tactics were, however, one of the primary 
methods used to rally support for the security forces and their actions. Quotes such as 
―unless the security forces can get on top of the situation, the wider authority of the 
Government in Northern Ireland will suffer serious damage‖,
336
 and ―British authority 
and troops in the north-east of the province of Ulster stand guard against the renewal of 
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civil war in Ireland‖,
337
 are just two examples supportive of the security forces‘ efforts 
and reflective of the belief that the presence of security forces in Northern Ireland was 
imperative to achieving and maintaining peace. Additionally, quotes such as 
―imprisonment without trial has been urged by senior security advisors desperate to halt 
Northern Ireland‘s spiralling sectarian violence‖,
338
 and ―the police had confirmed that 
the Act [The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1976] was as 
important to them as it had ever been‖,
339
 both demonstrate that support was also 
expressed through the justification of the security forces‘ extralegal and legal actions. 
Lastly, excerpts such as ―an intensification of the military effort is now the only way of 
achieving the necessary success against the urban guerrilla campaign‖,
340
 and ―if civil 
disruption continues on a significant scale it could mean that soldiers will have to take 
over running essential services in some areas‖,
341
 both illustrate how some aspects of fear 
were utilized to augment support for the security forces. Moreover, and especially in the 
cases in which security forces did have to ―take over running essential services in some 
areas‖, this technique was successful.  
Unlike the Spanish case, support for the British security forces and their 
actions was also generated by equating the fight against terrorism to a battle in times of 
war. Incidentally, this would be the exact justification the U.K. would use in order to 
derogate from Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights in order to 
prolong the detention of suspected terrorists. For example, Mr. Faulkner, former Prime 
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Minister of Northern Ireland stated, ―we are, quite simply, at war with the terrorists, and 
in a state of war many sacrifices have to be made, and made in a cooperative and 
understanding spirit.‖
342
 It was, moreover, even contended that ―the morality of killing 
terrorists cannot properly be distinguished from the morality of killing enemy soldiers in 
war‖, which added further justification to the security forces‘ use of the more extreme or 
questionable counterterrorism measures.
343
 It is worth mentioning that this comparison of 
the fight against terrorism to a battle in times of war has been rarely, if at all, used after 
the terrorist attacks of July 2005. This is due to the realization that the ―war on terror‖ 
cannot be won ―by military means alone, and because ... [the ―war on terror‖] isn‘t 
against one organized enemy with a clear identity and a coherent set of objectives‖, and, 
furthermore, because this type of language was ―deemed ‗counterproductive‘ by British 
diplomats, [and hence,] was abandoned in order to avoid any suggestion of a ‗clash or 
war of civilizations‘‖.
344
  
As in the case of Spain, an additional method of how British security forces and 
their actions were supported is that of the fact that they were often the targets of terrorist 
violence. As put by The Times, ―the ease and impunity with which the IRA has been able 
to pick off, especially in the border counties, off-duty policemen, reservists and members 
of the Ulster Defence Regiment have engendered understandable anger and [a] sense of 
insecurity".
345
 Given that, and the fact that ―the IRA has concentrated its fire on security 
personnel, particularly off-duty policemen and members of the part-time Ulster Defence 
Regiment, and particularly in the rural border areas of counties Fermanagh and Armagh 
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where it is hard to provide protection‖,
346
 and that overall, "members of the security 
forces bulk large among the IRA‘s victims‖,
347
 it is not difficult to see how the attacks 
against the security forces accounted for at least some of the support for the more drastic 
security measures implemented to combat the terrorist threat.  
The last aspect to be discussed regards how security forces were supported due to 
the fact that the attacks against the security forces were often attacks on civilians as well, 
considering the fact that often many, if not more, civilians were injured or killed in the 
terrorist attacks against security forces. In other words, ―placing the bombs in the area of 
army barracks allow[ed] the IRA to pretend that it [was] attacking military targets, even 
when it [was] predictable that many civilians [would] will also be casualties‖,
348
 which, 
as the following illustrates, often was the case: "as with so many previous atrocities in 
Northern Ireland it was civilians who bore the brunt of the explosion".
349
 It is worth 
highlighting the fact that this is the converse of the Spanish case. In other words, ETA 
rarely targeted civilians, and in the rare that it did target civilians, it was perhaps due to 
the fact that ―the elimination of experienced activists [due to them being arrested or 
killed] may have driven ETA to become more reckless in the use of explosives, and to 
target civilians rather than the security forces‖.
350
 Lastly, it should be mentioned that 
there is evidence that the specific targeting of security forces did lead to increasing troop 
numbers numerous different times as exemplified by the following excerpt: "the 
Government acted ... to counter the wave of Provisional IRA attacks on police stations in 
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Northern Ireland by announcing that an extra battalion of more than 550 men is being 
sent to the province ... to be stationed mainly in the border areas‖.
351
  
To conclude, a review of the data on security forces in the U.K. demonstrates that 
the security forces did operate both within and outside of the rule of law to combat the 
threat of terrorism and that they were vulnerable to both media and public scrutiny, but 
also that they were able to rally support, at least initially, for themselves and their actions 
when needed, especially when the security forces had been victims of terrorist attacks 
themselves.  
In analyzing and comparing the experience of the Spanish and British security 
forces it becomes apparent that both states‘ security forces operated both within and 
outside the rule of law. To put this in the context of the moral panic theory, it is possible 
to say that both countries‘ security forces did exhibit volatility, a heightened level of 
concern, an increased level of hostility, and substantial or widespread agreement or 
consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing group and their 
behavior, and disproportionality in their counterterrorism efforts. While it is true that the 
five indicators of a moral panic are present in both cases, the fact that the British 
experience arguably worsened over time while the Spanish experience improved as it 
successfully transitioned into a consolidated democracy, must be recalled and highlighted 
and, therefore, the case for moral panics is stronger for the British case. 
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Chapter 6: Legislation Data 
 
The purpose of this section is to review the legislation available to both Britain 
and Spain in their respective counterterrorism initiatives. Both countries are members of 
the European Union and also signatories to many international agreements and treaties 
regarding terrorism, which are discussed in addition to their own respective domestic 
legislations.  
  
Spain  
This section discusses Spain‘s legislative framework in regard to its attempt to 
combat the threat of domestic, primarily from ETA, and international terrorism. Before 
discussing the actual legislation applicable to combating terrorism, it must first be noted 
that in January 1977, the Spanish National Court, the Audencia Nacional, ―was created in 
Madrid to deal with serious organised crime and terrorist offences … [which] implied a 
fundamental jurisdictional change, since terrorist crimes would be dealt with, from that 
moment on, by ordinary judges instead of military courts as was previously the case‖.
352
 
Furthermore, Article 117(5) of the Spanish Constitution explicitly states, ―the law will 
regulate the exercise of military jurisdiction strictly within the scope of the military‖.
353
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The first piece of legislation addressing terrorism in the new democratic period 
was Organic Law (O.L.) 56/1978 ―Special Measures toward Crimes of Terrorism 
Committed by Armed Groups‖. This law ―was approved as emergency legislation … 
[and] was expanded by special Decree-Law 3/1979 [―On the Protection of Citizen 
Security‖]‖.
354
 After this legislation went into effect, ―the different antiterrorist laws were 
basically referred to as ‗criminal acts committed by armed groups,‘ without making 
almost any expressed reference to the term terrorism except in sporadic cases‖.
355
 The 
first piece of non-emergency counterterrorism legislation was Organic Law 2/1981, of 4 
May, for the Defense of the Constitution. Under this law,  
The powers of the Guardia Civil to detain and arrest anyone suspected of 
involvement with terrorism, even if peripherally, [were expanded] … 
[which] was made possible by the adoption of the very expansive and 
highly ambiguous definition of terrorism [which was defined] … not only 
as ‗embracing any attack on the integrity of the Spanish nation‘ but also as 
‗any effort to secure independence of any part of its territory, even if non 
violent‘.
356
  
 
It is imperative to note that the passage of this piece of legislation came after the 
failed coup d‘ètat of 23 February 1981, the first true test of the stability of the new 
Spanish democracy. Due in part to the attempted coup d‘état, ―in March 1981, a single 
centralized command for the fight against terrorism, known as Mando Unico para la 
Lucha Contraterrorrista (sic) [Single Command for the Counterterrorism Fight], was 
created for the first time since the democratic transition began‖.
357
 
358
 Due to controversy 
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that surrounded the attempted coup, and the status of members of the Government in the 
ensuing hours after the coup, in which many had believed that the military had overtaken 
the Government, Organic Law 4/1981, ―over states of alarm, exception and sites, defined 
the extraordinary powers that the state could assume in emergency situations‖, was 
passed.
359
 Additionally, Organic Law 1/1984, of 5 January, on the Reform of Organic 
Law 6/1980, of 1 July, for Regulation of the Basic Criteria of National Defense and 
Military Organization was passed to, inter alia, further define the role of the military and 
its duties. The role of the military and its duties was further expanded with Organic Law 
2/1986 on State Security Forces and Bodies. Organic Law 1/1992, of 21 February, on the 
Protection of Public Safety further,  
Authorises the police agents to use specific preventative measures … 
[and] permits the introduction of controls on the streets and in public 
places or establishments for the purpose of discovering and apprehending 
the participants in a crime and of securing the instruments, property or 
evidence connected therewith. … [However,] the police agents are not 
authorised, either in urgent or other exceptional circumstances, to dispense 
with a court-ordered warrant to enter homes in order to combat crimes.
360
 
 
Spain has elected to deal with the threat of terrorism by strengthening or 
toughening its existing criminal law and relating it to specific terrorist offences or 
offences associated with terrorism. Much of the counterterrorism legislation in Spain is 
established in the Spanish Penal Code approved in November 1995 under Title XII 
―Crimes Against Public Order‖, Chapter V on Possession, Trafficking, and Deposit of 
Arms, Ammunition, or Explosives and Terrorist Crimes, Section 2, Articles 571-580 all 
of which explicitly deal with terrorist offences. The offences found in Articles 571-580 
include: offenses for belonging to or working in the service of, or collaboration with 
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armed bands, organizations or groups (Article 571),
361
 possession of arms or explosive 
substances (Article 573), collaborating with armed bands or terrorist groups or 
organizations (Article 574), the financing of terrorism (Article 575),
362
 the 
criminalization of glorifying or justifying terrorism (Article 578), provisions for lower 
criminal penalties for abandoning terrorist activities and collaborating with police to 
prevent a terrorist attack or capture other terrorists (Article 579), and the provision to use 
previous foreign convictions of terrorism to further criminalize recidivist attacks (Article 
580).
363
 Articles 571-580, moreover, state the applicable criminal punishment (i.e. prison 
sentence) for the crimes described in the Articles. The punishments for these crimes can 
be summarized as the following: 
When a criminal act causes the death of a person, the sanctions defined in 
the Penal Code for crimes of terrorism can reach a maximum of 30 years 
in prison. For terrorist activities consisting of arson and destruction, the 
sanctions range from 15 to 20 years in prison. When a person is seriously 
injured, the sanction is also 15 to 20 years. When an injury is minor, the 
actor who belongs to the armed group threatens, coerces or illegally 
detains another person, the sanction ranges from 10 to 15 years in prison. 
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These prison sentences can be even longer when if terrorist actions are 
directed against government officials.
364
  
 
Two additional reforms of the Penal Code merit mentioning. The first is Organic 
Law 7/2000 on Regulating Penal Responsibility of Minors: Special Consideration of 
Educational-Sanction Measures, ―which, in general, provide[s] for special measures in 
cases involving persons younger than 18 years of age who commit terrorist offences. The 
law increases the length of detention for minors convicted of terrorist offences and 
creates a special Juvenile Court within the Audencia Nacional‖.
365
  The second refers to 
the Penal Code modifications of 2001 that were implemented in response to a ―new 
strategy instigated by ETA terrorist offences‖, to ―include criminal actions intended to 
intimidate part of a given population as well as entire social or political collectivities, and 
violent activities aimed at subverting the constitutional order and at seriously altering 
public peace‖.
366
 
As previous sections discuss the controversy surrounding negotiating or hosting 
dialogues with terrorists and the criminalization of Herri Batasuna, the legislation 
regarding these policies merit exploration. Looking firstly at the policy of negotiation, 
although: 
[I]n the Pact of Madrid of 5 November 1987, it was decided not to make 
the policy of counter-terrorism an issue of the political debate in the 
national Parliament [and] on the regional level, parallel agreements were 
concluded with the so-called Pact of Ajuria Enea of 12 January 1988 and 
the Pact of Navarre of 7 October 1988, … [which] clearly state that no 
political objective, however legitimate it may be, justifies the use of 
violence and categorically rule out the possibility of political negotiation 
with terrorists … they still [however] leave a door open for a negotiated 
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end to the violence, on the condition that ETA shows unequivocally that it 
is willing to cease its terrorist activities.
367
  
 
Additionally, the Popular Party (PP) and the Spanish Socialist Workers Party 
(PSOE), the two primary political parties in Spain, came together to reach the Accord in 
Favor of Liberties and Against Terrorism, Acuerdo por las libertades y contra el 
terrorismo, of 8 December 2000, which called upon the other political parties ―to express 
their will to collaborate in the goal of eradicating the scourge of terrorism‖.  
Turning now to the legislation regarding the criminalization of political parties, 
the most important is Organic Law 6/2002, of 27 June, on Political Parties. In which: 
[A]ccording to Article 9, a political party will be declared illegal if it fails 
to respect democratic principles and constitutional values, i.e. if it 
systematically harms fundamental rights and freedoms by promoting, 
justifying or exonerating attacks against the right to life and the integrity 
of the individual, if it foments, facilitates or legitimises violence, or 
complements and supports the actions of ―terrorist organisations‖.
368
 
 
After this law was passed Judge Baltasar Garzón: 
[F]iled an accusation that Batasuna was part of ‗the terrorist complex led 
by ETA‘, financed terrorism and was involved in the group‘s terrorist 
activities. Moreover, on the basis, [of] Article[s] 520 and 129 of the Penal 
Code, he ordered the suspension for three years, extendable to five years, 
of the political and economical activities of Batasuna, on the grounds that 
it formed an important and intrinsic part of the structure of ETA. … [and] 
further ordered that Batasuna‘s finances and possessions are to be claimed 
by the Spanish state …. [and] included a prohibition of any gathering or 
demonstration held either by groups or by individuals on Batasuna on its 
suspension. …. [Furthermore,] on 2 September 2002, Judge Garzón
 
issued 
a Court Order that appeared to widen the scope for the prohibition of ‗any 
gathering or demonstration‘, which was contained in the Order of 26 
August 2002. The judge stated explicitly that the order suspending 
Batasuna‘s activities included those that were either directly or indirectly 
driven or inspired by Batasuna or its members or leaders. Any symbols, 
logos, posters, placards, announcements, etc., referring to Batasuna, were 
also prohibited. 
369
 
                                                        
367
 Soria, 529-30 
368
 Soria, 545 
369
 Soria, 547-48 
131 
 
 
After the passage of Organic Law 6/2002 and Judge Garzón‘s accusation and Court 
Order, the Basque Government attempted to take the Spanish Government to the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) for violating Articles 6, 7, and 11
370
 of the 
European Covenant of Human Rights (ECHR), but in ―February 2004, the European 
Court of Human Rights unanimously agreed to reject the Basque Government‘s claim in 
relation to the banning of ETA‘s political wing‖.
371
 
Spain has additionally enacted a number of different legislative initiatives 
regarding compensation to victims of terrorist violence. The primary laws include: Law 
                                                        
370
 Article 6 ECHR: 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by 
an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgement shall be pronounced 
publicly by the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of 
morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles 
or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or the extent strictly necessary in the 
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of 
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committed, was criminal according the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. 
Article 11 ECHR: 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of 
his interests. 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. this article shall not prevent the 
imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, 
of the police or of the administration of the State. 
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12/1996, of 19 December, on Help to the Victims of Terrorism, Law 13/1996, of 30 
December, on Fiscal, Administrative Measures and of the Social Order, and Law 
32/1999, of 8 October, on Solidarity with the Victims of Terrorism. Compensation 
regulated by these laws is paid by the Spanish state. Law 13/1996 refers to ―both ... 
injuries and to material damage‖, Law 32/1999 ―establishes a scale of minimum 
compensation that could possibly be increased by judicial decision‖, and Law 12/1996 
―set[s] compensation for death in the case of terrorist attacks‖.
372
 
The last aspect of Spain‘s counterterrorism legislation to be addressed here is the 
international or multinational dimension of the legislation. It is worth mentioning the fact 
that, ―Spain, irrespective of the party in charge of the executive, has consistently 
supported multilateral agreements in the fight against transnational or international 
terrorism, both among liberal democratic regimes in the context of Western Europe, as 
well as in the framework of the United Nations‖.
373
 Spain ratified many of the existing 
international agreements against or related to terrorism in the years after its democratic 
transition (e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) ratified in 
1979, the European Convention of the Suppression of Terrorism 1977 which Spain 
ratified in 1980, the European Convention on Extradition of 1957 ratified in Spain in 
1982, etc.). After its transition, Spain not only implemented bilateral counterterrorism 
agreements (e.g. the Castellana Accords of 1984, an accord between France and Spain to 
combat ETA), but also multinational or international agreements such as the ratification 
of all of the U.N. conventions on terrorism (e.g. the U.N. Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984 and the U.N. 
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Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing and for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism of 1999), and the European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1987, and the Europol 
Convention of 1995 in which the ―inclusion of terrorism … was added … at the 
insistence of the Spanish executive‖.
374
  
Spain, moreover, enacted or ratified a number of counterterrorism policies as a 
direct response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in New York and Washington D.C. These 
include: the Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism 2002 and the Council 
of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 2005. Moreover, Spain justified its 
involvement in the United States‘ ―War on Terror‖ due to its obligations under Article 5, 
an attack on one, is an attack against all, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) treaty.
375
 It is important to stress the fact that these policies or legislative 
initiatives were adopted in the context of the European Union, the United Nations, or 
some other multinational organization, and were not initiatives that the Spanish 
Government undertook on a purely domestic level in reaction to the 9/11 attacks.  
 
United Kingdom  
Legislation used to combat terrorism is quite extensive in the U.K. As discussed 
below, the majority of this legislation is derived from measures deemed necessary to end 
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the terrorist violence in Northern Ireland. In more recent years, however, the legislation 
has started to reflect a growing concern for international terrorism.  
For purposes of this thesis, the main counterterrorism legislation dates back to the 
Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Acts of 1939-1973. These Acts were 
initially temporarily enacted, but were successively renewed until 1973 and, moreover, 
served as model for their replacement, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act passed in 1974. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 
of 1974 was passed ―largely in response to the Birmingham bombings‖,
376
 in which the 
IRA bombed two pubs in Birmingham, killing 21 and injuring another 162, and the 
continued IRA ―irredentist campaigns of violence against the British mainland‖.
377
 These 
Acts, which were successively renewed until 1989, ―applied to Northern Ireland terrorism 
as it affected the United Kingdom as a whole‖, and furthermore, they ―allowed, inter alia, 
[for the] proscription of organisations, powers of exclusion from one part of the UK to 
Northern Ireland and vice versa, and extended powers of post-arrest, pre-judicial 
detention‖.
378
 Additionally, in 1973, the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 
was passed to replace the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) of 
1922 that ―had conferred upon the authorities unusually wide powers for maintaining the 
peace‖,
379
 establishing ―special procedures for criminal procedure in Northern Ireland, 
both for the investigation and trial of so-called ‗Scheduled Offences‘, i.e. terrorist 
offences‖.
380
 This act was also ―intended as a temporary piece of legislation which had to 
be extended by Parliament at the end of a two years period, [but] the Act remained in 
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force for twenty-seven years [until 1996]‖.
381
 Furthermore, it must be noted that the 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1973 ―inter alia, also provided for 
internment without trial‖.
382
 The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts 1973-
1996 were replaced with the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 which 
came with a ―sunset‖ clause date of August 2000. The British Government, however, 
―arrived at the conclusion that the time [was] not yet right to remove all of those 
provisions in light of the evolving security situation‖ and, therefore, ―Part VII of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 … provides additional temporary measures for Northern Ireland‖.
383
   
Before returning to the Terrorism Act 2000, the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and 
Conspiracy) Act of 1998 needs to be addressed. This was the first piece of U.K. 
legislation that dealt specifically with international and not just Irish Republican 
terrorism. The Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act of 1998 was introduced 
in the aftermath of the Omagh bombing, one of the most deadly attacks in Northern 
Ireland, and it ―not only further[ed] counterterrorism laws for Northern Ireland but … 
extend[ed] the extraterritorial criminal liability of persons acting in the UK against the 
interests of foreign Governments‖.
384
 A review of existing counterterrorism legislation 
was conducted by Lord Lloyd in the late 1990s in which it was ―concluded that there was 
a continuing need for legislation, in some measure to be available against threats not 
hitherto falling within the counterterrorism legislation‖, and consequently, the Terrorism 
Act 2000 was passed ―with a vastly extended definition of terrorism,
385
 it being decided 
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 The definition of ―terrorism‖ was extended to: 1. (1) In this Act ―terrorism‖ means the use or 
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that there remained the need for special powers with respect to Northern Ireland and for 
the extension of existing powers to cover domestic and international terrorism‖.
386
 Some 
additional powers found in the Terrorism Act 2000 include: 
The power for the Secretary of State to proscribe terrorist organisations
387
  
… [provisions] for criminal sanctions with regard to a number of other 
activities related to terrorism like fund-raising for terrorist purposes, the 
training in the use of firearms for terrorist purposes, … [and, inter alia, it] 
gives the police special powers in order to facilitate the prevention of 
terrorist acts and the investigation of terrorist crime … [such as] powers to 
stop and search vehicles, their occupants, and pedestrians for the 
prevention of terrorism as well as special arrest powers which are 
applicable in cases where there is not enough evidence to charge an 
individual with a particular offense even though there is reasonable 
suspicion of his involvement in terrorism
388
.
389
 
 
Moreover, the Terrorism Act 2000 ―allowed the withdrawal of the final Art. 15 
derogation [of the European Convention on Human Rights]
390
 made by the Government 
                                                                                                                                                                     
to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and (c) the use 
or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. (2) 
Action falls within this subsection if it— (a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) 
involves serious damage to property, (c) endangers a person‘s life, other than that of the person 
committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of 
the public, or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic 
system. (3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of 
firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied. (4) In this 
section— (a) ―action‖ includes action outside the United Kingdom, (b) a reference to any person 
or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated, (c) a reference to the 
public includes a reference to the public of a country other than the United Kingdom, and (d) ―the 
government‖ means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or 
of a country other than the United Kingdom. (5) In this Act a reference to action taken for the 
purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed 
organisation.  
386
 Warbrick, 390 
387
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Terrorism Act 1989 and the Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act 1996 but under the 
Terrorism Act 2000 the proscription became non-specific and applicable to the U.K. in its 
entirety. For more information see Grote, 600. 
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in response to Northern Ireland terrorism‖.
391
 Furthermore, the Terrorism Act 2000 set a 
new precedent because, inter alia, it also covers offenses ―related to terrorism which have 
no equivalents in ordinary criminal law… [which includes] some core activities in 
relation to terrorism like the directing of a terrorist organization or the weapons training 
for terrorist purposes, including recruitment for such training‖.
392
 It is important to note 
that while the Terrorism Act 2000 did create new offences such as inciting terrorism 
abroad, most of the offences in the Act were ―carried over from previous legislation‖.
393
  
A mere two months after the 9/11 attacks, a new counterterrorism bill, the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001, was introduced in Parliament as ―a 
legislative response to the events following 11 September and [UN]SC Resolution 1373‖, 
and after receiving royal assent it entered into force on 14 December 2001.
394
 The 
ATCSA 2001:  
Includes measures to cut off terrorists from their funds by ensuring better 
information sharing between intelligence and security agencies; 
preventing terrorists from abusing immigration and asylum laws; 
tightening security in relation to aviation, at nuclear sites, and at 
laboratories holding stocks of dangerous substances; and enabling prompt 
action to implement measures agreed on by all European Union member 
countries to tackle terrorism and directly related crimes.
395
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law. No derogation 
from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 
4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision. Any High Contracting Party availing 
itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe fully 
informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the 
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the 
provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed. 
391
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The ATCSA 2001 also includes provisions found in Part 11, Retention of 
Communications Data, that ―relate the duty of communications data providers like 
telephone and internet companies to retain certain communications data and to disclose 
these data to secret intelligence and law enforcement agencies‖.
396
 It must be noted that 
similar provisions were present in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (RIPA) Bill 
2000, but that they were enhanced and extended in the ATCSA 2001.  
The most well known measure included in the ATCSA 2001 is perhaps the 
provision for indefinite detention without trial. This provision is found in Part 4, 
Immigration and Asylum, of the ATCSA 2001 which ―empowered the indefinite 
detention under immigration law powers which would otherwise be time-limited, of 
foreign nationals reasonably suspected of involvement in or supporting international 
terrorism whom the Home Secretary reasonably believed to be a threat to national 
security‖.
397
 This provision ―required an art. 15 derogation from art. 5 ECHR
398
 because 
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 Article 5 ECHR: ―Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed 
by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful 
arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to 
secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a 
person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority of 
reasonable suspicion of having committed and offence or when it is reasonably considered 
necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention 
of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for 
the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of 
persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, 
alcoholics or drug addicts, or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his 
effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken 
with a view to deportation or extradition. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in 
a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and the charge against him. 
Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this article 
shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial 
power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release 
may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by 
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detention pending deportation cannot be valid once it becomes clear that deportation is 
precluded for art. 3 ECHR
399
 reasons‖.
400
  It is important to note that since these powers 
of detention ―result from an extension of existing detention powers under the 
Immigration Act 1971, they do not apply to persons which are not subject to immigration 
control under the Act, i.e. British citizens‖.
401
 Furthermore, Britain also derogated from 
Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
402
 for two 
reasons. Firstly, ―to forestall a possible breach of the UK‘s obligations under the 
Covenant‖, and secondly, ―to protect the derogation under the ECHR from challenge … 
[since] Article 15 ECHR derogation measures are only admissible, among other things, if 
they are not inconsistent with the other obligations of the Member State under 
international law‖.
403
 Additionally, there was some precedent for extended detention from 
                                                                                                                                                                     
arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention 
shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 
Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this 
article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.‖ 
399
 Article 3 ECHR: ―No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.‖ 
400
 Supra note 397  
401
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the so-called ‗Soering’ Principle,
404
 a decision reached by the European Court of Human 
Rights in 1989 that held that a non-national could not be extradited if they would face 
torture or death. The legality of detention without trial was challenged in the A (and 
others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department case, also referred to as the 
―Belmarsh case‖. ―In its decision, the House of Lords, in exercise of its powers conferred 
by the Human Rights Act 1998,
405
 quashed the Human Rights (Designated Derogation) 
Order 2001, and made a declaration that s 23 of the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security 
Act 2001 was incompatible with Arts 5 and 14
406
 of the [European] Convention [of 
Human Rights]‖.
407
 This is an important ruling given the fact that this was the first time 
the Court was given the ―power to declare Acts of Parliament incompatible with the 
European Convention [of Human Rights]‖.
408
 It merits mention that those certified as 
terrorists and held in detention have recourse to the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission (SAIC) ―in lieu of the right to apply for habeas corpus‖.
409
 The SAIC ―was 
established in response to the judgment against the United Kingdom in Chalal by the 
Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (SIACA) in order to provide a 
judicial process where the Government raised national security considerations about the 
presentation of evidence in immigration cases‖.
410
 Furthermore:  
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[F]or as long as a suspected international terrorist remains in detention 
there will be an automatic review of the certificate by the SAIC. The first 
review will happen six months after the appeal (if there is one) or after the 
date on which the certificate was issued (if there is no appeal). Subsequent 
reviews will happen every three months beginning with the date on which 
the previous review is finally determined. As with the appeal, the SAIC is 
able to cancel the certificate on review if it is of the opinion that there are 
no longer any reasonable grounds to believe that the detained person is a 
risk to national security or a terrorist.
411
 
 
The last piece of legislation to discuss here is the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
(PTA) 2005. The PTA 2005 provides for two controversial and different types of control 
orders, ―non-derogating‖ and ―derogating‖ from the rights of the ECHR. The reasoning 
and:  
[F]unction of a control order is to impose obligations on individuals 
suspected of being involved in terrorism related activities. The obligations 
are designed to restrict or prevent further involvement by individuals in 
such activities. The intention is that each order is tailored to the particular 
risk posed by the individual concerned. Obligations that may be imposed 
include prohibitions on the possession or use of certain items, restrictions 
on movement to or within certain areas, restrictions on communications or 
associations and requirements of place of abode.
412
 
 
As with the case of the terrorist certifications, these control orders can also be 
appealed.
413
  
While several pieces of international legislation or decisions have been discussed 
above it is important to highlight several more that have not yet been discussed. As 
should be evident, the international dimension of U.K. counterterrorism legislation comes 
in many forms, including: European-wide counterterrorism initiatives, judicial decisions 
and legislation, security alliances, and also United Nations resolutions condemning 
terrorism. It is important to note that the U.K. is ―one of only a few states in the European 
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Union and the world ... [that] has ratified all of the international conventions dealing with 
the prevention and repression of terrorism [and furthermore,] it did not enter into any 
reservation concerning the substance of the obligations established by these treaties‖.
414
 
Some of the additional measures that are important for purposes of this thesis include: the 
European Convention on Extradition of 1957, the European Convention of the 
Suppression of Terrorism of 1977, the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984, the European Committee for 
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment of 1987, 
the U.N. Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing and for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism of 1999, the Council Framework Decision on Combating 
Terrorism of 2002, and the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 
of 2005. 
To conclude, as should be evident, both Spain and the U.K. have a wide range of 
counterterrorism legislation. Not only are both countries signatories to a number of the 
same conventions regarding terrorism, especially those within the European Union, but 
both have also enacted emergency legislation, both have enacted legislation in the 
aftermath of terrorist attacks, and both have vast definitions of terrorism, written as such 
to be as all-encompassing as possible. Due to these facts, it is possible to claim that both 
the British and Spanish counterterrorism policies appear to be reflective of the five 
indicators of a moral panic. There are, however, noticeable differences between the two 
countries‘ counterterrorism legislation. The first is that while both countries enacted 
emergency legislation, Spain used the emergency legislation only during times of 
emergency and not for an extended amount of time, which is the converse of the British 
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case. A second noticeable difference concerns the extent of disproportionate measures. 
While both Spain and the U.K. have used disproportionate measures, the use of these in 
Spain is limited to the first years of the time frame of this case study (i.e. during the years 
of Spain‘s transition to democracy and the early years of its consolidation), and the 
disproportionate measures implemented in the U.K. span most of the research period. A 
third difference is that U.K. counterterrorism legislation provides for very expansive 
counterterrorism measures, including provisions for indefinite detention, which has 
required Britain to derogate from a number of Articles in several different international 
covenants on human rights which Spain has not found necessary. The last noticeable 
difference to be discussed regards how the two countries‘ counterterrorism policies, 
although similar, are carried out differently. For example, both Spain and the U.K. have 
legislation regarding retaining communications data but whereas Spanish police forces 
need to seek judicial approval before they can access the data,
415
 British authorities do 
not, and a similar situation is found between the two countries‘ policies of entering a 
home. It is, therefore, possible to state that the British counterterrorism legislation is more 
indicative of a moral panic than is the Spanish counterterrorism legislation.  
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Conclusion 
 
The previous sections have reviewed the different ―agents of social control‖ that 
can contribute to the creation of a moral panic. This section reviews the conclusions of 
the previous sections and offers an analysis as to what these conclusions signify for 
democratic states‘ counterterrorism policies and the role of the public in the creation of 
these policies.  
To look first at the Spanish case, the data make it evident that the public was quite 
concerned with the threat of terrorism throughout the time frame of the case study given 
that it was typically one of the top concerns for Spanish society, but there was some 
noticeable, albeit limited, volatility regarding the extent of this concern. While this is 
true, it is reasonable to state that there was substantial or widespread agreement or 
consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing of certain group 
members and their behavior. It is also true that the Spanish public did exhibit some 
evidence of disproportionality and hostility regarding measures such as the possible re-
introduction of the death penalty. The data from Spanish action groups reinforce the 
public opinion data given the fact that not only did these organizations influence public 
opinion through, inter alia, the organization of demonstrations or collection of petition 
signatures, but also because, on occasion, the action groups themselves used or supported 
questionably legal, and hostile, perhaps, disproportionate measures such as attempting to 
criminalize all political parties to the extreme right along with their attempt to criminalize 
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Herri Batasuna. Regardless of the fact that there are a variety of different action groups, 
representing many different views, it is possible to state that there existed some volatility, 
and furthermore, that among the different action groups examined in this thesis, that there 
was a heightened level of concern and widespread agreement or consensus that the threat 
posed by terrorism was real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing members of society. 
A review of the Spanish editorial data demonstrates opinion overwhelmingly in 
favor of doing what was necessary to combat the threat of terrorism insofar as the chosen 
methods were compatible with the framework of a liberal democratic system. This 
included supporting controversial counterterrorism measures such as the reinsertion 
program of repentant etarras and condemning the potential reinstatement of the death 
penalty. In other words, while the Spanish editorial data do reflect a heightened level of 
concern for terrorism and substantial or widespread agreement or consensus that the 
threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing group members and their behavior, 
it does not reflect an increased level of hostility, disproportionality, or volatility, and, 
therefore, the editorial data only reflect two of the five indicators of a moral panic.  
The data on Spanish heads of government and opposition offer some evidence of 
a moral panic. While it is true that there were occasions in which Spanish politicians 
attempted to use the threat of terrorism as a method to incite fear or panic, especially with 
regard to the effect terrorism could have on Spanish democracy, it is also true that 
Spanish politicians were very mindful of how their words would be conceived or 
interpreted by the Spanish public, and they, therefore, attempted to avoid creating such a 
panic. Moreover, while some politicians indeed were quick to offer dramatic responses to 
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the threat of terrorism, by and large, Spanish politicians emphasized the importance of 
staying within the democratic system to combat terrorism. Furthermore, Spanish 
politicians largely tried to convince the public as to how measures publically deemed 
inappropriate (e.g. the reinsertion of repentant terrorists), or appropriate in other cases 
(e.g. the re-introduction of the death penalty), would actually be counterproductive in 
their quest to eradicate the threat of terrorism. It is also worthwhile to recall that when 
Spanish politicians pursued arguably disproportionate measures (e.g. the closure of the 
Egin newspaper), they would attempt to reassure the public that these measures were 
indeed necessary and legal. In other words, contrary to statements claiming that the 
politicians did not heed to public opinion, the data demonstrate that the converse was 
actually the case. In short, it can be said that while Spanish heads of government and 
opposition at times did exhibit the indicators of a moral panic, specifically increased 
levels of hostility and the use of disproportionate measures, they were quite cognizant of 
the impact their statements would have in the general public and, hence, largely refrained 
from using this type of language and instead referred to the strength of the Spanish 
democracy to combat terrorism with methods true to a democracy. It is also important to 
recall that the politicians who advocated for harsher punishments for terrorists, the more 
extreme or disproportionate measures, or exhibited more hostility and volatility often had 
been personally affected by terrorist violence.   
The data on Spanish counterterrorism legislation demonstrated that it is indicative 
of several moral panic indicators, specifically a heightened level of concern, substantial 
or widespread agreement or consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the 
wrongdoing group members and their behavior, and, to some extent, hostility. It is 
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necessary to recall that although Spain has signed and ratified most of the international 
agreements condemning terrorism, Spain did not enact any new domestic legislation in 
the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. or the 11/M 
terrorist attacks, with the exception of Organic Law 6/2002 which outlawed political 
parties that do not ―respect democratic principles and constitutional values‖. Moreover, it 
was argued that new legislation was not necessary to combat the new threat of Islamic 
terrorism given the fact that the Islamic terrorists were not attempting to work within the 
democratic system, and furthermore, that the existing legislation was already sufficient to 
combat this new terrorist threat. This is due to the fact that Spain has taken a criminal 
justice approach to counterterrorism, and, therefore, convicts terrorists for their crimes by 
finding their equivalent in existing legislation, albeit, the terrorism related crimes are 
subject to harsher punishments (e.g. longer prison sentences). Lastly, while Spain did 
enact emergency legislation, which could be viewed as a disproportionate measure, it was 
only used during times of emergency, and not for an extended amount of time. In sum, 
the Spanish legislative data do reflect a heightened level of concern, substantial or 
widespread agreement or consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the 
wrongdoing group members and their behavior, hostility, and, to a limited extent, 
disproportionality.  
The last agent of social control to review for the Spanish case is the security 
forces. While it is in fact the case that Spanish security forces have, on numerous 
occasions, operated outside of the rule of law or used questionable, albeit legal, measures 
to combat the terrorist threat, given that these measures were used, or actions taken, 
during the early years of Spain‘s transition to democracy, there is some evidence that 
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they have learned from their past lessons and have made an effort to correct their 
mistakes and work within the framework of a democratic society. For example, the 
Spanish Government itself was ordered to pay indemnifications to the victims of a 
terrorist attack given the fact that ―it was said in this case the negligence of the State 
Security Forces‘ actions was the responsibility of the Administration‖.
416
 Additionally, 
regarding how certain actions were kept secret (e.g. the GAL operations) an accord was 
signed ―that would guarantee that possible criminal acts or excesses of injuring people 
would not go unpunished not even at the margin of the acts of the judges‖.
417
 In the 
context of the moral panics indicators, the security forces did exhibit a heightened level 
of concern, an increased level of hostility, and substantial or widespread agreement or 
consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing group and their 
behavior, disproportionality, and volatility or, in other words, all five of the indicators of 
a moral panic. It is also true, however, that the experience of the Spanish security forces 
changed for the better (i.e. became less reflective of the moral panic indicators) as the 
country successfully transitioned into a democracy.  
Turning now to the British public opinion data, while it appears that the British 
citizenry exhibited a lesser amount of concern for terrorism than their Spanish 
counterparts, which may be due to the fact that most of the acts of terrorism during the 
time frame of this research occurred in Ireland, and not on the mainland; terrorism is still, 
however, a notable concern for the British public, at times even becoming volatile, 
revealing the presence of an increased level of hostility toward terrorists and regarding 
policies such as extended detention or imprisonment and the death penalty. While the 
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IRA enjoyed a higher level of public support than ETA, a significantly larger percentage 
of the British populace disapproved of the IRA and its actions, and therefore, the criterion 
of substantial or widespread agreement or consensus that the threat is real, serious, and 
caused by the wrongdoing group members and their behavior is also met. Lastly, there is 
some evidence of disproportionality present in the British public opinion data on 
terrorism, which is especially true regarding certain aspects of Britain‘s counterterrorism 
legislation and the public support for these counterterrorism initiatives such as extended 
detention. In summary, the U.K. public opinion data demonstrate evidence of all five of 
the moral panic indicators.  
To review the data on British action groups, it is important to recall that the action 
groups have been successful in achieving an improvement in the lives of victims of 
terrorism through economic and other forms of aid, in assisting and maintaining the 
integrity of the democratic system by protesting against legislative or security measures 
that could curtail civil liberties, and by ensuring that those who used these questionable 
or illegal methods of counterterrorism, or those who were responsible for others using 
them, faced the consequences of their actions or inactions. Furthermore, it can be stated 
with certainty that the British action groups were able to influence not only public 
opinion, by, for example, organizing or calling for the cancellation of demonstrations or 
marches, but also policy making, especially with regard to collecting indemnifications for 
the victims of terrorism. To put the data on British action groups into the context of the 
criteria of moral panics, it must be stated that while British actions groups did not exhibit 
much volatility, it is evident that a number of action groups did express a heightened 
level of concern, an increased level of hostility, and, although there was some contention 
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among the different action groups, substantial or widespread agreement or consensus that 
the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing group members and their 
behavior, and disproportionality. In other words, the data on British action groups 
demonstrate evidence of four of the five indicators of a moral panic. 
The data on British heads of government and opposition make it apparent that 
British politicians have used some fairly extreme language to refer to their 
counterterrorism initiatives and the threat that terrorism poses to the democratic state. 
This language, however, was often balanced out with statements referring to the strength 
and integrity of British democracy. One important contrast found in the British case is the 
prevalence of exceptional measures in the aftermath of the July 2005 terrorist attacks in 
London. While exceptional measures were used before the July 2005 terrorist attacks, 
after these attacks, it became more apparent that the British government would do 
anything it deemed necessary to eradicate the terrorist threat, and to prevent more 
terrorist attacks from occurring, regardless of the effect this would have on civil liberties 
or human rights. The example of the ―hierarchy of liberties‖ discussed in the examination 
of British statements of heads of government and opposition offers a compelling 
illustration of the exceptional measures. In the context of moral panics indicators, the 
data reveal that British heads of governments and opposition expressed a heightened level 
of concern, an increased level of hostility, substantial or widespread agreement or 
consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing group members 
and their behavior, disproportionality, and volatility, which is especially true in the 
aftermath of the July 2005 terrorist attacks.  
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A review of the editorial data confirms Britain‘s tough, seemingly legitimate, but 
questionable, counterterrorism measures. Although the editorials suggest that a hard-line 
approach to terrorism is necessary, they do, however, largely support these measures 
because they have been determined to be lawful. Moreover, the editorials also express the 
need for caution or prudence in the application of counterterrorism measures so that they 
do not cause more detriment than benefit. In other words, the editorial data demonstrate 
that the editorials are fairly balanced when discussing counterterrorism measures and the 
threat terrorism poses, at least when the measures fall under, or are covered by, existing 
laws or when new legislation can be drafted and implemented to make them lawful. A 
review of how the data on editorials fit into the moral panics model needs to be 
examined. While it is true that some of the U.K. editorial data reflect the need for 
prudence in the counterterrorism battle, the data also express a high level of support for 
controversial measures, including those that could potentially violate civil liberties, if 
they are included in British legislation regarding counterterrorism. This reflects an 
increased level of hostility, a heightened level of concern, substantial or widespread 
agreement or consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing 
group members and their behavior, disproportionality, and volatility, or, in other words, 
all of the indicators of a moral panic.  
A review of the data on security forces in the U.K. demonstrates that the security 
forces did operate both within and outside of the rule of law to combat the threat of 
terrorism and, moreover, that they were vulnerable to media and public scrutiny, and that 
they were also able to rally support, at least initially, for themselves and their actions 
when they needed to, especially when the security forces had been victims of terrorist 
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attacks themselves. To put this in the context of the moral panic theory, it is reasonable to 
say that the U.K. security forces did exhibit a heightened level of concern, an increased 
level of hostility, substantial or widespread agreement or consensus that the threat is real, 
serious, and caused by the wrongdoing group and their behavior, disproportionality, and 
volatility in their counterterrorism efforts. 
The last aspect of the U.K. case is that of its counterterrorism legislation. The 
U.K. has a wide range of counterterrorism legislation given that it is a signatory to all the 
international conventions regarding the prevention and repression of terrorism, has 
enacted emergency legislation, both in response to the Northern Ireland ―Troubles‖ and 
as a result of a terrorist incident, and, furthermore, uses a broad definition of terrorism, 
written to be as all-encompassing of terrorist activity as possible. The U.K. 
counterterrorism legislation provides for very expansive counterterrorism measures, 
including provisions for indefinite detention, which has required Britain to derogate from 
a number of Articles in several different international covenants on human rights. Due to 
these facts, it is reasonable to state that the British counterterrorism policies exhibit a 
heightened level of concern, an increased level of hostility, substantial or widespread 
agreement or consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing 
group and their behavior, disproportionality, and volatility, or, in other words, all five 
indicators of a moral panic. 
Given the evidence demonstrated by the data assembled and reviewed in this 
thesis, it is possible to state that moral panics were indeed apparent in both the cases of 
Spain and the United Kingdom. However, while the Spanish case reveals a number of 
contributors to a moral panic, as Spain successfully transitioned into a democracy it 
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adopted and had less public support for extreme, disproportionate, and questionably legal 
and democratic counterterrorism responses. Furthermore, the U.K. case is more reflective 
of a moral panic and the dangers that can accompany one, and this is especially true in 
the aftermath of the July 2005 terrorist attacks.  
This thesis puts forth the argument that the role of the public in influencing 
democratic states‘ counterterrorism policies can be explained, at least partially, with the 
theory of moral panics. According to Rothe and Muzzatti:  
[S]ome would argue ultimately the most important actor in a moral panic 
is the public. The success of the media, politicians, rule enforcers and 
moral entrepreneurs in generating and sustaining a moral panic is 
ultimately contingent upon how successfully they enrage the public and 
marshal their support against the folk devils. The vox populi is enlisted as 
a front-line agent in the crusade against the designated evil. Members of 
the public are relied upon to express contempt for the folk devils and 
support for the rule enforcers, to consume the media coverage, and wait 
for the latest pronouncements from politicians and/or action groups on 
how the problem is to be solved.
418
 
 
On the other hand, however, the public is not a unitary actor and, therefore, ―public 
opinion cannot be divorced from the political discourse and media frames that surround 
it. The apparent impact of the public on government policy often arises from a circular 
process in which government officials respond to the polling options, anticipated or 
perceived majorities, and priorities that many of them helped create‖.
419
 The fact that the 
public is not a unitary actor, and instead is part of a circular process, is evidenced by the 
data presented in this comparative case study.  
 While Cohen‘s theory of Moral Panics offered a useful framework to organize 
and examine the role of the public in democratic states‘ counterterrorism policies, 
unfortunately, it does fully explain the divergence found between British and Spanish 
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counterterrorism policies. However, the theory of Moral Panics was beneficial in a 
number of ways due to the fact that it led to some very insightful and surprising 
conclusions. The conclusions gathered from the data presented in this comparative case 
study offer a number of precautions and suggestions for democratic states to take into 
consideration when developing and implementing their counterterrorism policies. These 
include: the dangers of institutionalizing a moral panic, the dangers of overstepping the 
boundaries of a democratic system, the dangers of playing politics with terrorism, and the 
benefits of adopting a law enforcement or criminal justice approach to counterterrorism. 
Although this thesis demonstrates that moral panics were present in the cases, 
there is some room for optimism due to the fact that, ―a panic, by definition, is self-
limiting, temporary and spasmodic, a splutter of rage which burns itself out‖.
420
 However, 
one of the greatest threats of a moral panic is the potential legacy that can accompany it. 
In other words, while a moral panic cannot by definition last indefinitely, the extreme, or 
disproportionate, measures implemented to counter the threat of terrorism can leave a 
lasting impression. According to Goode and Ben-Yehuda:  
[I]n principle, moral panics can have two potential outcomes: they can end 
leaving little or no long-term institutional legacy, disappearing, as with 
fads, without a trace – they may generate or stimulate no new laws, no 
lasting social movements, no government agencies. On the other hand, the 
intensity of the concern that was expressed at the height of moral panics 
can, in principle, become captured, routinized, or institutionalized into 
ongoing, long-lasting organizational structures. In other words, one 
possibility is that moral panics can, in principle, generate social change; 
they can either leave a substantial institutional legacy, or none. And ... 
these institutional structures can be a diverse lot: laws but no social 
movements; social movements but no government agencies; and so on.
421
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Therefore, the possibility that a moral panic episode could lead to institutional or 
organizational changes like, for example, in the case of the U.K., is particularly 
worrisome. Additionally, even if a case of moral panics does not leave an ―organizational 
or institutional legacy, the collective excitement that citizens experience when it lasts 
prepares them for future panic-like experiences. They may reshape the normative, 
attitudinal, and value landscape of a society‖.
422
 Therefore, any evidence of a moral panic 
should not be taken lightly, and should be taken into consideration when creating or 
implementing future counterterrorism measures.   
Another lesson apparent from the British and Spanish cases is how dangerous it is 
to operate outside the democratic framework to counter the terrorist threat given the fact 
that extreme, disproportionate, and unlawful acts actually aid the terrorists whose aim is 
to destroy the democratic state or to, at a minimum, make it appear weak. This is 
especially true during times of crisis or emergency, when it is of the utmost importance 
for the state to remain democratically strong. As Gross writes:  
Fundamental democratic principles – the rule of law, the separation of 
powers, the independence of the judicial authority, and recognition of 
principles of social morality and justice at the core of which lie human 
rights – are not luxuries of peacetime which make the democracy in which 
we live a better one; rather without them the democracy does not exist. A 
democracy that permits itself to deviate from respect for these values – 
even for a limited period of time – is not a bad democracy, but from a 
substantive point of view it is not a democracy at all. Accordingly, the 
manner in which democratic states deal with emergency situations in 
general, and security emergencies in particular, must fall within the 
boundaries of the existing constitutional framework.
423
  
 
While it is true that democratic states have a responsibility to protect their citizens 
and the right to use some extreme measures, the cases of Britain and Spain demonstrate 
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that it would be tremendously erroneous to use extreme measures because they have 
proven futile in countering terrorism, and even worse, because they have proven to aid 
terrorists and their causes. For example, the experiences of the GAL in Spain and 
internment in the U.K. only led to greater sympathy for the Basque and Irish causes. With 
that being said, democratic states would find it immeasurably beneficial to learn from 
history, taking heed of these examples, to prevent a similar, or perhaps an even worse, 
reaction from other terrorist organizations or sympathizers. Even more importantly, when 
the democratic state steps out of the bounds of democracy to counter the threat of 
terrorism, it is only contributing to its own demise and, therefore, if it wishes to preserve 
democracy, then there is no choice but to act prudently in counterterrorism initiatives. 
This is especially true given the fact that: 
Even the most cursory knowledge of terrorism reveals that terrorists have 
never truly threatened a state, or democracy, or freedom, or the way of life 
of an entire people; nor have they ever threatened the peace of the world 
or the existence of any civilisation. ... On the other hand, there are 
numerous examples where the reaction of the authorities to terrorist 
attacks has endangered democracy and freedom by seriously undermining 
civil and political rights, and where the state‘s eagerness to suppress 
dissidents has led to gross miscarriages of justice and human rights abuses 
by the security forces. Such acts have undermined public respect for 
political institutions, damaged the functioning of democracy, and 
demoralised society. In reality, it is not terrorism that threatens the essence 
of our societies – terrorists are tiny groups of isolated individuals able to 
do little more than commit symbolic acts of violence – but rather state-led 
counter-terrorism and the dangers of over-reaction by the authorities.
424
  
 
A further, and related, lesson is that democracies have to learn that they cannot 
play politics with terrorism. In other words, it is ultimately not beneficial, although it may 
seem to be in the short term, to prey on the public, attempting to invoke public support 
for extreme or disproportionate counterterrorism measures by exaggerating, or 
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overreacting to, the terrorist threat. As Kassimeris writes, ―governments and career 
politicians have always been tempted to exploit disasters and use them to realise their 
political objectives. ... ―When it comes to terrorism, a phenomenon that almost always 
stirs fear and insecurity disproportionate to the actual danger, the temptation for 
governments to bend the rules and the truth becomes irresistible‖.
425
 While some argue 
that the leaders of democratic states have a vested interest in exaggerating the threat of 
terrorism due to the fact that: 
[P]oliticians and terrorism bureaucrats also have, as Jeffery Rosen points 
out, an ‗incentive to pass along vague and unconfirmed threats of future 
violence, in order to protect themselves from criticism‘ in the event of 
another attack. ‗Far better‘, notes Peter Beinart, ‗to warn of an attack that 
never comes than to remain silent and appear to be taken by surprise‘.
426
  
 
However true it may be that it is better for individual or groups of politicians to work in 
concert to exaggerate the terrorist threat for their own benefit, the disadvantages to doing 
this are immensely worse for the democratic state.  Similar to using extreme measures, 
which may in themselves be a byproduct of overreaction, ―overreaction undermines the 
moral fabric of a society that is victimized by terrorists and plays into the hands of the 
terrorists and the assumptions central to their calculus of violence‖.
427
 
An additional lesson that can be learned from this comparative case study is that a 
law enforcement approach to counterterrorism is not only more democratically 
legitimate, but also more effective. In one study on how terrorist groups ended, among 
which the different ways in which they ended consisted of a transition to nonviolence, 
effective policing, and, inter alia, military force, Jones and Libicki find, ―where terrorist 
groups cannot or will not make a transition to nonviolence, policing is usually most 
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effective in defeating terrorist groups‖.
428
 This is especially true given the fact that 
military operations are one of the least effective methods of counterterrorism. According 
to Jones and Libicki, ―military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of 
terrorist groups (7 percent)‖.
429
 The only exception is ―when they [terrorist groups] 
became strong enough to conduct insurgencies … [then they] ended because of military 
force 25 percent of the time‖.
430
 Furthermore, Jones and Libicki address religious terrorist 
organizations, which they rightfully recognize as ―different from those otherwise 
classified‖, and highlight, ―the most salient fact about religious terrorist groups is how 
hard they are to eliminate ... only 32 percent of religious terrorist groups have ended. ... 
of those that ended under pressure from authorities, most (13) fell to policing, while only 
three succumbed to military force‖.
431
 This is significant not only for the Spanish and 
U.K. cases discussed in this thesis, but also for the United States and its ―Global War on 
Terror‖, as all three are experiencing an increase in religiously motivated terrorist attacks.  
One of the primary reasons the law enforcement or criminal justice approach to 
counterterrorism is more effective than a military approach is because the police can get 
intelligence better than ―outsiders‖. In other words,  ―police have a permanent presence in 
cities, towns, and villages; a better understanding of local communities than other 
security forces and better intelligence. This enables them to be best suited to understand 
and penetrate terrorist networks‖.
432
 An additional reason why a law enforcement 
approach is more effective in countering terrorism is that it is possible to criminalize 
―activities that are necessary for terrorist groups to function, such as raising money or 
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openly recruiting‖.
433
  Moreover, ―in many cases, it may be easier and more effective to 
arrest and punish terrorists for other offenses, such as drug trafficking, that have little 
direct connection to their terrorist activity‖.
434
 Furthermore, in the cases in which the 
criminal activities can be linked to terrorism, an approach similar to the Spanish case, in 
which criminal activities are given longer prison sentences when related to terrorism, can 
be adopted.  Adopting a law enforcement approach to counterterrorism would not be 
difficult, and would have the added benefit of taking power away from terrorists. To 
elaborate, ―in most cases ... acts of international terrorism are primarily crimes under 
common law; they are sporadic and marginal acts that achieve a disproportionate effect 
through the amount of publicity they receive. In this sense, counterterrorism efforts only 
inflate terrorism‘s impact, reinforcing its power to intimidate and unsettle‖.
435
  Jones and 
Libicki refer to countering this publicity and write, ―winning the media war to label 
terrorists as criminals is especially important and virtually impossible to do in the face of 
a strategy based on military force‖.
436
 Lastly, ―every time we pretend we are fighting for 
our survival we not only confer greater power and importance to terrorists than they 
deserve but we also at the same time act as their main recruiting agent by suggesting that 
they have the slightest potential for success‖.
437
 
The fact that ―in most cases … acts of international terrorism are primarily crimes 
under common law‖ deserves to be highlighted further. One major difference found in 
this comparative case study was between the British and Spanish methods of 
counterterrorism with regard to counterterrorism legislation. While Britain continuously 
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enacted or re-enacted emergency and non-emergency legislation to combat terrorism, 
Spain largely has combated the terrorist threat with its Penal Code. While it is true that 
the Spanish Penal Code provides for longer or tougher sentences for crimes related to 
terrorism, the Spanish method is arguably more effective and true to the democratic 
system of governance given the facts that alleged terrorists can be tried more quickly for 
their crimes and that it is easier to prosecute someone for a given crime than it is to 
prosecute someone for suspected, or known, terrorist affiliation. 
One last policy implication regards the fact that analysts and scholars have largely 
avoided linking the concept of moral panics to terrorism. As this thesis demonstrates with 
the evidence from the British and Spanish cases, this should be re-visited, because not 
only is there a demonstrated connection between moral panics and terrorism, but also 
because it may be that in preventing a moral panic from occurring, or recognizing one in 
its formation, that it would be possible for democratic states remain democratic in their 
counterterrorism initiatives. The following excerpt is quoted at length because it offers an 
excellent depiction of how scholars of moral panics reacted to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 
and the potential problems that could arise from their reactions:  
In the aftermath of 9/11 it was noticeable that commentators carefully 
avoided describing the reaction as a moral panic – even when the conduct 
of the press, the control apparatus, and the public seemed to invite 
precisely this kind of analysis. Indeed, there was an article published six 
months after the events (Walker, 2002), interviewing a number of ‗moral 
panic‘ sociologists – Joel Best, Phillip Jenkins, Eric Goode – all of whom 
took great care to refuse the attribution of this term to the reaction, even 
though, as they noted, it appeared to fit the model in most aspects. Why 
was this? In part, no doubt, it was due to uncertainty about the nature of 
the threat involved.  ...  no one was sure about the scale of the danger or 
the likelihood of subsequent attacks. But the primary reason for this 
reluctance to invoke the idea of ‗moral panic‘ was, I think, an ethical one. 
These sociologists were unwilling to challenge the moral sentiments that 
drove the social reaction. They were unwilling to play the debunking 
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skeptics in the face of such intense grief and fear and so many murdered 
victims. It seems likely, at least to me, that they saw the attribution of 
‗moral panic‘ as analytically appropriate but ethically taboo.
438
  
 
One positive aspect regarding the media coverage linking terrorism to moral panics, 
however, is, as Altheide points out, that while the more mainstream news media will not 
connect the link between terrorism and moral panics, that some alternative news media 
are willing to make this link, and Altheide, furthermore, argues that this is especially true 
in the United States.
439
 Given the evidence of moral panics demonstrated in this 
comparative case study and the discrepancies between Spain and the United Kingdom in 
their counterterrorism initiatives, especially in the post 9/11 world, this is a link that 
should not be overlooked.  
In conclusion, while the data demonstrate the existence of a moral panic in both 
Spain and the United Kingdom and that the public has an active, though not unitary, role 
in creating and sustaining a moral panic, a surprising conclusion evident from the data is 
the role of the age of a democracy in being conducive to the formation of a moral panic. 
As aforementioned, the Spanish case reflects a moral panic but this reflection is most 
apparent in the years of Spain‘s transition to democracy. The data from the Spanish case 
reflect concern for staying within the confines of the democratic system to combat 
terrorism, which was especially true once they confronted their own misguided 
counterterrorism measures, such as the use of the GAL. In other words, the fact that 
Spain did not take their democracy for granted, as they were transitioning to democracy 
and later a consolidating, fledgling democracy, especially compared to the U.K., led them 
to pursue more democratically legitimate counterterrorism measures for fear of 
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destroying their democracy. Therefore, in sum, democratic states would find it 
immensely beneficial to not take their democracies for granted, because while freedom is 
not free, freely choosing counterterrorism policies that undermine democracy will only 
lead to the destruction of democracy and associated freedoms. In other words, although it 
is difficult to find the right balance between liberty and security, the costs of choosing 
security over liberty too often are far greater than choosing liberty over security, because 
once the foundation of democracy is torn apart, it may not be easy to repair. Recognizing 
the formation or re-emergence of a moral panic regarding terrorism is one method that 
would prove beneficial to democratic states and their citizenries, as it would caution them 
to exercise prudence in their counterterrorism initiatives so as to prevent the destruction 
of their democracy from ever becoming a reality. Moreover, as this case study has 
demonstrated, the public is able to exert influence over their governments, especially 
when organized, and therefore, they should continue to hold their governments 
accountable, and not permit them to try to convince the public to be swept away in a 
moral panic and this is especially true the older a democracy is. The good news is that by 
exercising prudence in counterterrorism measures, holding governments accountable, 
recognizing moral panics as they form, and not taking democracy for granted, regardless 
of how long it has been the system of governance in a given country, democratic states 
can help prevent themselves from falling into the trap of achieving what some terrorists 
want: the destruction of the democratic system.    
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Table 1: Moral Panic Indicators in Spanish Data Sources 
 
 
Public 
Opinion 
Action 
Groups 
Editorials Statements 
Security 
Forces 
Legislation 
Heightened Level 
of Concern 
X X X X X X 
Increased Level of 
Hostility 
X X  X X X 
Substantial or 
Widespread 
Agreement or 
Consensus that 
the Threat is Real, 
Serious, and 
Caused by the 
Wrongdoing 
Group Members 
and Their 
Behavior 
X X X X X X 
Disproportionality X LIMITED X  X LIMITED 
Volatility X LIMITED  X X  
 
 
 
X = presence of Moral Panic indicator 
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Table 2: Moral Panic Indicators in U.K. Data Sources 
 
 
Public 
Opinion 
Action 
Groups 
Editorials Statements 
Security 
Forces 
Legislation 
Heightened Level 
of Concern 
X X X X X X 
Increased Level of 
Hostility 
X X X X X X 
Substantial or 
Widespread 
Agreement or 
Consensus that 
the Threat is Real, 
Serious, and 
Caused by the 
Wrongdoing 
Group Members 
and Their 
Behavior 
X X X X X X 
Disproportionality X X X X X X 
Volatility X LIMITED X X X X 
 
 
X = presence of Moral Panic indicator 
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Appendix I: List of Action Groups: 
Spanish Action Groups  
The following list of Action Groups in Spain is listed first by their original name (if in 
Basque the Spanish translation follows first) followed by their English translation: 
 
1. La Asociación de Vecinos de Sant Andreu, The Association of Neighbors of Saint 
Andrew: A neighborhood association that organized demonstrations against the terrorist 
attack of the commercial center in Barcelona. 
 
2. La Asociación Víctimas del Terrorismo, The Victims of Terrorism Association: 
An association created in 1981 whose aim is to aid families of victims of terrorism in 
 advice and moral and material support.  
 
3. La Asociación de Víctimas del 11-M, The 11-M Victims Association: Founded 
three months after the 11 March 2004 attacks in Madrid, this association‘s main 
 objective is to ensure all those affected in the 11-M attacks receive the medical, 
psychological, social and legal support they need.
 440
  
 
4. La Asociación por la Paz de Euskal herria (País Vasco), The Association for the 
Peace of the Basque Country: An association created in 1986 that served as the ―principle 
daily witness to the rejection of political violence in Euskadi‖.
441
 
 
5. La Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (del País Vasco), The Pro Human Rights 
Association (of the Basque Country): An association that fights for the protection of 
human rights in the Basque Country. 
 
6. El Colectivo de Víctimas del Terrorismo del País Vasco (COVITE), The 
Collective of Victims of Terrorism of the Basque Country: Created in November 1998 
―with the intention to become a basic and inescapable reference in any peace process that 
could be undertaken in Basque Autonomous Community‖.
 442
 
 
7. La Confederación Empresarial Vasca (Confebask), The Basque Business 
Confederation: Formed in 1983 to ―represent and defend the interests of Basque 
businessmen‖ including to stand firm against terrorism and speak out against violence 
                                                        
440
 http://asociacion11m.org/quienes_somos.php  
441
 Barbaría, José Luis, ―La Asociación por la Paz de Euskal Herria, respuesta a la violencia en el 
País Vasco‖, El País,  12 May 1987  
442
 http://www.covite.org/covite_covite.html 
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and to represent the more than 13,000 private enterprises that are integrated into 
Confebask.
 443
  
 
8. La Comisión Obrera de Andalucía (COAN), The Workers‘ Commission of 
Andalucía: ―[A]n independent, democratic, and class union, that defends the professional, 
economic and social interests of working men and women in all areas, especially in all 
workplaces‖.
444
 
 
9. La Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE), The 
Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations: The CEOE was founded in 1977 and 
―is the major representative institution of the Spanish business community‖.
445
  
 
10. Denon Artean – Paz y Reconciliación, Peace and Reconciliation: An association 
dedicated to peace and reconciliation in the Basque Country. 
 
11. Diálogo, Dialogue:  An association founded in 1983 whose objective is ―to 
promote and encourage activities that promote a better understanding and dialogue 
between Spain and France‖.
446
  
 
12. Elkarri: Founded in 1992, ―Elkarri is the social movement for dialogue and 
agreement in the Basque Country‖.
447
 
 
13. La Federación Provincial de Asociaciones de Vecinos, The Provincial Federation 
of Neighborhood Associations: Foundations in each of Spain‘s provinces that work on 
behalf of and with those living in their communities for their social wellbeing, citizen 
participation, and youth and social movements among many other things.
448
 
 
14. La Fundación de Víctimas del Terrorismo, The Foundation for Victims of 
Terrorism: A foundation that ―intends to promote and spread democratic values, the 
defense of  human rights, and the plurality and freedom of citizens, and at the same 
time, to be a useful vehicle for consultation for a better understanding of the situation of 
victims of terrorism as a whole in Spain‖.
449
 
 
15. Gesto por la Paz (de Euskal Herria), Gesture for the Peace (of the Basque 
Country): ―[A] pacifist, civic, unitary, pluralist and independent platform that constitutes 
an organized response of civil society against the constant scourge of violence that the 
                                                        
443
http://www.confebask.es/Castellano/acercade.htm, 
http://www.confebask.es/Castellano/historia.htm  
444
 http://www.andalucia.ccoo.es/webandalucia/menu.do?Conoce_CCOO:_Quienes_somos?  
445
 http://www.ceoe.es/ceoe/contenidos.type.action?type=0864321&menuId=0864321  
446
 http://www.dialogo.es/es/quienes-somos/origen-y-objetivos.html  
447
 http://www.elkarri.org/en/textos/quienes.php  
448
 http://aavvmadrid.org/index.php/aavv/quienes_somos/Historia  
449
 http://www.fundacionvt.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=30  
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Basque and Navarrese people suffer from under some alleged political goals for this 
society‖.
450
  
 
 
U.K. Action Groups 
 
1. The British Irish Rights Watch: ―An independent non-governmental organisation 
that has been monitoring the human rights dimension of the conflict, and latterly the 
peace process, in Northern Ireland since 1990‖; provides services ―free of charge to 
anyone whose human rights have been violated because of the conflict, regardless of 
religious, political or community affiliations‖.
451
  
 
2. Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ): ―[A]n independent human 
rights organisation working since 1981 to ensure the protection and promotion of human 
rights of all those in Northern Ireland by reference to internationally agreed human rights 
standards‖.
452
 
 
3. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board: ―[A] government organisation that can 
pay money (compensation) to people who have been physically or mentally injured 
because they were the blameless victim of a violent crime‖.
453
  
 
4. Derry Citizens‘ Action Committee: ―A group established on 9 October 1968 
which was made up of representatives from a number of groups which at that time 
operated in Derry.‖
454
 
 
5. Families Acting for Innocent Relatives (FAIR): ―[F]ormed as an non-sectarian, 
non-political organisation to work in the interests of the innocent victims of terrorism in 
South Armagh‖.
455
  
 
6. Irish Commission for Prisoners Overseas (ICPO): ―[A] voluntary agency that 
provides assistance to Irish prisoners overseas and to their families in Ireland‖.
456
 
 
7. Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL): Founded in 1976, the ICCL ―is Ireland‘s 
leading independent human rights watchdog, which monitors, educates and campaigns in 
order to secure full enjoyment of human rights for everyone‖.
457
 
 
8. National Association of Victims Support Schemes: An ―independent charity for 
victims and witnesses of crime‖ that has ―grown to become the oldest and largest victims‘ 
                                                        
450
 http://www.gesto.org/definicion.htm  
451
 http://www.birw.org/  
452
 http://www.caj.org.uk/  
453
 http://www.cica.gov.uk/  
454
 http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/dorgan.htm  
455
 http://victims.org.uk/s08zhk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1&Itemid=2  
456
 http://www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=277  
457
 http://www.iccl.ie/about-the-iccl-2.html  
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organisation in the world‖ contacting ―over 1.5 million people [every year] after a crime 
to offer … help‖.
 458
  
 
 
9. The National Council for Civil Liberties (currently known as Liberty): ―Founded 
in 1934, … Liberty seeks to protect civil liberties and promote human rights for everyone 
[and] campaigns to protect basic rights and freedoms through the courts, in Parliament 
and in the wider community … through a combination of public campaigning, test case 
litigation, parliamentary lobbying, policy analysis and the provision of free advice and 
information‖. 
459
  
 
10. The National Victims Association: ―The UK‘s largest and longest established 
specialist homicide support charity [that] provide[s] a comprehensive advocacy, advice, 
counselling and support service to families bereaved through murder or manslaughter, 
and are widely regarded by many Government Ministers, statutory agencies, Police 
forces and Churches as the leading Charity specialising in this field of work‖.
460
 
 
11. Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA): ―The main organisation 
involved in the Civil Rights movement from the late 1960s to the 1970s. The NICRA 
grew out of the work of the Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ) and was modelled on the 
National Council for Civil Liberties based in London. The first committee of the NICRA 
was made up of representatives of trade unions and some of the political parties. The 
NICRA had a number of main aims: universal adult suffrage in local government 
elections; the end to 'gerrymandered' electoral boundaries; the allocation of public 
housing to be on the basis of need; repeal of the Special Powers Act; the disbanding of 
the 'B-Specials'; the end to discrimination in employment; and a system to deal with 
complaints of discrimination.‖
461
 
 
12. Relatives of Bloody Sunday Victims: A group comprised of members who lost 
family members and friends in the events of Bloody Sunday who campaigned for 
independent inquiry into the fateful events of that day. 
 
13. Relatives for Justice: ―Founded in April 1991 [by] … a number of bereaved 
families affected by the conflict came together to support one another. … [A] Belfast 
based NGO support group working with and providing support to relatives of people 
bereaved, and injured, by the conflict across the North of Ireland including border regions 
in the 26 counties‖.
462
  
 
                                                        
458
 http://www.victimsupport.org.uk/About%20us  
459
 http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/about/index.shtml  
460
 http://www.victimsfirst.co.uk/nva/Home.html  
461
 http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/norgan.htm  
462
 http://www.relativesforjustice.com/about-us.htm  
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Appendix II: Counterterrorism Legislation 
Select Legislation Used in Spanish Counterterrorism Initiatives
463
 
 
 Decree-Law 10/1975, of 16 August, Sobre Prevención del Terrorismo, (on the 
Prevention of Terrorism) 
 Decree-Law 1/1977, of 4 January, for the Creation of the National Court 
(Audencia Nacional)  
 Constitución Española (Spanish Constitution) approved by referendum 6 
December 1978 
 Decree-Law 21/1978, of 30 June, sobre Medidas en Relación con los Delitos 
Cometidos por Grupos o Bandas Armadas, (on Measures in Relation to the 
Crimes Committed by Armed Bands or Groups) 
 Organic Law 56/1978, of 4 December, de Medidas especiales en Relación con los 
Delitos de Terrorismo Cometidos por Grupos Armados (Special Measures toward 
Crimes of Terrorism Committed by Armed Groups) 
 Organic Law 1/1979, of 16 septiembre, de General Penitenciaria (on General 
Penitentiary) 
 Decree-Law 3/1979, of 26 January, sobre Protección de la seguridad ciudadana 
(on the Protection of Citizen Security)  
 Organic Law 3/1979, of 18 December, Estatuto de Autonomía del País Vasco, 
(Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country)  
 Organic Law 40/1979, of 10 December, sobre Régimen jurídico de Control de 
Cambios (on the Legal Status of Exchange Control) 
                                                        
463
 There are ―four basic types of Spanish legislation, in order of importance, are: (1) organic 
laws; (2) ordinary laws; (3) decree laws; and (4) legislative decrees. Organic laws are reserved for 
special subject matters. In particular, organic laws deal with the regulation of fundamental rights 
and liberties, the passage of the autonomous communities‘ Statutes of Autonomy, and the 
regulation of the electoral regime. C.E. [Constitución Española, Spanish Constitution] art. 81(1). 
Moreover, organic laws can be passed only by the affirmative vote of an absolute majority of the 
Parliament. Id. Art 81(2). Ordinary laws are those passed by a simple majority of the legislature, 
and which regulate matters not subject to organic laws. Id. art. 90(2). Decree laws are temporary 
laws passed by the executive subject to approval by the legislature within thirty days. Id. art. 86 
(1)-(2). Like ordinary laws, decree laws may not affect subjects regulated by organic laws. Id. art. 
86(1). Finally, legislative decrees are laws promulgated by the government pursuant to a 
legislative grant of authority. Id. art 82 (3).‖ (MacKinnon, 615, footnote 52)  
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 Real Decree Law 190/1980, of 1 February, sobre Delegados Especiales del 
Gobierno para la Seguridad, (on Special Government Delegates for Security) 
 Organic Law 4/1980, of 21 May, de Reforma del Código Penal en materia de 
delitos relativos a las libertades de expresión, reunión y asociación, (On the 
Reform of the Penal Code on Crimes Related to the Freedoms of Expression, 
Meeting, and Association)  
 Organic Law 6/1980, of 1 July, por la que se regulan los criterios básicos de la 
Defensa Nacional y la Organización Militar, (for the Regulation for the Basic 
Criteria of National Defense and Military Organization)   
 Organic Law 11/1980, of 1 December, sobre los supuestos previstos en el artículo 
55.2 de la Constitución (on the Cases Referred to in Article 55.2 of the 
Constitution)   
 Organic Law 2/1981, of 4 May, que modifica y adiciona determinados artículos 
del Código Penal y del de Justicia Militar, (to Modify and Add Determined 
Articles of the Penal Code and of the Military Justice)  
 Organic Law 4/1981, of 1 June, de los Estados de Alarma, Excepción y Sitio (on 
States of Alarm, Exception and Sites) 
 Organic Law 1/1984, of 5 January, de reforma de la Ley Orgánica 6/1980, de 1 
de julio, por la que se regulan los criterios básicos de la defensa nacional y la 
organización militar (on the Reform of Organic Law 6/1980, of 1 July, for 
Regulation of the Basic Criteria of National Defense and Military Organization)  
 Law 5/1984, of 26 March, Reguladora del derecho de asilo y de la condición de 
refugiado, (Regulating the Right of Asylum and Refugee Status) 
 Organic Law 6/1984, of 24 May, Reguladora del Procedimiento Habeas Corpus, 
(Regulating Habeas Corpus Procedure) 
 Organic Law 9/1984, of 26 December, contra la actuación de Bandas armadas y 
elementos terroristas y de desarrollo del artículo 55.2 de la Constitución (Against 
the Actions of Armed Groups and Terrorist Elements and the Development of 
Article 55.2 of the Constitution)  
 Castellana Accords 1984 
 Organic Law 6/1985 of 1 July, del Poder Judicial (on Judiciary Powers) 
 Organic Law 13/1985, of 9 December, de Código Penal Militar (on the Military 
Penal Code) 
 Organic Law 2/1986, of 13 March, de Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad (on State 
Security Forces and Bodies) 
 Organic Law 4/1987, of 15 July, de la Competencia y Organización de la 
Jurisdicción Militar (of the Competence and Organization of Military 
Jurisdiction)  
 Pact of Madrid 5 November 1987 
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 Organic Law 3/1988, of 25 May, de Reforma del Codigo penal (for Reform of the 
Penal Code) 
 Organic Law 4/1988, of 25 May, de reforma de la ley de Enjuicimiento Criminal 
(for Reform of the Criminal Prosecution Act) 
 Pact of Ajuria Enea 12 January 1988 
 Pact of Navarra 7 October 1988 
 Organic Law 2/1989, of 13 April, Procesal Militar (on Military Procedure) 
 Organic Law 1/1992, of 21 February, sobre Protección de la Seguridad 
Ciudadana (on the Protection of Public Safety) 
 Organic Law 10/1995, of 23 November, del Código Penal (on the Penal Code) 
o Title XII ―Crimes Against Public Order‖, Chapter V on Possession, 
Trafficking, and Deposit of Arms, Ammunition, or Explosives and Terrorist 
Crimes, Section 2, Articles 571-580 deal specifically with terrorism related 
offenses  
 Law 12/1996, of 19 December, on Help to the Victims of Terrorism 
 Law 13/1996, of 30 December, on Fiscal, Administrative Measures and of the 
Social Order 
 Law 44/1998, of 15 December, of Plan and Territorial Organization of Military 
Jurisdiction 
 Law No. 41/1999 of 12 November, sobre Sistemas de Pagos y de Liquidación de 
Valores, (on Payment Systems and Liquidation of Assets) 
 Law 32/1999, of 8 October, de Solidaridad con las víctimas del terrorismo (on 
Solidarity with the Victims of Terrorism) 
 Law 1/2000, of 7 January, de Enjuiciamiento Civil (of Civil Procedure) 
 Acuerdo por las libertades y contra el terrorismo, of 8 December 2000 (Accord in 
Favor of Liberties and Against Terrorism) 
 Organic Law 7/2000 de modificación de la Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de 
noviembre, del Código Penal, y de la Ley Orgánica 5/2000, de 12 de enero, 
reguladora de la Responsabilidad Penal de los Menores, en relación con los 
delitos de terrorismo (on the modification of Organic Law 10/1995, of 23 
November, of the Penal Code, and of Organic Law 5/2000, of 12 January, 
regulating Penal Responsibility of Minors, in Relation with Crimes of Terrorism)  
 Penal Code modifications 2001 
 Organic Law 6/2002, of 27 June, de Partidos Políticos (on Political Parties) 
 Law No. 34/2002, of 11 July, de servicios de la sociedad de la información y de 
comercio electrónico (on Services of the Information Society and of Electronic 
Commerce) 
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 Organic Law 7/2003, of 30 June, de medidas de reforma para el cumplimiento 
íntegro y efectivo de las penas, (On Measures of Reform for Full and Effective 
Penalties) 
 Organic Law 13/2003, of 24 October, de Reforma de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento 
Criminal en material de prisión provisional (on Reform of the Criminal 
Prosecution Law regarding Provisional Detention) 
 Organic Law 20/2003, of 23 December, de modificación de la Ley Orgánica del 
Poder Judicial y del Código Penal, (On the Modification of the Organic Law on 
Judicial Power and of the Penal Code) 
 
International  
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, codified in Article 10(2) of the 
Spanish Constitution 
 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 1949, ratified in 1982 
 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
1950  
 The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1953 
 The European Convention on Extradition 1957, ratified in 1982 
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1976, ratified 
in 1979 
 The European Convention of the Suppression of Terrorism 1977, ratified 9 May 
1980 
 The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 
 The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment of Punishment 1987 
 The Europol Convention 1995 
 The United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing and for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999 
 The Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism 2002 
 The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 2005 
 
Other 
 March 1981, creation of the single centralized command for the fight against 
terrorism, known as Mando Unico para la Lucha Contraterrorista (Single 
Command for the Counterterrorism Fight) 
 Pact of Madrid 5 November 1987 
 Pact of Ajuria Enea 12 January 1988 
 Pact of Navarre 7 October 1988 
173 
 
Select Legislation Used in U.K. Counterterrorism Initiatives 
 
 The Offenses Against the Person Act 1861 
 The Explosive Substances Act 1883 
 The Aliens Registration Act 1914 
 The Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act 1919 
 The Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) of 1922 
 The Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Acts 1939-73 
 The Immigration Act 1971 
 The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 – 1996 
 The Biological Weapons Act 1974 
 The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974-1989 
 The Biological Weapons Act 1976 
 The Race Discrimination Act 1976 
 The Criminal Law Act 1977 
 The Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 
 The Criminal Attempts Act 1981 
 The Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 
 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 
 The Public Order Act 1986 
 The Biological Weapons Act 1989 
 The Official Secrets Act 1989 
 The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 
 The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
 The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 
 The Chemical Weapons Act 1996 
 The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
 The Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act of 1998 
 The Good Friday Accords 1998  
 The Human Rights Act 1998 
 The Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 
 The Terrorism Act 2000 
 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (RIPA) Bill 2000  
 The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001 
 The Human Rights (Designated Derogation) Order 2001 
 The Crime (International Cooperation) Act 2003 
 The Criminal Justice Act 2003 
 The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 
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 The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 
 The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 
 The Immigration, Nationality, and Asylum Act 2006 
 The Terrorism Act 2006 
 
International
464
  
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ratified in 1948 
 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ratified in 1949  
 The United Nations Refugee Convention 1951 
 The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1953 
 The European Convention on Extradition 1957 
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1976 
 The European Convention of the Suppression of Terrorism 1977 
 The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 
 The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment of Punishment 1987 
 The Chemical Weapons Convention 1992 
 The United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing and for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999 
 The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 2001 
 The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1378 2001 
 The Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism 2002 
 The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 2005 
 
Decisions 
 The Farrakan Decision 1986 
 The ‗Soering’ Principle 1989 
 The Brannigan and McBride Decision 1993 
 Chahal v. UK (1996) 
 The Roma rights case  
 The Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) decisions 
 A (and others) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2004) 
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. M (2004) 
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ, KK, GG, HH, NN, and LL 
(2006) 
                                                        
464
 The U.K. has ratified, without reservations, all of the international conventions concerning the 
prevention and repression of terrorism. 
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Appendix III: Editorial Translations 
 
―First Blood‖ (Primera Sangre) 11 March 1978  
Before the attacks yesterday that took the lives of an armed police officer in 
Madrid and of a retired Guardia Civil officer in San Sebastian, there is little more than 
ritualizing the mourning and condemnation. The man killed two of his own species and 
that is how it will continue to happen unless there is a genetic mutation. We will have 
terrorism with democracy like we had with the dictatorship. There will always be 
marginal groups that include in their analysis the factor of ―the worse, the better‖. From 
the extreme left with the objective of inciting the more fundamentalist sectors to think in 
a dictatorship that – according to such schemes – drive in the medium term [toward] a 
social revolution, and from the extreme right with the same dictatorial objective but with 
intent to be permanent. In the short term some give as much as the others; as if they are 
not delinquents of the same path.  
But today it is necessary to stress that in less that one week two services of the 
Armed Police Forces have received their baptism in blood: the EDAX (bomb disposal) 
and that of the surveillance patrols, very recently created. Two days ago in Santa Cruz de 
Tenerife the first EDAX artificer [explosives expert] died, killed in service trying to 
remove an explosive. With very precarious technical means, on occasion with the mere 
protection of a shield and helmet with a visor, the agents of this grouping of the Armed 
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Police remove and disassemble practically daily every type of artifact from buildings and 
public ways. 
On their part, the agents of the surveillance patrols have started to make 
themselves normal and known in the streets regardless of whether or not they prevent 
public disturbances. Following the Anglo-Saxon model that has given good results they 
watch for the security of the neighbors, offer their services to whoever asks for it and 
quickly recover stolen cars that before took weeks to appear. 
The murderers have chosen their victims well. Because a serious intellectual 
distortion is missing to associate these two servicemen of the Armed Police with 
activities of social or political repression. Today honor these men that patrol the street or 
that remove bombs from the roads for us and that have already had their first blood in 
active service.  
 
Democracy Against Terrorism (Democracia frente a terrorismo) 1 April 1978 
Fifteen days since one of the most spectacular terrorist attacks in contemporary 
history, the Italian Politian Aldo Moro is still in the hands of his kidnappers, serving at 
the same time the shocking publicity and dramatic blackmail of not only the so-called 
―established system‖, but also the political regime of the same Italians that 
democratically elected him. It is an act that goes beyond the simple definition of a 
criminal act. An attack against a person, against a regime, against a community, and 
against a conception of the world. From there the attempts that have taken place in the 
western democratic community, harassed and tense by the increase of violence and 
terrorism, to equip itself with an adequate legal methodology to fight against this tragic 
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avalanche. The Council of Europe has arbitrated an instrument, admittedly it is still 
controversial, that is the European Convention for the Repression of Terrorism, already 
signed by sixteen countries; those that have not yet are Ireland, Malta, and Spain, which 
is the most recent member of the organization and hardly has had the time to do so. The 
countries of the Common Market, for their part, currently are negotiating a similar text, 
more restrictive than the previous, that will be applicable in the nine countries of the EEC 
[European Economic Community]. In the U.N., however, things do not seem to be going 
in the same direction, since last February a commission of experts of the organization, 
brought together to study the problem, adjourned without any result.  
The European antiterrorism convention, despite its critics that have arisen even 
within Europe, will enter into force sooner or later. The reservations that have been made 
are centered in the argument that the text – directly inspired by Federal Germany, the 
country that has gotten the farthest in this area – considerably limits democratic liberties, 
above all in what is referred to as the concept of political crime and the right to asylum. 
Bonn, who has suffered very directly from this rise in terrorism, has preferred to take the 
middle ground and respond to violence with violence. An extremely dangerous method 
that without a doubt is more than a danger for democracy. But it does not also stop to be a 
logical temptation.  
Ten or fifteen years ago, for example, in the Western world the idea to abolish the 
death penalty broke through. Not only did many countries erase it from their penal 
legislations, but also public opinion in almost all of Europe was inclined toward this 
measure of human justice. Today, on the contrary, surveys demonstrate that the increase 
in violence in the industrial society has provoked the break of all humanism, and today 
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the Western towns are favorable to the death penalty for the pure and terrible reflection of 
what is called legitimate defense. In France the number in favor of capital punishment is 
increasing and Giscard himself, who declared his opposition to it before being elected 
president, not only has not proposed its abolition, but also has permitted it to be applied. 
Finally, regarding the rise augment of terrorism, Paris has joined Bonn to sponsor the 
controversial antiterrorism convention.  
 Violence creates violence, and the collective reflection before the wave of the 
terrorist threat passing instinctively above all ideological or moral consideration to 
demand concrete results. This is the terrain in which it is most evident that the terrorists 
are achieving their goals. They are making the European public opinion doubt the values 
of democracy and of civil liberties.  
 In the United Nations, some representatives of non-European countries, such as 
Algeria, Libya or Syria, have refused to work on developing a universal treaty against 
terrorism. They have manifested their opposition to an accord that prevent hijackings, 
considering that ―it would restrict the already precarious means that the liberation 
movements have‖. Naturally, the Near East and the OLP [Organization for the Liberation 
of Palestine] are behind the taking of this position. The problems that terrorist acts raise 
should, therefore, also be resolved politically; colonial violence or war, the historical 
grievances of the peoples of the Third World have widened a good part of the terrorist 
violence, that at the same time threatens to destroy the democratic system. This analysis 
of the facts is useless when it comes to trying to morally justify the same. Terrorism is the 
worst of the ills that plague civilized society, and it has to be fought. But it would be wise 
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to know that the world is headed toward zones in which terrorism will receive different 
treatment and where politics will play a role in the terror business.  
However, it may be, the people who defend democratic values, among them Italy, 
among them today happily Spain itself, cannot and should not fight against violence, 
renouncing these convictions. The narrow path that remains is to refine the legal means to 
make them more efficient and robust: to perfect the police and legal machinery, giving 
them the best and most modern means of investigation. But do not fall into the trap of 
blowing up the same world of liberties that it is supposed to defend. 
 
―The Government, Again against the Constitution‖ (El Gobierno, de nuevo contra la 
Constitución) 5 December 1979  
It is not easily comprehensible, and even less excusable, the persistent 
perseverance with which the Government borders the terrain of unconstitutionality, or 
they openly step on it, on what is referred to as the individual rights and guarantees 
recognized in Title I of the Constitution. When the sanctioning of the fundamental text 
was not even a month ago, the decree-law of Public Safety, enacted quickly and running, 
with clear electoral objectives, poorly able to withstand the criticisms that denounced its 
unconstitutional character. Now, in dates close to the first anniversary of the 
constitutional referendum, the Boletín Oficial del Estado [Official State Bulletin] 
publishes a new decree-law that not only extents for a year the Antiterrorism Law of 4 
December 1978, but also, moreover, widens in a manner quite exotic, the ambit of 
competences of the Audencia Nacional [National Court]. If the decree-law of 28 January 
1979 could only save face for its constitutionality in Congress by means of the discipline 
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of the UCD vote, some grams of cynicism and various kilos of fallacious arguments, the 
Government‘s recidivism to continue in this path is already a useless scandal. Moreover, 
and incidentally, because, predictably, the Antiterrorism Law has not been of any use in 
fighting political violence in this country. Article 86 of the Constitution conditions the 
use of decree-laws in cases of ―extraordinary and urgent necessity‖ and explicitly and 
exhaustively prohibits their enactment when they affect ―the rights, duties and freedoms 
of citizens, regulated in Title I‖. The new decree-law extends the validity of a law that 
establishes substantial cuts to habeas corpus, the inviolability of the home and the 
secrecy of the postal, telephonic and telegraphic communications guaranteed by Articles 
17 and 18 in Title I of the Constitution. This norm, so gallantly flattered with a fixed one 
year extension, in the first of its final depositions, that its validity would be a year from 
its enactment, without making the smallest reference to the possibility of extension. 
Is it possible to conceive of a more arbitrary decision than the Government‘s 
violation of the norm established in Article 86 of the Constitution for the enactment of 
decree-laws and a very contemptuous attitude toward the work of the previous 
legislature, equally controlled by the UCD, than the violation of the expressed will of 
limiting a law to only be in force for one year? Now we believe so. Because this same 
decree-law includes, apropos, a generous expansion of the competences of the National 
Court in issues barely related to terrorism such as the falsification of money, organized 
prostitution, the public scandal produced by pornographic movies and drug trafficking. If 
this modification of jurisdictional boundaries corresponds to the organic law on Judicial 
Power, whose project has already been sent to the Courts, the Government has seen fit to 
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consider it of ―extraordinary and urgent necessity‖ to strip the natural judges and the 
provincial courts from this, it seems, explosive package of competences.  
Without a doubt, the reason for this extension through an inappropriate decree-
law is that the Government forgot when signaling the priorities of its legislative calendar 
and did not notice that the Law of Public Safety would come into effect after it ceased to 
be called the Antiterrorism Law. It is not surprising that a party such as UCD, which 
boasts having the best experts in law, has broken in this instance all of the brands of legal 
bundling. But the most lamentable is that the UCD, that presents itself around the entire 
planet as a champion in the defense of human rights, can cut citizens‘ guarantees and 
liberties without respecting the procedures and without taking the precautions 
exhaustively established in Article 86 of the Constitution. And we say it is lamentable, 
but it is barely a surprising result, because the seriousness of the democratic convictions 
of many centrist deputies are being, and not without reason, questioned. Here, the patents 
of democracy are not extended by anyone. But anyone can show their own badge of 
authoritarianism and disregard for freedoms. We refer ourselves to the tests.  
 
Terrorism and Independence (Terrorismo e independentismo) 17 May 1980 
The CRIMES of ETA militar will never lose, despite the cumulative and 
appalling character of their frequency, the ability to produce that invincible feeling of 
horror and contempt that still engenders the cruel cowardice of the murderers, and leads, 
again and again, to ask how the human species can permit in their codes of conduct the 
possibility that someone takes the life of a fellow [human being]. The political 
justifications and the ideological motivations that terrorists use to turn their sinister 
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ambushes in epic stamps only adds to the vileness of the crime the contempt for the 
ability of men to reason, discuss and decide on their own the destiny of their public life. 
For these fanatics, clinging to the simplifications of their catechisms and the butts of their 
guns, they do not use conviction, but intimidation, to impose, by blood and fire, their 
programs and ideas. Those who think that the flags are used to wash the blood of Cain, 
which stains the murderers, or that the patriotic hymns need the rattle of arms as an 
accompaniment are wrong. Although the verbal and gestural revolution of the traveling 
companions of ETA militar are offensive, increasingly, in their mechanisms of 
motivation and murderous conduct, the Basque terrorists and right-wing fascists are 
indistinguishable. Certainly the symbolic emblems, the warrior sounds, the political 
rationalizations and ideological contents are distinct between both species of patriots. 
However, such contempt for fellow man, the denial of the fundamental human right that 
is the right to life and the fanatical and stupid arrogance of considering themselves 
owners of the truth and bearers of mysterious essences is related in the brotherhood of 
crime in these two tribes of violence cultivators. 
The new wave of killings in Euskadi, has coincided with the proposition of law 
that the PNV will submit to the Basque Parliament, which follows the brave previous 
statements of the Basque Government and the Minister of the Interior against violence 
and the "revolutionary tax‖. This is not a coincidence. As in the past, each measure of the 
Government and of the Courts in favor of autonomy and of peace in Euskadi had as a 
response a barbaric act of terrorism, the clear route of the Basque government toward 
peace and the strengthening of democracy now receives an identical criminal response. 
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The PNV calls on all Euskadi political forces to renounce "violence of any kind and the 
use of arms" and to accept "the political pathways as the only channel, within the 
democratic system, for the legitimate and necessary confrontation of all ideologies and 
options‖. It also underlines the necessity of ensuring the "strict adherence to any and all 
rights of the person, especially that [to the right] of life‖. 
The document also addresses other issues and problems that are related to the 
consolidation of structures of coexistence among Basques, which could permit the 
eradication of the phenomenon of violence in the medium term. Thus, the legalization of 
all political parties and the freedom of expression, vindicated in the text, point, no doubt, 
toward the convenience of not depriving the voice of the independent options or their 
ability to organize within the law. On more than one occasion we have argued, from these 
columns, the right of all citizens to freely express opinions and to organize to propagate 
them. The only limitations on that right of association is to not peacefully defend the 
independence movement, but that which is established in Article 22 of the Constitution, 
which prohibits "secret societies and those of a paramilitary nature" and that [which] 
establishes that "associations which pursue ends or use methods, characterized as 
criminal are illegal‖.  
 Regarding the delicate topic of grace measures [i.e. pardons], it is clear that the 
purpose of the PNV is to promote and encourage the definitive abandonment of arms by 
those who are inclined to take that step, through the promise of making their reintegration 
into civil life possible. You can agree or disagree with this peacemaking strategy. But it 
would be wise, in any case, to remember that a public man so little suspect of extremism 
or indiscretions such as Mr. Areilza, a representative of the parliamentary group led by 
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Mr. Fraga, has defended the necessity of negotiating with ETAm, which would logically 
include the adoption measures of grace. Dialogue is a path that no civilized Government 
can renounce, especially if from the dialogue the eradication of violence could be 
derived. 
 The no proposition of the law insists on "the development and deepening of the 
Statute of Autonomy" to achieve authentic institutions of self-governance. Indeed, the 
only way for the social and electoral bases of the terrorists to begin to weaken and break 
down is for the Euskadi Government to show its people that the path to autonomy is not a 
dead end, but rather a political and historical reality. And the murder of members of the 
Forces of Public Order will be more difficult when the Basque regional police force is put 
in charge of missions that today are assigned to the National Police or Civil Guard. 
 In any case, the reasonable doubts that could honestly be harbored on the sincerity 
of the PNV and of its Government in its search for a peaceful, constitutional and 
democratic end to the Basque conflict cannot be maintained in good faith after the 
virulent statement released yesterday by ETAm. The text viciously attacks the Basque 
Government – qualifying it as a "puppet government‖ – for its convictions of violence 
and its advice for citizens (following Mr. Alcorta‘s example of civic bravery) to resist the 
extortion and gangster blackmail, pompously madeup as "revolutionary taxes‖. For this 
the recent wave of killings could be the point of political desperation more than anything 
else. If it turns out to be this way, it would also be that we have started, perhaps without 
realizing it, the long and slow road to peace in Euskadi. 
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Reflections on Terrorism (Reflexiones sobre terrorismo) 15 April 1981 
 In the event that the Law for the Defense of the Constitution permits intellectual 
approximations to terrorist tactics and strategy, we will have to agree that the mafia gang 
that is ETA militar is proceeding to give their criminal response to the work of the so-
called single anti-terrorism command in the Basque Country. It is already beginning to be 
difficult to extrapolate statistics of the long history of murders of ETAm, but one does not 
remember the vile etarra terror the commission of three murders of these features in a 
single day – and in the space of just a few hours – and two of them in the same province. 
Despite the added cowardice which is the fact that criminals choose as victims of their 
savagery retired bosses or ex-officials and industrials without protection, or any special 
significance, it is not unreasonable to see in this escalation of ETA – started a few days 
ago with other barbaric attacks against national police [officers] – a sinister here we 
continue directed at emphasizing the defense minister's tour, visiting the troops pledged 
by the Government to waterproofing the Basque-Navarre Pyrenees. The identification of 
the latest victims of ETAm should also be emphasized: military retirees voluntarily 
settled in Euskadi and murdered in a particularly cruel and repugnant form, it is as if 
there is a ranking of cruelty in the premeditated death of a man. The least warned could 
caution [against] the latest ETAm actions, a frontal assault on the psychological 
resistance of members of the Armed Forces. A new proof that ETA terrorism has decided 
to launch without mercy by the slope of the proponents of the coup d‘état, against the 
liberties of the Spanish. 
The possibility that etarra terrorism is creating ambient temperature for Aberri 
Eguna (next Sunday) stained with violence and clashes [should] also not be neglected. 
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But, and still recognizing the objective difficulty of the fight against political banditry, 
these facts seem to indicate, on the one hand, that it is not desirable to participate in the 
triumphalism with which its administration has initiated this conglomeration of 
unconnected competences called single antiterrorism command.  
 Yesterday, the happy release of the industrial Luis Suñer from Alcira (on whose 
circumstances the responsible law enforcement officers have laid a blanket of silence, but 
it seems they go through a high rescue) was so tarnished by these three immune crimes, 
that now it is obvious to condemn when words, in a repeated manner, lose the brightness 
and strength of their original coinage. 
 Almost daily it rains on the mammoth [sized] official relations officers of 
detained [terrorists] or of captured terrorist material; the public has been offered 
statistical tables which purport to demonstrate that in this or that period of time – always 
with special legislation and indiscriminate threats on the use of freedom – they have 
proceeded to carry out somewhat more successfully antiterrorist services than at the this 
same time last year. It has entered a worthy lexicography worthy of the dictatorship, in 
which seditious liberal newspapers call for the hunting of man as the tiger, thus equating 
their brilliant intellectual and journalistic trajectory to the same trajectory of inhumane 
violence, and have taken the step – just barely discussed – that the Governments of 
Franco never decided to take, not even when the Prime Minister was assassinated: to 
approximate the Armed Forces to the direct fight against terrorism. 
 Of course, no anti-terrorist operation of any kind could be able to prevent terror in 
a few weeks. But few are fully aware that behind the resounding front of a single 
command there are many loose twigs, poor technology, adequate diplomatic work, 
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previous reorganization of debilitated services, such as that of the Defense Intelligence, 
and above all, a single [antiterrorism] command. Recent statements from Commissioner 
Ballesteros recognizing that coordination between military, civil guards and police was 
made at the level of friends, move to such embarrassment that we are advised to be quiet 
in this moment. One has already been advised, from these and from many other pages, 
that Ballesteros was the reissue of his teacher, Commissioner Conesa, condemned as the 
first, as this one with the GRAPO, to the new Sisyphean torture to announce the 
dismantling, over and again, of ETA. 
 Therefore, if apart from the horror that the crimes arise we can draw some brief 
lessons of such infamy, these at least are crystal clear. The first and most important is 
that, as we already said, at the time of the murder of the engineer Ryan, that ETA: was 
pure villain, today one can now add that this villain is now not only in its fascist pseudo-
intellectual origins, but has in their immediate objectives a coup d‘état. The second is that 
the Government of Calvo Sotelo, abundant in gestures – and in gestures, we say without 
reluctance, interesting and courageous, but gestures in the end – has to start producing 
policies. 
 
Forgiveness for Terrorists (Perdón para terroristas) 8 August 1982 
The publication of the conversations of those responsible in the Ministry of the 
Interior with leaders of Euskadiko Ezquerra to implement measures of grace to a group of 
old ETA Political-Military militants in the VII Assembly has led to curled 
pronouncements from bodies of information and to some demonstrations from political 
leaders who do not waste not even the smallest occasion to cultivate emotions in citizens 
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before the next electoral confrontation. A football player, in a survey carried out by the 
newspaper Ya, condemned the issue as seeming to him as the Government dropping their 
pants. Without coming to this brunt opinion, other more qualified figures in Spanish 
political life hid in their opinions more visceral and unfocused reasoning like that of the 
Real Madrid player Juanito. The problems of social coexistence in the Basque Country 
are much older than the actual political regime of freedoms and their roots are largely 
sunk in the blink politics of the dictatorship, which, with its simplicity and lack of 
historical vision, was the most valuable ally in the blossoming of armed gangs. It is 
enough to remember, in this sense, that all of the action displayed in those years to seal 
the indestructible unity of the men and the lands of Spain resulted in blowing through the 
air the Prime Minister and the inheritance, to the parliamentary monarchy, from a 
terrorist group with solid social support.  
 In the parliamentary spectrum, the politicians who think that the terrorist problem 
in the Basque Country is a simple case of public order are few. Those who are defending 
on the front line and from within the security forces the fight against the activity of armed 
gangs have said so on numerous occasions. However, some ineffective politicians, that 
played important roles in the first moments of the transition and harvested resounding 
failures, are returning now, masquerading as the white hope of the Spanish right, to 
preach, with unrepentant stubbornness, that it is all a simple question of hard labor and, 
therefore, there is nothing better than a state of emergency at the time. God save us from 
these messiahs.  
 It is a bit repetitive to repeat that the fight against terrorism is not only an issue of 
police efficiency. The activity of armed gangs is unthinkable without the social support 
189 
 
that makes their movements possible. For that, all of the political and judicial measures 
that serve to isolate terrorist groups signify a qualified advance to enable a peaceful 
coexistence in the Basque Country.  
 In this sense, and with an analysis moved by dispassion, and not by hot emotions, 
in which we must place the Minister of the Interior‘s political initiative, from which it 
would be convenient to give some details. It is an evil, or at least, an interesting poison to 
state that the law is violated or that the State loses respectability when applying measures 
of this type. The action that will be followed will be applied by competent jurisdictional 
bodies and under the provisions of specific sections of the penal legislation. Therefore, 
there is not the smallest creepy shadow or hidden and shameful negotiation, like the 
lackeys of the criminal coup attempt to portray to the public opinion.  
 The measures that are going to be applied to members of ETA Political-Military 
who abandoned their activities for more than a year and a half, because they understood, 
after the failed coup d‘état, that their actions were aimed at consolidating the dawn of 
times in Spain.   
 The first group of persons included in these measures are those that, not having 
any responsibility, are found in exile for reasonable fear of reprisals. The other two 
groups are composed of those still serving their long sentences, they could be, at the 
court‘s discretion, applied to the provisions of existing legislation on remission of the 
sentence or parole, and, in the last place, of those preventative prisoners to which they 
can apply more mild sentences until they have their respective trials. In any case, in all 
circumstances, those guilty of murder, illegal detentions, or of other [crimes] of 
significance and seriousness are excluded. Therefore, the assumptions made about those 
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to whom these so-called measures of grace will be applied do not seem as significant as 
to cause so much turmoil.  
 However, above or below the scrupulous respect that one has in the action of this 
law and the distribution of powers true to a system of rule of law, the Minister of the 
Interior‘s initiative constitutes a laudable and brave policy initiative. Terrorism has left 
our country with a sequel of frustrations and painful memories that will not be easily 
forgotten. But whatever attitude that put a definite end to the violence and facilitates 
coexistence under the rule of law can only be well received by those who love peace and 
progress. To nourish the confrontations inexorably leads to catalyze the tensions and 
reproduce violence.  
 There is, lastly, one equally important issue. The groups related to the coup d‘état, 
that are unwavering in their efforts to drive our country to fratricidal confrontation, have 
started what will become an overwhelming campaign to apply similar measures of grace 
as well to the rebel participants in the 23 February attempt[ed] [coup d‘état]. In principle, 
here fit some clarifications. In first place, the participants of those facts have never 
recognized their criminal authorship, and some have confirmed that they will attempt it 
again. Politically, therefore, it would be inconsistent to consolidate peace and coexistence 
of all citizens to kindly apply the penal law, if it has not already been applied with 
complete generosity, to those who are ready to impose by force – relying on their special 
status as members of the Armed Forces – their political viewpoints. It is, therefore, a 
quite different issue. And to establish a parallel does not appear encouraged by the sound 
criminal principle of social reinsertion and the policy of [criminal] offenders, but, rather, 
a ploy to confuse citizens and to hinder the governorship of the State. In any case, it 
191 
 
would not be convenient to forget that the decision of the Supreme Council of Military 
Justice recommended to the Government the commutation of sentences to Milans and 
Tejero‘s immediate inferior. The rebellion leaders renounced this benefit in an arrogant 
gesture.    
 
The Crime of Rentería and ETA‘s Electoral Campaign (El crimen de Rentería y la 
campaña electoral de ETA) 15 September 1982 
The general elections of this 28 October will allow the Basque people to decide, 
for the fifth time in four years, with the ballot box. After the general and municipal 
elections of 1979, the referendum that approved the Statute of Guernica and the election 
of the autonomous Parliament in March 1980, the designation of deputies and senators to 
the General Courts will be a new occasion for the citizens of the Basque Country to 
express, through universal suffrage, free and secret ballot, their preferences and opinions, 
the only way to ascertain the real social support of the [political] parties and their 
programs. Despite the undisputed importance of the vote obtained by Herri Batasuna in 
the general election of 1979, the fact is that only 149,685 citizens of Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa 
and Alava were delivered, on a census of eligible voters of 1,625,280 (9.20%) and 
1,020,793 actual voters (14.66%), against peace, democracy and harmony. The enemies, 
of representative government have always theorized their aristocratic contempt toward 
the popular will through aberrant ideological constructs that reserve the monopoly of an 
alleged patriotic truth to a determined minority capable of imposing through arms its 
dictatorship. Despite this doctrinal arrogance, each adverse electoral consult puts these 
self-appointed messiahs in the awkward position of having to seek extravagant arguments 
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with the public opinion to justify their bloody loneliness. Determined to close the ballot 
boxes forever once they have conquered [their way] to power, they have to conform, in 
the meantime, to interfere, directly or indirectly, the celebration of elections and 
introduce factors of alteration in their normal development. While vanguards despise 
from their infatuated stupidity the votes as a source of political legitimacy, the 
restlessness that produces in their bases the sense of isolation moves them to boycott or 
distort the democratic elections to the extent that their efforts are permitted. 
 The sad comment regarding the ambush perpetrated Monday near Rentería, which 
claimed the lives of four national police, should be exhausted, from a purely human point 
of view, in the expression of horror at this new manifestation of barbarism. The 
persecution waged by terrorists to top off one of the injured policemen, that was being 
driven to a hospital, constitutes one of the horrifying feats of cruelty and sadism 
committed by these criminal gangs throughout their shady history. However, the 
murderers, to reap human lives, tactical objectives are also proposed, despite the 
repugnancy aroused by the instrumentalization of death in the service of other goals, it is 
necessary to analyze. ETA undertakes, so, their own electoral campaign, designed to 
induce – as a maximum program – the definite closure of the polls or to dramatize – as 
the resigned alternative, – a situation that would be even more adverse without the 
exasperation and fear terrorism breeds with its crimes. The overheating of the pre-
electoral atmosphere by commissioning the action-repression spiral [of violence] in the 
Basque Country is but a desperate attempt to distort, to the advantage of radical 
nationalism and of the conservative opinions, the verdict of the ballot boxes. 
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The other clip of the pliers to crush the liberties of Basques and the rest of 
Spaniards has been the revival, at the beginning of the election campaign, of 
demonstrations in favor of the amnesty, aimed at coldly instrumentalizing the emotions 
of the prisoners‘ families and friends. Freedom of the accused or convicted is not the goal 
of these demonstrations, but rather the dirty expectation of getting – as in San Sebastian 
this past Sunday – new names for the martyrdom with the help of some exasperated and 
frightened Forces of Public Order who respond disproportionately or wrongfully to the 
provocations. The maneuver is even more nauseating since those same manipulators have 
slandered the leaders of the rogue Euskadiko Ezkerra, that advocate for the Ministers of 
Justice and of the Interior to revise the records and add an elevated number of former 
ETA Political-Military members committed to abandoning arms. 
 Never has it been more evident than now that the inmates are simple exchange 
rates for their seditious benefactors of the pro-amnesty advocates, human merchandise 
that has to always be behind bars with the end of serving an altruistic flag for 
mobilizations that strategically looks for other purposes. In the exclusively human terrain, 
the pain of the prisoners‘ family members is worth all respect, although, different than 
that of the families of those killed by ETA, who have the consolation of knowing that 
they are still alive and harbor the hope that someday they will hug them in freedom. 
However, only contempt are creditors those who politically trade with the feelings of 
solidarity and condemn to a second time the inmates to the horror of prison, by defending 
a strategy of violence that makes it unthinkable to negotiate any measures of grace and to 
consider as a betrayal the efforts in favor of those exiled and prosecuted within the 
framework of legality. Because nobody in their right mind could honestly ask for pardons 
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for those who, the day after leaving prison, were willing to commit murder as atrocious 
as those committed yesterday in Rentería. And only the disappearance of violence in the 
Basque Country would make a change to the situation of the prisoners imaginable. But 
this is well known by those who obscenely manipulate demonstrations in favor of the 
amnesty as one more piece of a strategy of provocation and death. 
 
The Government and Constitutional Guarantees (El Gobierno y las garantías 
constitucionales) 9 April 1983 
THE MINISTER of the Interior called a press conference yesterday to report the 
results obtained by the spectacular police operations carried out in Madrid in recent days. 
While these actions have not yet managed to locate the whereabouts of Diego Prado and 
his kidnappers, Jose Barrionuevo justified the usefulness of the raids started in the 
neighborhood of Pilar through data related to the partial disarticulation of an ETA unit 
that was preparing criminal attacks and that is organically linked with the terrorists who 
criminally hold the financier. In a measured tone, which is welcomed as showing a new 
political sensibility, the Minister of the Interior apologized to the public for any 
inconvenience caused by the deployment of the Security Forces, while the propaganda 
services of his department placed advertisements in the Press to thank the residents of 
Madrid for their collaboration in home registrations. Simultaneously, whole 
neighborhoods of the capital continued to be subjected yesterday to the rigorous combing, 
continuing the largest scale of police operations put into action since the establishment of 
the democratic system. In a previous editorial commentary (see EL PAIS of 7 March) we 
noted that although the eventual achievements of the spectacular raid could make up for 
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many (under the moral of success) of the irregularities ordered by the Ministry of the 
Interior, no victory could justify – ethically, politically and legally – the violation of a 
constitutional guarantee as important as the inviolability of the home. The Minister of the 
Interior, convinced that his glance at the Constitution is the correct one, has invited those 
who have criticized him to carefully read Article 18.2 of the Constitution, which states 
that "the home is inviolable" and that "no entry or registration may be made without the 
consent of the owner or a court order, except in cases of flagrant crime‖. Although the 
willingness of Jose Barrionuevo as a hermeneutic should not be doubted, it is compulsory 
to return the advice to him and ask him to analyze that paragraph in greater detail and 
with better legal consultancy. 
 The official media emphasize the voluntary nature of the authorizations given by 
citizens for the public order patrols to register their dwellings. It is surprising, in this 
respect, the efficiency with which the mechanisms of forgetting operate as a function of 
the changes of position produced by upward mobility and the occupation of political 
power. Because those socialists who lived in secrecy until a few years ago, should at least 
consider as a problem the investigation of the real reasons that might prompt a citizen to 
grant such permission. Given that any human act is always motivated in multiple ways, it 
seems to be an excessive simplification to highlight the excitement and to reject fear in 
all of the cases in which "consent of the owner" of an address was produced for the entry 
and registry by police, without a warrant. The Minister of the Interior, instead of rejoicing 
exclusively for the ease received for the address registrations, perhaps should also worry 
about the automatic behavior of those who, with the fresh memory of the days in which 
they were simply subjected [to the registrations], have not gotten used to fully assuming 
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their condition as citizens, which involves the exercise of each and every one of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of 1978. 
 Playing to those of the past and those of the future, one could imagine the reaction 
of the socialists, turned into the opposition, in the case that an operation such as that 
carried out this week in Madrid were to be endorsed by a Government of UCD (in the 
past) or Manuel Fraga (in the future). Probably senior socialists and a good part of its 
voters would argue that the ownership of power, today occupied by the left, completely 
changes the nature of state actions and magically changes their meaning. It would result, 
therefore, that the only important thing is to know who governs, so that the assessment of 
the decisions of power should not be carried out in function of its concrete content but of 
its ideological origins. Unfortunately, not only history has been responsible for denying 
such arrogant presumptions (it is enough to cite the liquidation of the SFIO, that is, the 
French Socialists, as a result of their behavior during the Algerian war), but the 
absolution of the errors by the alleged sacramental efficiency of some centuries is a thesis 
that would be difficultly maintained by those who have formally settled to the 
foundations of their political conduct and have rejected the specious independence of the 
means with respect to the ends. 
 Regardless of the eventual lack of consent produced by intimidation and the 
memory of other times, the exceptions – few or many, one would be enough – to the 
voluntary acceptance of the address registry are sufficient – to raise in its integrity respect 
for the constitutional guarantee of the inviolability of the home. The issues of principle, 
as badly as they weigh on the defenders of State reasoning, do not allow [for] quantitative 
discounts. Moreover, the Ministrer of the Interior showed, with their initial hesitations 
197 
 
when it came time to justify the home raids, a legal uncertainty which could be 
interpreted as a symptom of a deeper bad conscience. At first, the authorities spoke 
indistinctly of injunctions to house searches, consistent with Article 18.2 of the 
Constitution, and of the application of the Antiterrorism Law of 1 December 1980, that 
authorizes the raids of dwellings without previous judicial resolution in exceptional 
circumstances. Yesterday, however, once the news that the duty judge of Madrid had not 
been requested by the police to issue search warrants [was] made public, the Minister of 
the Interior has gone out of his anxieties and has justified the raids exclusively through 
the application of the Antiterrorism Law. 
 This legal retreat is, however, a worrying manifestation that the heights of power 
can dizzy those who occupy the positions until the point that they temporarily forget their 
own past and jeopardize their credibility. The Antiterrorism Law, enacted in the ambit of 
Article 55 of the Constitution but situated – in the opinion of leading experts – outside the 
framework of our legality, suspends, effectively, the right to inviolability of the home and 
does not support any registration without supplied judicial consent or resolution. In this 
way, the members of the State Security Forces and Bodies may proceed under this rule 
without prior judicial authorization, to raid and search homes. But it occurs that an 
exceptional law cannot be interpreted in the rule of law and a democratic system; in an 
abusive form with analogous criteria. The suspension of the constitutional guarantees 
strictly affects the persons "suspected of being integrated or relating well with terrorist 
elements, along with armed gangs‖. The application of the antiterrorism legislation to 
defeat the resistances of a simple citizen to police bursting in into their home without a 
warrant is a legal and political aberration. And the suspension of constitutional rights of 
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the thousands of residents of the Madrid neighborhoods combed through by the police is 
an indignant abuse of power from a government that massively and cleanly won the 
elections, under the defense of freedoms. Let us point out, finally, that the Minister of the 
Interior is obliged by the antiterrorist law to report in these cases to the Central Court of 
the Audiencia Nacional the records made, the reasons that motivated them and the results 
obtained. Let us hope that this communication is done quickly. 
 Only bad faith or recklessness could lead to confuse the necessary collaboration 
of society in the fight against terrorism, defended always in the pages of El País, with the 
use of dubious constitutional mechanisms and unpleasant authoritarians to extract 
through psychological intimidation or the violation of fundamental rights an appearance 
of civic voluntarism in this task. It is always difficult to balance the dialectic between 
public security and civil liberties. However, apart from the short-term euphoria produced 
by short-term efficacy of the measures of force, it is evident that a democratic system 
must rest, whatever the ideology expressed in its parliamentary majority, on the 
principles of freedom and has to exclude any possibility that the Executive Power – 
hypnotized by the rhetoric slogan of a Government that governs – makes their daily 
practice indistinguishable from that of any authoritarian regime. 
 
Terrorism, Before Congress (El Terrorismo, ante el Congreso) 3 November 1983 
TODAY Congress will know the government‘s plans to improve the effectiveness 
of actions taken against terrorist groups. The tense moments and the emotions unleashed 
by the monstrous murder of Captain Alberto Martín are the beginning of the call for this 
plenary. However, ETA has not wavered in their harassment since the inauguration of 
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Felipe González. The long and painful list of attacks and murders during this period is 
testimony to this fact. It is possible that the socialist Government believed at the 
beginning of their mandate that the gates of terrorist hell could not prevail against the 
new majority. Perhaps that initial trust made them lower their guard or underestimate the 
dangers in the first moments. It can be speculated, thus, about omissions in the field of 
diplomatic pressure and errors in the reorganization of the intelligence services and 
police. The weak hopes for a truce from the different terrorist branches showed their 
illusory character to failure, partly due to PSOE‘s own fault, the Garaikoetxea initiative 
of convening a peace talk. 
 The information available gives reason to suspect that the Government has given 
up adopting some antiterrorist measures that would in the short-term only have 
propaganda effects, and that in the medium and long term would be counterproductive. 
Heated suggestions to declare a state of emergency, to claim military intervention or to 
extend for no less than up to 20 days the period of preventative detention before having to 
go before a judge for those suspected of being members of armed gangs have been on the 
Government‘s table. Also the expressed criminalization of Herri Batasuna and of the 
parties that form the coalition, currently located in a limbo of lawlessness, criminalization 
that would only lead to greater tension in the social body of the Basque Country. Finally, 
the dirty war – some of whose methods the Government seems to be using – is an action 
forbidden to anyone who believes in the political and ethical superiority of democratic 
systems and who is committed to the defense of their values. But, moreover, the 
experience also indicates that institutional terrorism – sufficient with the example of 
Argentina – would not only discount those who practice the same miserable moral 
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condition of the armed gangs, but would also condemn them to [what is] surely political 
bankruptcy. 
 In any case, the news that arrives – and that we hope will be confirmed today – 
that the Government has wisely decided to give up the revenue of a spectacular but 
useless dramatization in the antiterrorism fight does not mean that the pressures to require 
confirming visible gestures – effective or not – in their obvious intention to obstruct the 
armed gangs can completely resisted.  It appears that the devised measures that 
Parliament will debate today will be judicial, penal, procedural and criminal. In the 
judicial sphere the exceptions to the general principle of territoriality of the penal law 
would be extended, with the aim to prosecute the extortions and actions of terrorists 
abroad, and would deal with trying to change extradition practices with other countries. 
In the penitentiary terrain, the precautions adopted to guarantee the safety of officials 
could indirectly punish the families of prisoners and call into question the principles of 
penitentiary reform. In the litigation field, the measures to apply the maximum period of 
preventative prison do not need, in our view, any modification of the laws. In the penal 
sphere, equipping the military with authority in case of attack would permit the use of a 
type of aggravated penalty that is used when the victims are members of the Forces of 
Public Order. The insults to the flag committed by public officials would be more 
severely sanctioned. The reality is that, ultimately, the government finds itself with the 
fact that there exist laws that are more than powerful – and some that are even doubtfully 
constitutional for the fight against terrorism, and it is not about modifying them if it is not 
to quell the hydra coup or popular tribulation from the increase of terrorism. But it would 
be a dangerous error if the Government were to follow the slope of panic on this issue. 
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This incline is insinuated in the decision to more rigorously pursue, and under the 
expectation of more severe punishment, the so-called crime of advocating terrorism. 
Once again it is necessary to point out that the indetermination and vagueness of such 
offense violated, in our view, the constitutional principles of legality and legal security. 
The Penal Code had always considered the condoning of crime – as it is defined in 
Article 566 – as a simple failure. Elevating it to a substantive offense of "public 
condoning" of the conducts or activities of people "integrated into organized and armed 
groups or bands and their associates‖ vainly tries to contain within the limits of penal law 
legal-political phenomena that are difficult to define, and for whose denunciation the 
prosecution has no fixed or firm criteria. Moreover, the experience of the so-called Law 
for the Defense of Democracy teaches that it is not these types of threats that will manage 
to defeat terrorism, but those that agitate its waters. The Government is not obligated to 
offer miracles in its fight against ETA, but it is, instead, obliged to not make mistakes in 
their repressive response. We expect and hope that this is the spirit that will appear today 
before the Courts.  
 
Again Terrorism (Otra vez el terrorismo) 21 November 1984 
The terrorist murder of Santiago Brouard, leader of Herri Batasuna, in Bilbao is a 
new and disgusting attack against democratic coexistence in this country. The specific 
circumstances surrounding [the murder] – the doctor was viciously attacked while giving 
a consult – help highlight the moral misery of the murderers. There has been a new 
victim of this bloody intolerance that threatens to destroy the roots of coexistence in 
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Euskadi. President of the Revolutionary Socialist People's Party (HASI), elected member 
to the Basque Parliament, and deputy mayor of the Bilbao City Council during the 
previous term, Santiago Brouard, Santi, was a pediatrician and a highly esteemed person 
for his personal kindness and his professional work. He met the criteria for a leader, and 
since many times these columns have disagreed even bitterly with his approaches and 
beliefs, it is necessary today to highlight the despicable act which ended his life, the 
human and political aberration that was committed once again by the sowers of violence. 
It is too early to analyze the explanation of the murder. The fact that the crime was 
committed on 20 November carries ominous and disturbing connotations the coincidence 
between that date and the death of the dictator Franco. The possibility that the 
responsibility [for the attack] corresponds to the Anti-Terrorist Liberation Groups (GAL), 
so far settled on French soil for the operation of their bloody business, will more 
dramatically plant serious questions in public opinion – not yet convincingly clarified by 
the Government – about the origin, financing, supplying, and address of that criminal 
gang. The possibility that, as in the fable of the sorcerer's apprentice, the hired murderers 
of the GAL were able to escape control by their employers and act as a loose wheel in 
this awful drama should not be ruled out.  
 In any case we should ask who benefits from this attack. Indeed, not democracy 
and peace. It will be necessary to exude prudence, imagination, and political know-how 
so that this murder does not lead to the paroxysm of a spiral of violence in Euskadi. Even 
with all the differences that exist between conflict zones, the specter of Ulster, 
understood as a violent confrontation in the heart of a civil society divided by ideological 
hatred and sectarian misunderstanding, it should disturb and frighten all who sense that 
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the future of democracy and freedom in Spain is inseparable from the future of the 
Basque Country. At the present time, the institutions of the autonomous region are almost 
paralyzed by the internal divisions of the Basque Nationalist Party and by the attempts of 
other political forces to utilize these conflicts to their advantage. Yesterday's attack 
impacts, moreover, the negotiating process started last summer by the Madrid 
Government aimed at pacifying the Basque Country, to achieve social reintegration of 
not a few ex-militants of ETA and give a political exit and not only police [exit] to the 
conflict. Now no one doubts that everything will be more difficult. But perhaps those 
who defend, [from] deep within and even in their statements, the existence of a terrorism 
of response, a type of good, anti-etarra terrorism, against the other bad, etarra terrorism 
will learn a lesson. The facts demonstrate that outside the action of the law and strict 
respect for democratic norms there is no free solution to the Basque problem. The 
murderers of Brouard are not better than those of the socialist senator Enrique Casas, or 
the latter than the former. But the extension of political criminality can ruin in a few days 
the hopes of peace opened recently. The Basque and Madrid Governments need to give a 
response to this urgent call from the citizens: security in democracy. And arrest and 
punishment of all terrorists. 
 
Terrorism and Security (El terrorismo y la seguridad) 28 April 1985  
Two weeks after the tragedy that occurred in El Descanso, that cost the lives of 18 
clients of the popular Madrid restaurant, the scrupulous silence or complete ignorance of 
the Minister of the Interior has stolen from the public opinion this basic information 
about the brutal attack to which the citizens of a democratic system have the right and 
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that justify the rational confidence of society in the competence and efficacy of their 
police services. Although definitive and reliable evidence demonstrates that the 
vindication made in Beirut by an Islamic terrorist organization was authentic, [it] would 
still [be necessary to] reconstruct the path taken by this criminal enterprise from Lebanon 
to the heart of Spanish territory. That criminal orders were originally given beyond our 
borders constitutes a marginal fact in investigating the infrastructure, the composition and 
contacts in our land of a foreign band able to select [as] a target a restaurant frequented 
by North American nationals, install an explosive charge in the building, erase their 
tracks and find safe refuge in a strange urban environment. The coldness and distance 
shown by the official media toward the victims of this attack – buried without the 
presence of some usual personalities of this type of funeral – perhaps rests on the unjust 
judgment that it is not the same an indiscriminate killing of modest persons perpetrated 
by a foreign band as the targeted killing of uniformed men, political leaders or social 
leaders executed by a Spanish organization. If this were the explanation, one would have 
to doubt not only the sensibility of the Government and of its strange conception of 
public safety, but also of their capacity to understand the scale and implications of 
international terrorism. Because the incorporation of Spanish territory into the field of 
operations where the secret services of the great powers and of their allies, free their 
destabilizing wars is news as much or more serious than the persistence of terrorist 
groups with known identity. That kind of unacknowledged official relief that underlies 
the hypothesis of foreign authorship in the El Descanso attack is particularly puzzling if 
one recalls President Reagan‘s impending trip to Madrid. 
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Along with the disturbing emergence of the terrorist outbreak materialized in the 
El Descanso tragedy, the statement made public on Friday by ETA militar (see EL PAIS 
of 26 April) adds another concern to public safety. ETA militar threatens Spanish and 
foreign tourists with a "campaign of sabotage" in the Mediterranean zone, to the style of 
that developed by ETA Político-militar in the summers of 1979 and 1980. Still without 
excessive confidence in the efficacy of the quotes, we will remind that five years ago 
Herri Batasuna considered the polimilis’ [members of ETA Político-militar] anti-tourism 
campaign "counterrevolutionary" "crazy" and "harmful" accused of "confusing the 
struggle of the Basque people and undermining the necessary solidarity between the 
workers of the distinct peoples of Spain". 
 If the new direction taken by ETA Militar is confirmed it might be inferred that 
the strengthening of the measures adopted by French authorities in the former sanctuary 
of the armed groups has obliged the terrorist organization to cross the border and extend 
their area of operation – so far basically limited to the Basque Country and Madrid – to 
the rest of Spain. French cooperation was a condition so that Spanish democracy could 
deal with the terrorist challenge. Also compromise of the Basque Government and the 
Basque Nationalist Party with the antiterrorism fight constitutes an indispensible 
requirement for its success. The legislative pact between Basque nationalists and 
socialists and the energetic pronouncements from the lendakari Ardanza have satisfied 
this requirement. Finally, the police authorities have always claimed, with more than 
debatable arguments, Udder hands to arrest suspects, register homes, intervene 
communications and question for 10 days those detained. The present Government's 
Antiterrorism Law strengthens and extends the exceptional legislation, with the end to 
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give the police the requested facilities. The pretexts have ended: the Minister of the 
Interior already has all the cards in his hand and the success of the fight against ETA 
depends on his efficacy and capacity.  
 
The Ertzantza, on the Front Line (La Ertzantza, en primera línea) 3 November 1986 
Genaro García de Andoáin, head of the Basque autonomous police was shot dead 
yesterday by an ETA unit in the operation which rescued the industrial Lucio 
Aguinagalde, is the first representative of the Ertzantza to fall in a battle against the 
terrorist organization. In the operation that freed Aguinagalde from the kidnapping other 
State antiterrorist entities were not involved, and apparently were not informed of the 
arrangements put in place for the Basque police. This is not the first time the Ertzantza 
collaborated in some way in the fight against terrorism and this is not the first ertzaina 
killed by ETA. The Basque terrorist organization took responsibility for the murder, on 7 
March 1985, of the superintendent of the regional police force, Lieutenant Colonel Carlos 
Díaz Arcocha. The assassination coincided with the beginning of the Ertzantza anti-
terrorist activity, to which ETA responded with the brutality that has traditionally been 
common. 
In all, the special meaning of yesterday‘s action escapes no one. García de 
Andoáin was a man of confidence of the adviser to the Interior of the Basque 
Government, Luis María Retolaza, a personality of great importance in the Basque 
Nationalist Party. Lucio Aguinagalde, industrial, 69, is the oldest militant of the PNV in 
Vitoria and had accepted, a week before the kidnapping, a position of responsibility in the 
municipal court of the party. Thus, both the kidnapping and its resolution have been an 
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open challenge from ETA to PNV. The president of the party, Xabier Arzalluz, said in 
the Bilbao Press: "The kidnapping of Lucio Aguinagalde is a direct confrontation from 
ETA against the PNV. We are doing things to even find him, which are difficult and 
dangerous". Reality has confirmed Arzalluz‘s suspicion. The response of PNV to the 
challenge of ETA highlights the will of the ruling party in Euskadi to confront terrorism 
as much in the political as in the police front. A significant fact, without a doubt, when 
the discussion of who has the responsibility of the antiterrorism fight remains in the 
Basque Country. 
In that debate, in which there are no shortages of confusing profiles, it should not 
be forgotten that ETA is the common enemy of the democratic forces that defend the 
Statute of Guernica and peaceful coexistence in Euskadi. Terrorists extort or kidnap 
without distinction. For the Basque terrorist organization, the enemy is defined as anyone 
who disagrees with their violent approaches. 
The responsibility to end the climate of violence in Euskadi belongs, by the same, 
to everyone. ETA similarly kills citizens who cross the lights when they decide to end the 
family of a militant as the civil guards or the children playing in the street. 
 The terrorist challenge requires practical cooperation of all democrats and all 
public institutions. The PNV finds itself in these moments in an unsurpassable position to 
ensure proper implementation of that solidarity. And the assumption by the Basque police 
of the antiterrorism fight, in all its dimensions and with all its consequences, is first-rate 
news that inspires all kinds of hopes. 
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The Fall Assessment (Pulso de otoño) 16 October 1987 
SPANIARDS are not necessarily happier, but contemplate the evolution of the 
political situation, and especially of the economic situation, with increasing optimism, per 
a poll corresponding to this fall by the company Demoscopia for El País. The favorable 
indicators of the economic situation released in the past months – decrease in inflation, 
increased investment and production – have permeated into the consciousness of the 
people, who envision the future with greater confidence. The percentage of those who 
consider the general economic situation to be bad or very bad decreases from 44% in 
June to 32% at the end of September, while increasing by 30% the number of citizens 
who have a positive evaluation. This occurs despite [the fact that] the opinion of personal 
household economic [situation] hardly changed, while noting some improvement in the 
estimate. The survey shows a clear parallel between the evolution of the assessment of 
the economic situation and that of the political. The number of pessimists descends by 
seven points, while those who consider the current political situation to be very good 
increases by five points with respect to the survey from the beginning of the summer. 
That assessment barely has a reflection on the voting intentions of Spaniards. The slow 
decrease of the PSOE continues parallel to the Alianza Popular [Popular Alliance], as has 
been happening practically since 1982, so that, as a whole, the electoral map is barely 
modified. With everything, the tendency toward greater pluralism highlighted in the local 
elections of last 10 June is maintained. 
 Suarez's CDS continues to get results inferior to those of his leader in the 
popularity ranking of politicians. Fraga continues surpassing, by a narrow margin, 
Hernandez Mancha, and Felipe Gonzalez remains the most popular politician. As a 
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particular case, in the Basque region a great permeability is observed between the voters 
of the two forces that divided the PNV last year, expressed also in the appreciation of 
each electoral group to the leader of the rival sector: not only is Garaikoetxea esteemed 
more by those who vote Ardanza, something that was already known, but the voters of 
the leader of Eusko Alkartasuna also show a clear respect for the current lehendakari. 
 The survey, held a week before the arrest in France of the ETA leader Santiago 
Arrospide, does not permit assessing the effect that in the perception of the problem of 
terrorism they could have produced developments as a consequence of this arrest. At the 
end of September, a relative majority (42%) of those polled considered that the ETA 
problem was worse than few years ago, and only 10% felt that that it was getting better. 
The pessimism from young people with respect [to this] is significant: 23% of those 
under age 21 do not see any solution to the problem of terrorism on the horizon. A few 
days after the Prime Minister recognized that he had maintained contacts with ETA, 51% 
of Spaniards positively valued that attitude, but it was very high, 32%, the number of 
those who spoke against any type of contact with the terrorists. 
 Like every quarter, the survey includes a series of seven questions designed to 
highlight the evolution of what the pollsters call the vital tone of the Spanish: level of 
self-satisfaction with their own work, euphoria or depression, hope for the future, etc. 
The results reveal a slow shift toward greater lethargy, fundamentally determined by the 
relative absence of stimuli. Whether this is compatible with a more optimistic assessment 
regarding the evolution of political and economic situations could perhaps be interpreted 
as a sign of maturity of Spanish society. Today, the excessive euphoria and the 
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disproportionate disappointments of the transition gone, people have learned to separate 
the private sphere from the public plane. 
 
The Law and the Bomb (La ley y la bomba) 24 May 1988 
―IT WAS ALL legal‖, is the terse reply from the Minister of the Interior about the 
armed assault that a family and a local Leganés (Madrid) politician suffered in the early 
hours yesterday from the Special Operating Groups (GEO). With that which they 
sanctioned the legality of police and political incompetence. All counterterrorism action 
involves the risk of negative consequences for its innocent witnesses. But from there to 
any mischief that Fraga calls "burdens of citizenship" is a very big stretch. The concept 
that in the fight against terrorism anything goes and that it is unfortunate but inevitable 
that some spectator ends up badly harmed is a fallacy imposed by what is considered 
expedient in the fight against this modern plague. 
 The citizenry must not carry more burdens than those covered by law; the rest are 
illegal, regardless of who implements them and regardless of their justification. And it is 
necessary to know what specific legal norm protected the barbarity of the GEO, that is to 
say, what has permitted them to violate the  [right of the] inviolability of the home 
provided in the Constitution. It is only possible, twisting the argument, to find remote 
support in the sixteenth article of the aberrant antiterrorism law, which permits security 
forces and bodies to detain alleged terrorists without previous judicial authorization – 
which obviously is not case. One must ask, this article automatically converts Spaniards 
into suspects in the eyes of the Government and extends a blank check to law 
enforcement. In that case, the proven ineffectiveness of the antiterrorist law – 
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unconstitutional for many reasons – to fight terrorism alone, will be comparable to its 
utility patent to terrorize the population. 
 Regarding kidnapping, the Government of Felipe Gonzalez has tested everything, 
from the paramilitary occupation of entire neighborhoods up to the GEO smashing 
through the doors of the house of Leganés. The Nani disappeared for the sake of the fight 
against terrorism, and the police officer Amedo is involved in serious criminal charges 
for his alleged involvement in the GAL case (antiterrorism terrorism, as the socialist 
Government likes to dictate). Many times we have had the opportunity to point out that 
along with the destruction and damage directly caused by the criminal barbarity of ETA 
the moral damages in the social body, the discredit of the democracy and its methods, the 
perversion of authority or the leniency regarding the violation of the basic values of the 
rule of law should be accounted for. The inadmissible and cruel torture to which the 
Revilla industry is being subjected to by ETA gangsters cannot be a pretext or a reason 
for the State apparatus to lose its nerves. The maxim that against terrorism anything goes 
is indignant of any democratic sensibility, but is moreover, and as can be verified, stupid. 
 [Very] recently, Felipe Gonzalez acknowledged the wear of his Minister of 
Education. When will it be recognized that it is inhumane to keep in the position of the 
Interior a man so inept and politically mediocre such as that who occupies the office? 
How many blunders, abuses, excesses, arrogances, should this team of foolish 
administrators of the public order commit before we Spaniards finally receive the grace 
of his dismissal? 
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The Last of ETA (La horma de ETA) 19 September 1989 
 The dismantling of the Araba command of ETA – to which 39 murders in the last 
years are attributed – the arrest of practically all of its collaborators and the seizure of an 
abundant arsenal of arms and other materials that would serve to carry out and to 
camouflage their criminal acts constitutes an inappreciable and valuable police success. 
But, moreover, the dismantling of this dangerous firing squad and of their accomplices is 
a very timely blow to the terrorist organization, in a period of resurgence of criminal 
activity after the talks in Algiers broke down. Since ETA unilaterally considered that the 
informal contacts that it maintained with emissaries of the Spanish government in the 
Algerian capital did not meet their claims, their murderous arm has claimed at least a 
dozen lives in just six months, the latest of which is that of National Court prosecutor 
Carmen Tagle. Operations such as that culminated by the Guardia Civil with the 
dismantling of the Araba command show that the democratic State has the capacity and 
legal means to deal with the challenge of terrorists so that their criminal activity does not 
go unpunished.  
 Although, in principle, the official version of events seems plausible, the Director 
General of the Guardia Civil, Luis Roldán, does not do a good service to the required 
transparency in a democratic society when he refuses to give "too many details" to "avoid 
controversy" about its outcome: two terrorists killed and three civil guards wounded to 
varying degrees. In any case, the details of the operation, publically denied at this time, 
cannot be hidden from a judicial inquiry, which shall ultimately rule on the legality of the 
police action. In the rule of law, no violent death – not even those produced by the 
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security forces in the legitimate struggle against terrorism – falls outside the margin of 
clarification by an independent and impartial body such as the judiciary.  
The speed with which Herri Batasuna and pro-amnesty solicitors have condemned 
the police action, which they have qualified as an "ambush", is all a sample of the crude 
hypocrisy that often leads those who walk around the world asking the dead for their 
identity and political affiliation to decide what use will be made of them. Always willing 
to praise the dead terrorists and analysts punctilious on the circumstances of their death in 
light of a democratic legality that they fight with fury as heroes, they do not blink when 
the dead are others. Fortunately, the immense majority of the Basque society discovered 
long ago the imposture of these executioners. 
 
Death Instinct (Pulsión de muerte) 7 September 1990 
The hypothesis that it was members of the First of October Antifascist Resistance 
Groups (GRAPO) that placed the three bombs that exploded yesterday in two official 
buildings of Madrid is perfectly plausible. Known only by the cruelty of their actions, but 
not for other types of causes that could possibly evoke to justify them, this group of 
desperate [persons] only moves, like their ETA counterparts, as the Bishop of Bilbao just 
described as, citing Paul Ricoeur, an extreme "death instinct". Kill and destroy, that is 
their concise program. To apply it you do not need any special qualities. It is neither 
necessary to be smart nor is it indispensable to be brave. It is enough to be unscrupulous 
and close your eyes to the effects caused. To place a bomb in a public place like the 
Madrid Stock Exchange is to blindly bet on an indeterminate number of random victims. 
To do it in the Constitutional Court's headquarters or the office of a ministry is to seek 
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victims at random between anonymous officials. Therein lay the motive of those who 
have been won over by this death instinct that dominates the soul of the terrorist. In 
which, its action being arbitrary and indiscriminate, no one can feel safe. Their desire for 
omnipotence is done when they know that we all fear. 
The hypothesis of the responsibility of the GRAPO is also weight[ed] [given] the 
artisanal– but no less deadly – character of the artifacts, such as, above all in the case of 
the Constitutional Court, the barely sophisticated system used to place them. But that 
itself highlights the resounding failure and fragility of the existing security systems in the 
affected centers. 
 Spain is one of the European countries most punished by terrorism, and the 
security measures must be proportionate to the risk. It is true that killing and destroying is 
always too easy, and that, as experts have repeatedly reiterated, no security plan can 
eliminate one hundred percent risk of terrorist action: if in a given place the security 
measures were almost insurmountable, the terrorists would look for other less protected 
targets. And then the editor in charge of communications would be responsible for 
explaining that the new target symbolically represented that which was abandoned for 
being inaccessible. All this is true, but from it no good conscience should be derived. 
Precisely because in the fight against terrorism the symbolic battle is decisive, the 
democratic State has to step up its effort to avoid any image of vulnerability. At least so 
that it does not give the impression that the terrorists have not had to struggle too much to 
cause the destruction to which they aspired. 
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Judges and Terrorism (Jueces y terrorismo) 23 November 1991 
Many things are felt, from indignation to bewilderment, about the recent decision 
from the Criminal Division of the National Court to absolve three ETA collaborators, 
nevertheless recognizing their criminal conduct. The exculpation of those who developed 
and partially executed a plan to get the etarra Ignacio de Juana Chaos to escape from the 
Herrera de la Mancha jail, sentenced for various attacks, among others that which caused 
the death of five Civil Guard members in Juan Bravo de Madrid Street in 1985, has 
prompted the prosecutorial board of said tribunal to show their indignation. For their part, 
the State security forces have expressed their discouragement, and from the broadest 
areas of society it is not difficult to feel perplexed about the judicial statement. This 
varied range of sentiments is not only due to the absolution itself but rather that it is a 
product of a mechanical application to the case of a series of legal principles and 
guarantees that have led, definitely, to the impunity of behaviors that the court itself 
describes in its conviction as materially criminal. The principle argument of the tribunal 
is that such conducts do not constitute the crime of collaboration with armed bands, as 
intended by the prosecutor, but rather the attempted escape of prisoners. The perpetrators 
are consequently absolved of the first crime, but they cannot be sentenced for the second 
for lack of indictment.  
 It is incomprehensible, however, that the tribunal waited for the sentencing to 
present their criteria regarding the classification of the facts and did not warn the ministry 
publically of its possible error in the oral hearing, when it was still possible to remedy it. 
It is also incomprehensible that this same tribunal was able to keep for almost two years 
in temporary detention those accused of a crime that was later considered unfounded.  
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 The justice is usually represented as a blindfolded woman. But that is not to say 
that it must act blind in the process, in a bureaucratic manner. On the contrary, their 
obligatory blindness to the outside world to the process is a condition for better 
clairvoyance against what occurs in its interior. When this is not what happens situations 
really Kafkaesque can occur, such as that in which collaborators of a terrorist 
organization that seek the destruction of the rule of law unduly benefit from its 
guarantees. Guarantees that, obviously, apply to all, including terrorists, but taking care 
that its imprecise legal formation or the malpractice and the routine [manner of] its 
application does not serve the purposes of those who do not believe in them and who 
viciously fight the institutions that guarantee them.  
 It is true that the justice system has mechanisms to redress its own wrongdoings. 
In the case that motivates this commentary, the Supreme Court, to which the prosecution 
has appealed, can still prevent the law from being definitely circumvented. But it will be 
difficult that, in that case, their decision has any other value than that strictly moral. It is 
not probable that the justice [system will] get back in their hands those who achieved to 
circumvent it, taking advantage of the methods in which, on occasion, are given.  
 Meanwhile it is not strange that the situation created garners indignation or 
discouragement. It is worth specifying, however, that the State officials should not, in any 
case, condition their acts on the success or failure of other officials. Discouragement, 
which can be comprehensible in this case, cannot be a determinant factor for those who 
have essential responsibilities in the rule of law.  
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Fascism and Reason (Fascismo y razón) 24 March 1992 
 THOSE WHO CHOOSE democratic coexistence as the best known system of 
political and social organization – that is, the immense majority of Spaniards – know that, 
against the murder and extortion of the ETA Mafia, the most sensible thing is to trust in 
the institutions of the rule of law: the justice and the police. In these days there have been 
two consistent and commendable facts: the Supreme Court upheld the sentences of 108 
years imprisonment for those who turn away from democratic legitimacy to combat 
terrorism (the GAL case) and the Ministry of Interior scored a success by arresting in 
Tarragona an alleged member of ETA, the discovery of two safe houses of the group and 
a van. That is the right way for those of us who believe in democracy. The murder of a 
young man of 26 years yesterday in Madrid is the way of those who only accept the 
dialectic of guns: fascist totalitarianism. 
 Against those who choose death as a way of life, only constancy of political 
reason and the legitimate defense mechanisms of the same are possible. 
 
When the Medium is the Message (Cuando el medio es el mensaje) 3 December 1993 
That Herri Batasuna and ETA are two bodies with the same head is not a 
suspicion, but something so evident, at least, as that the Egin newspaper is the organ of 
expression of those bodies and their corresponding soul. That, as a function of it, there is 
someone who considers [it] convenient or even morally justified that said newspaper stop 
publication does not make any lawful administrative measure aimed at closing it. But the 
invocation of the freedom of expression also is not enough to make any act of that or any 
other newspaper lawful. Between the arbitrariness of power and naked impunity there is a 
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third possibility, the one appropriate with the rule of law: the judicial investigation of 
facts from which evidence of criminal behavior can be derived. It is to say, the 
application of the law. It is what Judge Bueren has done regarding the documentation 
submitted by the French authorities and that was found in the possession of Carlos 
Almorza, allegedly responsible for the ETA extortion network, detained in said country a 
few months ago. That documentation reveals that reports about companies and 
individuals that had been commissioned by Egin to a private company were in the hands 
of the terrorists. 
 Given the long dedication of ETA to the task of extorting businessmen, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that someone from Egin would have passed these reports to the 
terrorists with the end to make it easier for them to obtain funds for these proceedings.  In 
any case, it was something that deserved to be investigated. The entrance of the 
Ertzaintza, by court order, in the Egin newsrooms in Bilbao and Hernani to search for 
any evidence that could confirm such evidence was, therefore, justified. 
 As the Basque Interior Minister, Juan Maria Atutxa, revealed yesterday regarding 
the material seized in those newsrooms, it is already known that among the businessmen 
that Egin sought information include, in addition to some from the Gohierri district that 
were subjected to extortion, others related to the works of the Leizarán highway that were 
once victims of ETA attacks. This extends the field of investigation: it should be 
ascertained whether the information utilized by the terrorists to select their victims and to 
prepare the attacks had its origin in the cited newspaper. The investigation should clarify 
in that case which person or persons sent such reports to the terrorists. It is about, in any 
case, the responsibility of individual persons. 
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Linking this investigation with the "campaign of harassment", as the director of 
Egin has done, is, therefore, misplaced. Different from the etarra world, in which the 
rifle commands and in which the terrorists are attributed to the legislative power; judicial 
and executive – in the double sense of the word – in a democratic society the judges are 
independent of the other powers and apply preexisting norms and regulated proceedings. 
The evidence obliges the judge to intervene.   
The Penal Code does not provide for the possibility of closing a newspaper, 
although it does [provide for] the seizure of the printing press, in certain cases related to 
crimes of terrorism. In the analyzed case, such a possibility seems unrealistic, given that 
the crimes under investigation have been committed, where applicable, by individuals 
and not by the paper as such. 
 But beyond this particular case, and given that the issue has been raised, one 
questions if whether the right to freedom of expression protected by the Constitution and 
now invoked by Egin covers anything that appears on their pages. The answer is no. 
Right from the start, the freedom of speech to criticize and that to incite murder are not 
the same. It is one thing to express ideas, however abhorrent they could be for the 
majority of the population, and another to utter credible threats.   
 When, after the arrest of ETA's network of extortionists dismantled by the 
Ertzaintza at the beginning of 1992, a spokesman for Herri Batasuna accused the judge 
that intervened in the case of "acting like a super cop‖, he warned that HB "took good 
note of their actions‖ and he threatened him to ―act accordingly‖, he was doing 
something that absolutely could be considered protected by the Constitution. If the 
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transmission of such threats by the Egin newspaper constitutes a crime or not is 
something that the judges will have to determine.  
 
Reinsertion (Reinserción) 22 July 1994 
IF THERE is a field in which all parties should avoid conflict it is that of the 
counterterrorism fight. And if there has been in the democratic Spain a successful 
operation in this field it has been precisely the collaboration – the solidarity – of the 
parties in what became known as the Ajuria Enea table. The terrorists in our country are 
increasingly less and less, increasingly isolated, and many of them, in prisons, are sorry 
for having been, or at least determined not to return to be one. For that it would be an 
unpardonable insanity if the Government and the opposition were to get involved now in 
public disputes about the antiterrorism strategy. It would only benefit those who wish to 
continue killing and those that applaud them. Terrorism has lost the battle in Euskadi and 
in all of Spain, and what is now needed is for all of those who have been its activists or 
supporters realize it. Conflicts between democrats in this terrain only grant balls of 
oxygen to those who deny this reality. 
 The Popular Party has every right to criticize when it wishes specific aspects of 
the Government‘s counterterrorism policy. That from within it there is a strong resistance 
to the reinsertion policy is logical. It is also there in other [political] parties. The sense of 
justice that all citizens rebel to some degree before what is undoubtedly a State pardon 
toward a delinquent responsible for heinous crimes in some cases. But political wisdom 
sometimes requires generosity, not so much for the good of the jailed delinquent, but for 
that of society and all of the potential victims of terrorism. To close the pathways of 
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incorporation into society of these former terrorists who have abdicated violence would 
not only promote the collective irrationality of prisoners still committed to the crime. It 
would also feed the numantinismo of terrorists still in freedom and of their political 
environment. 
The policy of reinsertion has been a success. Criticizing it can be popular. Even 
electorally profitable for those who are seen already, again or continuously, immersed in 
campaigning. Political profits [are] also accrued by promoting instincts of revenge. But 
the State policy in the fight against the scourge of terrorism should define clear ideas and 
cool heads. Emotions generate emotions, and precisely from these [emotions] terrorists 
are nurtured for their work to recruit new members. 
That the accelerated reinsertion of the last few months coincides with a process 
whose end is the granting of the penitentiary third degree to the police officers Amedo 
and Domínguez, convicted for belonging to the GAL, cannot be a coincidence. But, in 
any case, it would be absurd to say that it is motivated by it. The policy of reinsertion and 
the general lines of penitentiary treatment for terrorist prisoners are, [along] with the 
police action, the cornerstone of the democratic State's fight against terrorism and [they] 
were designed long before the two police officers were convicted. 
 If something has changed it is because the current Minister of Justice and the 
Interior has the political will to carry them out without consequence and does not hide it. 
As in the reinsertion cases of etarras, the sense of justice also rebels against Amedo and 
Domínguez obtaining more or less limited freedom.  
Moreover there exists the perception in much of society that this favor is granted 
by the Government under pressure from some prisoners that without a doubt have 
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information about the plot of the GAL and any implications that the State does not want 
to come to light. But if gradual reintegration of Amedo and Domínguez serves to make 
the enemies of this policy toward etarras understand that it is the best way to end nearly 
three decades of deaths and pain caused by terrorism, it is worth it to support this malaise 
that causes many Spaniards [to be] certain that they will not complete the sentence they 
deserved. 
  
The Government Cannot Keep Quiet (El Gobierno no puede seguir callado) 21 
December 1994 
A day and a half after a judge ordered the arrest of the former Director General of 
State Security Julian Sancristóbal, accused of crimes that refer to an alleged plot of State 
terrorism, the Government has not said a single word to dispel the concern and 
discouragement that have taken hold of many citizens. It is true that, starting with 
unemployment and job insecurity, the people's concerns are not reduced to what is 
happening these days in the Audencia Nacional. Also, it is that the charges for which 
Sancristóbal has been arrested refer to events that occurred more than a decade ago. But, 
in an already very tense environment, it will be difficult to address those problems that 
concern the citizens while the suspect of serious events continues depending on active 
political leaders. It is alleged that someone could have had a personal or political interest 
in reactivating the GAL issue now. It is possible that this is how it could have been, and 
citizens should know, but that does not change things: the GAL issue has not been dug up 
because it was never buried. And it was not because nobody in power, ever 
acknowledged that the GAL was a tremendous political mistake and a criminally botched 
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job. There were not even publicly known terminations or resignations that could have 
been interpreted by the public as an implicit admission of guilt and commitment to non-
recurrence. The reverse: still yesterday, the former minister Barrionuevo claimed the 
solidarity of "friends and supporters". Supporters of what or of whom? Perhaps of the 
efficacy of the GAL to clean the border from terrorists, according to a police union 
[official] affirmed yesterday? 
 It is true that the attitude of the French authorities changed after the attacks 
claimed by the GAL. But that change would have occurred anyway, because belligerence 
against terrorist groups ambushed in their territory formed an essential part of the 
program of the center-right coalition that won the 1986 elections, and that later the other 
parties assumed. But, in return, the existence of the GAL provided ETA the flag they 
were looking for to prove their theory of two symmetrical violences, speech in which, 
they have founded the continuation of the armed struggle by a new generation of activists 
with their corresponding civilian supporters. ETA was never so close to success as in the 
years of the GAL. The de-legitimization of the democratic State they were looking for by 
provoking military [personnel] – in the hope of producing a regressive blow – they 
almost got it in those months and years in which the GAL and ETA competed in the same 
field. Including that of the so-called "mistakes". Up to nine French citizens outside the 
terrorist organization figure among the victims of the gunmen in the GAL. 
 At the end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties there were many 
politicians of all ideologies – including the Basque nationalism and what was later called 
the Popular Party – which insinuated, when they did not proclaim, openly, that the only 
way to end ETA was "to do what De Gaulle did with those of the OAS". But the only 
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[thing] that can be claimed from the Government is precisely that the GAL disappeared, 
while ETA has continued killing. Exactly, 214 people since the beginning of 1987, the 
year in which the last attack attributed to the GAL was committed. That is the only self-
criticism of which one has on record by the Government of Felipe Gonzalez in relation to 
this matter. 
 
‗Dirty‘ Histories (Historias ‘sucias’) 25 February 1995 
THE STATEMENTS of Lieutenant-General Sáenz de Santa María regarding the 
antiterrorism fight are of unquestionable informative interest. Not in vain was he an 
essential piece in this difficult fight during the first 10 years of democracy, as, delegate of 
the Government in the Basque Country and commander-in-chief of the National Police 
and Civil Guard, where he relieved Luis Roldán. Some of his statements are truly 
disturbing and, of course, objectionable. Above all, the thinly veiled recognition of the 
need to utilize dirty war methods, even of murder if there is no other alternative, and the 
general hypothesis that the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism demands on 
occasion going beyond the edge of legality. 
 The greatest triumph of terrorism over the rule of law is that it arrives to copy 
their methods of terror. With this not only are their institutions degraded. It is also a form, 
if effective, to extend the life of terrorism, including if the historical or ideological alibis 
that gave it [its] origin have disappeared. This is, perhaps, what has happened in Spain 
with the GAL and with some of the stories that now Lieutenant-General Sáenz de Santa 
María tells us. 
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 He has said that, at times, in the fight against terrorism there are things that should 
not be done; that if they are done, they should not be talked about, and if they are said, 
they should be denied. Although the harsh reality is like this sometimes, it does not 
negate in any way the obligation of the rule of law to investigate such facts and punish 
those who could have committed crimes. This is exactly what the legal proceedings 
underway regarding the GAL is about. That unlawful procedures were employed in the 
early years of democracy does not absolve from blame those who have done it during the 
socialist phase. It is more: the responsibility of those is greater, because the democratic 
system was more settled and had sufficient strength to purge the most antidemocratic 
elements from its police.  
 
Secret and Antiterrorism (Secreto y antiterrorismo) 23 March 1996 
The Public Defender, Fernando Álvarez de Miranda, has asked the Government 
for information about their confusing and controversial accord that permits it to declare 
police and the Civil Guard proceedings on terrorism secret. The Director of the Data 
Protection Agency (DPA), the official body that makes sure, among other things, that 
certain information from police files is not kept prohibited from public knowledge had 
previously done the same thing. This Government accord has all the traces of influencing 
sensitive issues of the fundamental rights of the person whose defense has been assigned 
both to the institution of the Ombudsman and the Data Protection Agency. Therefore, it is 
essential that the Government explain its nature and scope. For now, the only public 
explanation has been given by the Secretary of the Interior, Margarita Robles. But it does 
not clear the unknown principals. Margarita Robles has been limited to ensuring that the 
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declaration of reserved matters does not affect [neither] operations nor police actions 
against terrorism, but only the information relating to them. That would ensure that 
possible criminal acts or excesses that hurt people would not go unpunished or fall 
outside the judges‘ actions. She has also said that the agreement is not retroactive and, 
therefore, does not affect the dirty war actions against ETA, such as the GAL and others, 
currently under judicial investigation. It may well be so, but that explanation does not 
reassure everything about the potential impacts that a simple agreement could have on 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution or by organic laws. In any case, the Government 
should give this guarantee formally and in writing. A mere newspaper statement is not 
sufficient to clarify this important issue. It is what the Ombudsman and the Director of 
the Data Protection Agency ask. 
 
Fear is the Message (El miedo es el mensaje) 9 February 1997 
On 10 December 1995, ETA assassinated in Madrid six workers who were 
traveling in a Navy van. A few hours earlier, 500 people had demonstrated in Ordizia, 
Guipúzcoa, in solidarity with a young man of 23 years arrested after murdering two 
ertzainas. This young man, a "prominent member of the nationalist left" as defined by 
the Minister Atutxa, will be tried by jury soon for two alleged crimes of murder. 
However, more than half of the 36 people – including members and alternates – 
appointed by lottery to form part of that jury have tried, under various pretexts, to be 
exempt from that role. None of them claimed to be afraid. In the Basque Country there is 
so much fear that even to recognize that one has it takes courage. The production of fear 
has turned out to be the principal activity of this so-called left-wing nationalism; it is to 
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say, the political front: those who offer press conferences and threaten, sector by sector, 
professors, journalists, judges, politicians. The youth mobs harass those threatened; 
[putting] graffiti in fronts of their homes or in their classrooms. And every once in a 
while ETA kills someone – a seller of bicycles that crossed the path of a terrorist, a 
professor, a non-nationalist politician, a nationalist ertzaina – to make it clear that the 
threat can be met. Fear has, therefore, objective reasons: there are motives to take their 
threats seriously. But fear disturbs the trial; when someone is not able to overcome it, it is 
probable that one ends up joining those who threaten them. For that there were enough 
people willing to mobilize in solidarity with the murderer of the two ertzainas; for that 
there is no shortage of feverish protesters that convert into murder the apparent suicide of 
José María Aranzamendi in the Alcalá Meco prison – without any evidence and before 
the judge concludes their inquiries – and for that there are not enough citizens willing to 
form part of the jury that will judge Ordizia‘s alleged killer. This evidence justifies the 
existence of the Audiencia Nacional, born precisely to reduce the effects of the social 
climate of intimidation of judges in charge of judging crimes of terrorism. But it also 
questions the drastic distinction between terrorist murder and common homicide in 
certain cases. The murderer had a history as an active participant in street riots and other 
violent acts in demonstrations promoted by ETA satellite organizations. Although he is 
not a member of ETA, it is ETA that those who try to wriggle out are afraid of: fear will 
be free, as they say, but it enslaves people. 
 On Friday, a San Sebastian newspaper published a letter from a neighbor in 
Ordizia – precisely – in which the "hoax" that the husband of their daughter was an 
ertzaina was rejected. Someone had spread it, and soon threats appeared painted on their 
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house, for which the family talked with ―someone we considered appropriate‖. Despite 
this, this past 1
st
, at dawn, they planted a bomb. The woman ends her letter by asking: 
"To whom do I have to go for this to end? These kids have some responsible [for them], 
right?". They do, but there are doubts about the opportunity to apply the law to them as 
any other citizen. 
 Authoritative, sound, equidistant voices deduce from the invocation by the violent 
[persons] political reasons or pretexts that it is an error to think that you have to apply 
police or judicial solutions, that only serve to "give them publicity"; however, to not offer 
an alternative other than that to become distracted, that the authorities do as if they do not 
find out that HB broadcasts a terrorist propaganda video, specifically a video which 
offers the message that ETA made public in April 1995 with the motive of the attempted 
assassination of Aznar. It is possible that those of HB are thrilled at the prospect of 
appearing on the news for 20 days when they are arrested, but they would be even more 
so if justice were not done: they would give on conquered ground the dissemination of 
such messages, and the next time would increase the dose. And the fear would continue 
to be the gasoline that fuels the motor of our defeat. 
 
Truce and Opinion (Tregua y opinión) 20 September 1998 
It is not surprising that the ETA truce is viewed with more hope in Euskadi than 
in the rest of Spain. The emergency survey published yesterday by this newspaper has 
come to ratify this perception differently than a fact that has had an enormous impact in 
all of the country. Given that the Basques have a more immediate threat of terrorism, it is 
natural that above all other considerations they value whatever initiative that would 
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alleviate this tension. An ETA truce is viewed well by those who have nothing to fear – 
because they have adapted more or less – but above all for those who resisted violent 
imposition and do not cover. The sum of both groups totals 73% of hopeful Basques. The 
rest of the territory dominates in skepticism and not without good reason. The survey also 
includes some more surprising reactions. For example, that the citizens who consider the 
Statute of Guernica to be a still useful instrument, and not expired, are more numerous in 
the Basque Country (51%) than in the rest of Spain (34%). This surely means that this 
negative exterior perception is conditioned on the detachment shown by nationalist 
politicians in their statements; but Basques themselves do not see it this way. One of the 
debates that raises with this new situation is if in the political framework that the 
nationalist parties advocate for with diverse intensity corresponds to a real demand in 
Basque society or to the fact that ETA makes it depend on the definite abandonment of 
violence.  
 The survey offers some indication. For example, there is a difference of 20 points 
between those who consider self-determination as ―a priority issue‖ (39%) and those who 
are willing to accept ―a change to the Spanish Constitution that recognizes the right of 
self-determination‖ (59%) in exchange for ETA to permanently abandon weapons.  
 The responses taken as a whole show that what the politicians busy themselves 
with does not necessarily coincide with what the citizens are concerned about and they 
often invoke in vain the alleged public will to implement decisions that only they are 
interested in. The newspaper survey that the Vitoria Government did a few years ago 
regarding the priority concerns of Basques systematically indicate[d] that terrorism [was], 
along with unemployment, one of the two essential concerns; while the ―development of 
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the Statute [of Guernica]‖ and ―the achievement of self-governance aspirations‖ always 
figure in the three less pressing problems in a list of 16 issues.  
 It is surprising – although the data had already been revealed by other, previous 
studies – that there are more Basques ready to accept a change to the Constitution and the 
Statute [of Guernica] than to grant amnesty to ETA prisoners. Surpising, because without 
a doubt it would be more feasible to release the prisoners than to undertake legal reforms 
that are of doubtful democratic legitimacy – to the extent that a minority imposes its 
points of view to the majority – and that would require a difficultly achievable consensus.  
But beyond the findings that this emergency survey gives, we are in a situation in 
which the politicians, in first place the Government, cannot simply wait for developments 
or jump the gun when there are no firm indications that an indefinite truce could become 
definite. The Government has consistent indicators that there is a real chance that it will 
be like this. And ti should go to any depths to achieve it. Aznar‘s statement from Lima 
points in the right path, that is none other than concerted action of all the democratic 
parties to explore the paths that would contribute to a lasting peace. The fact itself that 
President Aznar yesterday went directly from the airport to the Zarzuela, to interview 
with the King, transmits to the citizens without further explanation the message that we 
find ourselves before an exceptional situation.  
 The absence of attacks should permit all of the parties to open a profound debate 
and to not shy away from any issue. As the lehendakari Ardanza has recalled, we could 
have arrived to the moment of opening the process of dialogue contemplated in Article 10 
of the Pact of Ajuria Enea for at the moment there exists an ―unequivocal will‖ from 
ETA to renounce violence. But this same text establishes the rule of democratic majority 
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for any accord of political nature. It would be an unacceptable precedence to those who 
carry more than 800 deaths on their backs.  
 
Terror and Error (Terror y error) 25 September 1998 
The global fight against terrorism, or better said the terrorisms, is up to everyone, 
as Clinton claimed from the platform of the United Nations. But the President‘s claim 
lost legitimacy after it came to light that the North American attack against a factory in 
Sudan, this past 20 August, was based in false or improbable information. Could a forger 
really have deceived the super power‘s Administration, as the North American press has 
highlighted, in information that has been denied in an unconvincing way by the White 
House? In Al Shifa, it seems, they were not manufacturing chemical weapons, but rather 
pharmaceutical and agricultural products. The error, if it is actually an equivocation, is 
serious. The Government of the United States, as former President Carter has asked, 
should publically ask the Sudan for an apology and compensate the victims. Clinton, 
internally weakened by the Lewinsky case, reacted too quickly to the terrible attacks 
against the embassies of his country in Kenya and Tanzania, that caused 258 deaths, 12 
of them North Americans. He looked for two objectives in order to bomb: the 
manufacturing plant in the Sudan and a base in Afghanistan, where he did not reach the 
millionaire Osama Bin Laden, who the United States puts behind these attacks. Haste is 
not good advice in the fight against terrorism. Unilateral actions, ignoring international 
rules, also are not the way. 
The fight against terrorism has converted into the star issue in the General 
Assembly of the United Nations. If the Spanish Minister Abel Matutes has asked for 
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―collective instruments‖ to fight this scourge, it was France that was the most precise to 
propose a ―universal convention against the financing of terrorism‖ that would allow 
lifting banking secrecy in all countries in case of a judicial investigation into terrorist 
crimes which would include freezing the accounts of those suspected of financing such 
activities, thereby attacking its channels of support. International cooperation, and not 
only advocating from the Western countries, will work when there are not geographic or 
fiscal sanctuaries for those who use this type of violence. And if errors are not committed 
like those of Clinton in the Sudan, that undermine the moral base of the fight against 
terrorism.  
 
Basque Plurality (La pluralidad vasca) 7 July 1999 
The accession of a socialist to the presidency of the General Assembly of Álava 
(the provincial parliament) is the anticipated confirmation that it will be the Popular Party 
candidate – the most vote formation in the province – who leads the Provincial Council 
(the Executive). Another member of the Popular Party, Alfonso Alonso, is the mayor of 
Vitoria since Saturday, where Aznar's party won more comfortably. The institutional map 
of the Basque Country after the agreements exactly reflects the picture that came out of 
the ballot boxes on 13 June. The intense polarization lived the last year between 
nationalists and non-nationalists has failed to override the substantial differences between 
the PP and the PSE, on the one hand, and between the PNV and EH, on the other. Hence, 
in the municipalities and counties of Euskadi, institutions closer to citizens and to actual 
politics, it is much more difficult to reach general agreements such as that signed by all 
the nationalist forces in the Basque Parliament. In many cases, the electoral verdict does 
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not even allow it. Therefore, the principle that municipal and provincial institutions are 
governed by the candidate of the list most voted has been generally imposed. In some 
cases, unstable governments are anticipated, given that no party won an absolute majority 
in the three Basque capitals or in the General Assembly of Álava, Guipúzcoa and 
Vizcaya, and the only majority agreement applicable to the six institutions – the old 
tripartite of the two moderate nationalist parties and the PSE – was ruined by the 
sovereign winds driven by Lizarra accord. 
Contemplating the the post-electoral Basque scenario – the three Basque capitals, 
governed by a different party: the PNV, in Bilbao; the PP, in Vitoria; and the PSE in San 
Sebastian, and broken in Álava the traditional flake of PNV in the councils – one 
discovers until what point the bet Arzalluz‘s [political] party was wrong. And not for 
trying to attract Herri Batasuna to institutional terrain, but for doing so by embracing the 
political script of Arnaldo Otegi. Álava involves the most visible and felt failure from the 
scene of nationalist hegemony in which the PNV embarked with the argument of 
consolidating the ETA truce. By rewarding the PP, it does not seem that the Alavese 
repudiate the PNV administration in institutions, but rather the intentions that they sensed 
in the messages of the nationalist leaders. Far from expanding their electoral base, the 
discourses of the ―new majority‖ and of the ―Basque ambit of decision‖ have made 
nationalism lose one of the three territories which it has ruled for two decades. 
The Alavese exception recalls that identity, ideological, cultural and territorial plurality is 
a constituent note of Basque society, not a hassle from which one can free their self in the 
next electoral convocation. But it also has its consequences in terms of power. For the 
first time in 20 years, the PNV is going to be out of a Provincial Council, an organism of 
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great importance in the Basque Country for the confederal character of its institutions. 
Among their responsibilities, the Basque councils have one essential [responsibility]: to 
raise, under the Economic Agreement, all taxes from their territory, that they make every 
year one part to the Basque Government and the other (the quota) to the State. Unlike 
other communities, there are many things in Euskadi that cannot be made against the 
criterion of a council. For example, to address the merger of Basque savings banks, taht 
now will have to forcibly consider a restructuring of power, above all in the case of the 
Alavese Caja Vital Alava, or create the Basque Public Bank envisioned in the program of 
the Basque Government (PNV-EA). 
 The complex is more difficult to manage than the simple, but that is the plural 
reality of Euskadi, and that key is expressed, consult after consul, [by] their citizens. 
They did it when ETA violence and intimidation was at its height, and they do it now that 
there is reasonable hope that the cessation of terrorism is definitive. Therein lies the 
challenge of politicians: to take plurality as a virtue and oblige oneself to seek agreements 
and common areas; the opposite of exclusionary discourses and radical attitudes that 
proliferate in Basque politics. 
 
Against ETA (Frente a ETA) 17 September 2000 
 Police and judicial action is essential to counter ETA terrorism. From there the 
latest arrests and judicial proceedings are encouraging. But the political problems in the 
Basque Country, perfectly separable from totalitarian murder, require the capacity for 
dialogue. The Basque citizens know this well, incapable of exercising their democratic 
rights, they are reacting civically and peacefully to the unbearable harassment from 
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violent persons. The arrest of 18 Ekin leaders, politically considered responsible for ETA, 
and one of the most bloodthirsty etarra bosses, Iñaki de Rentería, in the south of France, 
mark a turning point in the counterterrorism fight, which returns to recuperate the 
initiative after months of uncertainty. The satisfaction with these police achievements 
should not, however, convert into euphoria, in a moment of increasing tension in the 
streets of the Basque Country. Full precaution is little against the reactions of the etarras, 
like that which almost cost José Ramón Recalde his life. Yesterday, the Basque police 
found a launcher with eight armed timed grenades near the Chillida Museum in Hernani, 
shortly before the King and Queen of Spain were to inaugurate it. And not far away, 
violent youth attacked José Ramón Chica, one of the two Socialist Councilors in the 
Town Hall, in the name of EH.   
 There is no room for euphoria, above all because on Friday the responsible for the 
Interior of the Basque Government provided authentic samples that the rule of law and 
the civil liberties of citizens are in question in the territory under the responsibility of the 
lehendakari Ibarretxe. The autonomous Basque police, following very clear political 
orders, used force to dissolve peaceful demonstrations that marched through the streets of 
San Sebastian in protest of the attack against Recalde. Guided by an intolerable and 
hypocritical principle of equidistance, they were limited to avoiding contact between the 
peaceful demonstration and the group of pro-etarras that chanted the slogans ―ETA, kill 
them‖ and ―More ETA military‖. Going with the form of the law – the violent [persons] 
had demonstration permits – they did not repress an illegal act of apologizing for 
terrorism and of intimidating the peaceful citizens and they dissolved, in exchange, the 
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tranquil protest of those who demanded the full exercise of the system of freedoms in the 
Basque Country.  
 The Prime Minister reasonably asks for ―tenacity‖ and ―perseverance‖ in the 
counterterrorism fight and encourages social mobilization against the abuses. But this 
also requires the forces of public order to defend civil liberties, and obliges them to push 
for political dialogue to build bridges in a society on the border of the abyss, which from 
within aggravates social division.  
 
Blow to Our Civilization (Golpe a nuestra civilización) 12 September 2001 
The world finds itself in suspense after a series of terrorist attacks [reached] the 
heart of the greatest power of the world: its financial center in New York (represented by 
the symbolic Twin Towers) and the core of its military command (the Pentagon). It is 
impossible at this time to count the number of victims, likely to be hundreds, if not 
thousands, or who is behind this unprecedented offensive that reveals a limitless audacity 
and fanaticism. It is the largest attack ever experienced by the United States on their own 
territory, but above all, it is an integral aggression against its political system, against 
democracy, and the free market. In short, against all of us who share the same democratic 
principles that were so hard-won in our country.  
 After the chill that has shaken the world, and also fear, why not say it, it is time to 
make an appeal for calm and trust in the capacity of the first international power and of 
the allied defense system to cope with this indiscriminate assault. We should also be 
prepared for a severe response. Spain is one of the United States‘ allies in the Atlantic 
system of defense [NATO] and should act as such.  
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The terrorist attack, make no mistake, it is at the essence of our political 
civilization, and, regardless if its perpetrators are identified, it demonstrates the terrible 
contaminating effect of conflicts as fierce as those of the Near East.  
 What has happened in the United States could repeat itself in Europe, given that 
the emulation factor of terrorism, as recent history has demonstrated, is large in a media 
[dominated] world. Test of this is that some European governments immediately formed 
their crisis cabinets. The Spanish Prime Minister, José María Aznar, announced his 
immediate return from his trip to Estonia, as did almost all of the European leaders who 
were outside of their coordination centers. Vladimir Putin quickly offered his solidarity to 
the United States, a reflection that highlights that, fortunately, the Cold War is a thing of 
the past.  
 Hurrying to identify the perpetrators is bad advice, and moreover could generate 
greater injustices. They cannot pay for the sins. Although it will be difficult, political 
leaders have to avoid hysteria between themselves. Bush and his administration should 
pursue those responsible, as the President has promised to do, but not fall to the 
temptation of launching counter-offensives if it is not known for certain from whom or 
where the attack came from.  
 The series of coordinated attacks requires a high level of organization, 
cooperation, and finance. The chain of attacks, which started with the hijacking of four 
airplanes, two of which would be flown by some kamikazes into the Twin Towers of New 
York, draws a terrorist capacity unknown until now and a determination that connects 
with the most extreme fanaticism. Many eyes, and the U.S. Government‘s suspicions, 
have gone immediate toward some violent fundamentalist group, and in particular toward 
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those that are promoted by the Saudi millionaire Osama Bin Laden, who sought refuge in 
Afghanistan of the Taliban – a regime that yesterday condemned the attack – and who 
three weeks ago forewarned of an ―unprecedented‖ attack against the United States.   
 Although many leaders of movements or Muslim States quickly condemned the 
attacks, it does not stop being significant the climate in which yesterday many saw the 
attacks in diverse Islamic populations, understanding that it meant a humiliation of the 
United States. The television images of numerous Palestinian children dancing in 
Jerusalem were sufficiently representative of this type of revenge of the suffering that 
they have endured many times through Western silence. The Arab-Israeli conflict has a 
global contaminating effect, which should have been tackled long ago. Arafat was quick 
to distance himself from the attacks and express his condolences to the U.S.. Ariel Sharon 
should learn the lessons from what has happened, and move toward détente.  
Global Projection 
At this point, no hypothesis regarding who is responsible for the attacks can be 
ruled out. The Oklahoma massacre was an act of a fanatic American. Even if the attack 
came from the Islamic world, it should not be demonized as a whole for a violent act of a 
few. It is necessary to banish the idea that we are before a brutal test of the clash of 
civilizations that Huntington predicted, when the American society, despite all its 
problems, is especially plural and multicultural. To remove this temptation is part of the 
complexity of an advanced and plural society, a characteristic with which we need not 
only to live, but one from which we draw strength.  
Terrorist acts such as those yesterday – that manifest in massive attacks like those 
that cost dozens of lives in 1998 in the United States‘ embassies of Tanzania and Kenya – 
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seek global public projection. The experts of violence of ideological intention have 
warned for years about the new forms of terrorism that appeared at the end of the last 
millennium. On the one hand, the appearance of religiously motivated terrorism capable 
of removing any moral restraint to the use of violence; on the other, the combination 
between the vulnerability of our intercommunicative societies and the relatively easy 
access to means of massive destruction. The indications are that both factors were able to 
cross to cause yesterday‘s catastrophe.  
Bush‘s reaction and that of his Administration has been quick, cold, and effective. 
When in doubt, U.S. airspace was closed, all federal buildings were evacuated and their 
activities were suspended. Public life in the United States was in fact suspended 
throughout a good part of the territory. But what could be, in theory, be a relatively small 
group of terrorists, has generated a sensation of lack of control, powerlessness, and 
vulnerability in the country with the most power in the world, and that until now has felt 
practically invulnerable in its territory. The increased complexity of societies, such as the 
American, makes them more vulnerable. The attack is a human tragedy; and it will also 
generate a self-esteem crisis in the U.S.. Bush will have to demonstrate leadership 
capacity so that the American society recovers confidence in itself.  
 The manner in which the attacks were produced highlights how absurd and 
useless Bush‘s bet for an antimissile shield against possible aggressions from alleged 
thug States is. A tremendous failure of the U.S. intelligence services, who expected a 
terrorist attack against one of its embassies, but not an attack in their own territory, has 
been revealed, a type of postmodern Pearl Harbor that has come to its own Pentagon, 
incredibly poorly protected. And to fight against this type of terrorism, to avoid the 
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recurrence of acts like those of yesterday, that represent a new type of war although it is 
not between States, international cooperation will be most efficient. This indiscriminant 
terrorism, fruit of the most evident fanaticism, is the new central threat that democracies 
should deal with, with methods true to their values. The tragedy has been enormous, but 
it would have been greater if the terrorists would have had nuclear weapons. Good 
intelligence, based in indispensible international cooperation, is worth much more than a 
lot of nuclear shields.  
It is also the first act of hyperterrorism of the global information era. From the 
first minutes, we were all watching the crisis live. But the globalized terrorists also count 
on this. After the initial bafflement, the sensation of panic spread to the economic and 
financial markets. In an incomprehensible manner, quotes were not suspended, while 
Wall Street was, although its managers insisted that they resume their activities as soon 
as possible. The price of petroleum shot up, to a point disastrous for the global economy.    
The citizens of New York, Washington, and generally in all of the United States, 
have lived and continue living in distressing times. The act of hyperterrorism has reached 
us all. The smoke that Manhattan was immersed in yesterday makes recently born 
citizens cry. The feeling is that this act marked the beginning of a 21
st
 century plagued 
with serious uncertainties.  
 
Signs of Death (Señales de muerte) 4 December 2002 
Yesterday, ETA again gave signs of life, that is to say of death, this time in 
Santander. There were no victims because this time the advanced warning – given to a 
newspaper that has to alert the Ertzaintza so that they tell the National Police – gave a 
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range of 20 minutes to evacuate the parking lot where the device exploded. The method 
of the car bombing is blind by definition, with or without advanced warning, and 
sometimes it causes victims, as in the Hipercor in Santa Pola, and other times it does not. 
But the objective is met in both cases: make it clear that ETA has not gone away, that 
they can kill again. 
 The message has special meaning this time. It has been three months since the 
beginning of the process of criminalizing Batasuna and the preventative suspension of its 
activities, and the outrageous reaction from this movement‘s social base that predicted 
those who would be opposed to both things has not taken place. The arrests of activists 
has continued, in Spain and in France; the process for the judicial criminalization of 
Batasuna is in progress and Judge Garzón has continued revealing the plot forged around 
ETA. Yesterday, the National Court upheld the prosecution of 32 members of Ekin, the 
agency coordinating the plot with double militancy, which makes fools of those described 
as "waiters" in the first steps of the judge in that direction. 
 All of that has not provoked protests similar to those that were common. Street 
violence has been reduced, and the social eco of the rudeness of the leaders of Batasuna 
(now with great aim the so-called Sozialista Abertzaleak, SA: The same acronym as the 
Assault Section of the Nazi party) is very relative. It is not that ETA has disappeared, 
because so far this year it has placed thirteen car bombs and many people are still 
threatened. The change consists in the affirmation of the rule of law, to end by two 
parallel tracks with the impunity of those who have one foot inside and one outside the 
law, is proving [to be] the most effective firewall of the generational reproduction of 
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violence. It provides many young people [with] the alibi to disengage from the inertia of 
low intensity terrorism 
That is happening, and that is why ETA wanted to send the most indiscriminate 
message possible by placing a car bomb in a parking lot. 
 
Sleeper Cell (Célula durmiente) 25 January 2003 
Yesterday‘s arrest, in various Catalan localities, of 16 people, the majority of 
Algerian nationality, suspected of belonging to the terrorist network Al Qaeda that is 
directed by Osama Bin Laden, reinforces the hypothesis of the important role that Islamic 
terrorism has awarded Spain as a backup zone and as an installation of sleeper cells, 
awaiting the order to act. With yesterday‘s arrests the total number of persons imprisoned 
in Spain for their alleged link to Al Qaeda increased to 40 since the terrorist attacks of 11 
September. The Prime Minister, then, is right to point out that the threat of Islamic 
terrorism is not a fantasy. The facts point out that it is very well present in Spain, and that 
only extreme vigilance, that which permitted the police operation yesterday, can avert 
this threat and prevent it from converting into a real threat.  
 Aznar has assessed the operation as ―the disarticulation‖ of an important terrorist 
network linked to Bin Laden, that ―was preparing for the commission of attacks with 
explosives and chemical material‖. And although we will have to wait for the results of 
the judicial investigation, the material intervened by the police – portable transmission 
equipment, computers, explosives and chemical materials to make them – and the 
connections of some of those detained with terrorist cells established in the United 
Kingdom and France speak to the danger posed by the dismantled group. It has been 
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these connections, especially those maintained with alleged terrorists recently detained in 
the United Kingdom and in France, which led those countries‘ police [forces] to alert the 
Spanish police to the existence of the dismantled network. Which demonstrates once 
more, as if it were necessary, the importance of collaboration or even joint police work 
between countries that face a terrorist threat that does not have borders and that can make 
itself be felt anywhere. Needless to say yesterday‘s arrests cannot assume at all the 
criminalization of the Maghreb immigrants that live and work in Cataluña.  
 
Lawless Limbo (Limbo sin ley) 13 March 2003 
Fourteen months after moving them from Afghanistan to the base at Guantanamo 
Bay, in Cuba, the United States continues to keep some 650 prisoners in conditions of 
inhumane isolation, among them one prisoner of Spanish nationality, for whom the 
Government has not been able to get even the minimum judicial guarantees. A federal 
tribunal in Washington has denied these prisoners the right to a trial in the United States, 
considering that it is about foreigners on territory that does not fall under the jurisdiction 
of its Constitution. The Minister of Justice has described the situation as ―an important 
victory in the war against terrorism‖. Quite the opposite. The blind fight against terrorist 
is blowing away civil liberties and the credibility of the United States with respect to 
human rights. 
 Formally considered ―illegal combatants‖ so that the Geneva Convention of 1929 
does not apply to them, the United States maintains these prisoners without the right to 
family visitation or to legal assistance, in a base that constitutes a lawless limbo, an 
anachronism in sovereign Cuban territory. Legal arguments aside, we are seeing an 
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immoral act by a super power that extents the extraterritoriality of its laws in a near 
universal form to protect its own citizens and soldiers.  
 Hopefully, the Supreme Court will rectify this, since the Bush Administration, 
judging by Ashcroft‘s assessment, will not. Just as it has not tackled the debate about 
whether it is possible to torture prisoners to obtain information about the terrorist 
networks they belong to. There is absolutely no control over what the CIA and other 
agencies outside of the United States do when it comes to trying to extract information 
from prisoners such as Bin Laden‘s lieutenant, detained in Pakistan. Acting this way 
takes away all credibility for the alleged policy of promoting democracy and human 
rights throughout the globe.  
 
Political Priorities (Prioridades políticas) 23 April 2004 
References to a new terrorist threat on one hand, and constitutional reforms on the 
other, were the center of discussion between the King and the President of the Courts, 
Manual Marín, in the opening session of the VIII Legislature. The Prime Minister also 
referred to the constitutional reform when Francisco Rubio Llorente took the position of 
President of the Council of Europe.  
The response to Islamic terrorism is the immediate priority in the beginning of 
this legislature. The efficiency demonstrated by the police in the identification and arrest 
of the perpetrators of the 11-M massacre has been unanimously recognized. But the 
investigation itself has revealed grave failures in its prevention: essential evidence was 
underestimated; the role that Al Qaeda assigned to Spanish territory in its strategy was 
assessed incorrectly, although 66 of its members had been arrested since 11-S [9/11]; few 
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police officers were dedicated to the task of getting information about this terrorism; 
there were coordination failures, etcetera.  
The new director of the National Intelligence Center, Alberto Saiz, who came to 
the position without previous experience, will have as his first mission to verify where 
the failures were produced and how to find ways to deal with them. The ongoing 
investigation in the United States about similar errors in relation to 11-S [9/11] is an 
example that the Spanish Parliament cannot ignore. In any case, it will be essential that 
the measures that the Government adopts have full parliamentary support.  
 The Constitutional reforms (and of some of the statutes of autonomy) will 
certainly mark the political calendar of the next four years. They should be addressed, 
said the King, ―with the same spirit of consensus‖ as that with which they were drafted. 
Something that is not easy, because it is evident, as the Speaker of the House recalled, 
that there exist very different visions and interests regarding these reforms. For them to 
prosper, an accord between the two big parties, that represents 80% of the voters, is 
needed. But who drives the reform, the PSOE, needs the support of the nationalist allies 
to complete a majority, and their proposals do not necessarily coincide. All of this could 
lead to a paralysis or, on the contrary, to the dynamization of political life. Because, as 
Marín also recalled, the harmonization of different ideas and interests is the same as 
uppercase Politics. A legislature is opening in which political talent will become a 
necessity again.  
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To Channel Without Trivializing (Canalizar sin banalizar) 11 May 2004 
Although for distinct reasons, PP and PSOE are to channel toward a monitoring 
commission for the Antiterrorism Pact, which will meet tomorrow, some of the 
controversies that they keep facing. Rajoy demanded the meeting via a letter to Zapatero 
so that the Minister could rectify his opinion that before 11-M there had been "political 
insight". For its part, the Government committed itself to convene to discuss measures 
that would improve antiterrorism efficacy.  
 Since there is such a framework, it seems logical to try to take advantage of it to 
eliminate misunderstandings, since there have been some, before they become a pretext 
for an antiterrorism policy of division and confrontation. To avoid it was one of the 
objectives of the pact, and it could be considered applicable to any [form of] terrorism. 
However, it would be little realistic to pretend to go further and convert the accord into a 
framework for eventual shared initiatives against Islamic terrorism. The pact, its concrete 
content, only makes sense against ETA. It is a public commitment that no change in 
majority will modify the criterion of not negotiating political concessions with terrorists; 
precisely because the expectation of achieving this has been the principle incentive of 
ETA's continuation. For that it was a pact between the only parties with realistic 
possibilities of governing, although other forces could join.  
 The accord develops this principle in relation to matters such as the Pact of 
Lizarra, the Statute of Guernica, the penitentiary policy, eventual legislative reforms, 
etcetera. It is to say, always in reference to the specific problems posed by ETA 
terrorism. It would be artificial to try to apply those principles to Al Qaeda, which does 
247 
 
not propose to change the Spanish Constitution to include self-determination, or deal with 
legal organization, nor pretends to negotiate anything with the Government.  
The meeting tomorrow should serve to clear up misunderstandings, to reaffirm the 
compromise to take the topic of terrorism out of partisan confrontation, and perhaps both 
parties will exchange ideas about how to tackle this new challenge; but it would trivialize 
the pact to pretend that, given that it is called antiterrorist, that it serves as a guide to deal 
with any terrorism: all are condemnable, regardless of the pretext that they claim, but that 
does not mean, as Aznar seemed to believe, that all are equal or should be combated with 
the same measures. 
 
Defensive Measures (Medidas defensivas) 26 May 2004 
The Minister of the Interior, José Antonio Alonso, has presented some of the 
measures destined to combat Islamic terrorism that the Government is going to put into 
action. It is a priority of the new Executive, per the compromise reiterated by Zapatero. 
But it is also a task that presents great difficulties; due to the extreme fanaticism of this 
type of terrorists, immune to almost any moral inhibition regarding the effects of their 
actions, including their own lives, which increases their dangerousness and creates 
obstacles for its prevention; and due to the absence of achievable political goals, which 
prevents them from acting on cited pretexts. Its international character is another 
difficulty, although it also favors concerted action of all nations.  
Minister Alonso‘s measures are fundamentally legislative and organizational. We 
hope that he does not fall in the syndrome that affected that previous Government to 
respond to each political or police difficulty with a legal reform. Experience indicates that 
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what is more efficient than changing legislation is to apply with tenacity measures that 
already exist. But it is possible that some norms, such as the Law on the Protection of 
Data, should include clauses that permit a more flexible application in relation to certain 
transfers of funds or the identification of users of mobile telephone cards. It also seems 
convenient a better control of lodgings, car rentals and the existence of explosives in 
quarries and job sites. It is about limitations that do not question the liberal model of 
coexistence.  
In the organizational aspect, a Center for Information Coordination, internal and 
exterior, will be created for Islamic terrorism. Being an almost virgin terrain, it must be 
hoped that the traditional resistance of the distinct police bodies to share information will 
not manifest in this case as obstructionism. The increase from 200 to 600 agents 
specialized in this type of terrorism is an adequate measure for the situation, although its 
efficacy will depend on the qualification of the human teams, which includes knowing 
the Arabic language.  
 One last consideration is that it would be a error that this strengthening to combat 
against Islamic terrorism was done at the cost of the fight against ETA. Maintaining 
police efficiency and judicial strength, as well as democratic unity, against this band is 
now the essential condition so that the (realistic) expectation of its definite defeat does 
not fail. 
 
Bush Cultivates Fear (Bush cultiva el miedo) 14 July 2004 
Bush continues clinging to the strategy of fear, because he believes that with it he 
can win a second term. His last notice has been to investigate, at the insistence of the 
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Commission for Electoral Assistance, who would have authority to suspend the elections 
of 2 November in case of an attack similar to that of 11-S [9/11]. Despite those who 
claim that there is a legal vacuum, the response seems fairly clear: the decision would 
correspond to, by law, Congress and the local authorities. Never to the Executive. There 
is a close precedent: the postponement of the primaries by two weeks that should have 
occurred that fateful 11 September 2001, for the New York municipalities. But not even 
during the Civil War, nor in the two World Wars, did the U.S. suspend or postpone 
national elections.  
The Administration constantly stirs the spectrum of an attack before the elections, 
so much so that a report from Congress has complained that the alert levels are 
established without sufficient basis or explication. But the White House does not only 
have deaf ears for criticism, but also reinforces its own speech. Bush continues to defend 
preventative war and affirm that after the invasion of Iraq, despite not finding weapons of 
mass destruction, he has stopped their proliferation, the world is more secure and the U.S. 
is winning the ―war against terrorism‖. The speech could have an effective result, as, per 
a survey published yesterday by The Washington Post, more citizens trust Bush than 
Kerry when conducting the campaign against terrorism. But for the first time in this 
series of surveys by the Post, less than half of the country believes that the U.S. is 
winning this ―war‖. A record 38% had the opinion that it is even losing the war, and 53%, 
another record, believe the war in Iraq has not been worth it.  
 The question is, until what point a President that arrived to the White House 
thanks to lawyers and the Supreme Court with the vote recount in Florida is ready to 
continue playing tricks and with fear to guarantee their reelection? The danger is that a 
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party or a ruler is considered to be in a situation that some sociologists call post-
democratic, in which they feel authorized to whatever they want once they have won 
power at the ballot box. Fortunately, there are still counterweights in democracies.  
 
Are We Ready? (¿Estamos preparados?) 28 October 2004 
Ten of the sixteen Islamists detained by order of Judge Garzón accused of 
preparing an attack against the Audiencia Nacional were prisoners: three for crimes 
related to Islamic terrorist networks and seven for small crimes. A profile, [taken] all 
together, similar to the group of hardened fanatics and fanatical recruits that carried out 
the slaughter of 11-M. Therefore, the measures that the Interior has started to put into 
practice to reinforce the control of prisoner‘s activities that have this type of history, and 
also those who have shown signs of getting close to the leaders who instruct, recruit, and 
train them to become martyrs, are justified. 
 The increase of the prison population in general, and that of Maghreb origin in 
particular, favors the conversion of prisons into pools of terrorists. More than 6,000 of the 
nearly 60,000 prisoners that are currently in the 77 Spanish jails are Muslim. Regardless 
of how dispersed they are, there will still be dozens of them in each establishment. The 
number of internees related to Islamic terrorism has gone from three in 2000 to 52 this 
year, per one of the reports sent by the Interior to the 11-M Commission. Prison – with a 
lot of free time – favors the psychological influence of radical leaders that offer petty 
criminals to continue what they were doing – for example, falsifying phone [SIM] cards, 
– but now to the service of a great cause. And with the possibility of becoming martyrs.  
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There are increasing indications that the 11-M plot went through the prisons. It is 
known, for example, that Abu Dahdah, detained since 2001 as the alleged boss of Al 
Qaeda in Spain, reported on Monday by a police officer as a likely instigator of the 
March attacks, received visits from people related to the perpetrators. If to this the fact is 
added that Judge Garzón just alerted about the inadequacy of the current legislation to 
cope with the new terrorism, very distinct from that of ETA, it is evident that there is still 
a lot of work to confront a challenge that will surely last.  
The meeting for the Antiterrorist Pact planned for the 3
rd
 of next month should 
serve so that the two biggest parties, instead having a blasting row, they coordinate to 
agree on the guidelines of what to do now, especially in the penitentiary and legislative 
terrains.   
 
Better Vibrations (Mejores vibraciones) 28 July 2005 
The generalized threat of Islamic terrorism has made Blair and Zapatero put their 
difference behind them. Pragmatism unites, above all in times of crisis. Even more so 
when it represents parties of the same family and one notices that there are not a few 
coincidences in antiterrorism material or in others of the European agenda, especially in 
the camp of police and judicial cooperation, and in that of economic reform of the EU 
that London advocates. The British Prime Minister, who invited the Spanish Prime 
Minister to a lunch in Downing Street yesterday, has manifested a notable interest in an 
Alliance of Civilizations, an initiative that the Spanish socialist leader exposed at the 
U.N. in September 2004 to create a common front between western and Muslim 
countries, and escape from the fatalism of a clash of civilizations.  
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Blair wanted to address it directly over the tablecloth and said that he had 
sufficient potential and importance for it be developed in the coming months. This idea 
also has the sponsorship of the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who also 
met with the British Premier, and who just publically received a boost from the Secretary 
General of the U.N.. Zapatero‘s idea, that is in its initial approach is not exempt from 
ambiguities and for that it requires a better definition, is considered by the PP to not be 
serious. Yesterday, Mariano Rajoy did not gauge the significance that the initiative could 
have beyond Spain when he affirmed, before the Downing Street meeting, that he had 
faith that Zapatero would not expel his speaker. The reverse is exactly what happened, 
something that Rajoy should take note of.  
 The War in Iraq and the close relationship between Blair and Aznar made the 
relationship between the British Labour Party and Spanish Socialists more difficult, and 
they did not get better when they arrived to the Government in 2004. Even less when 
Zapatero decided to align with the Franco-German axis. But the situation has changed 
dramatically in the wake of the latest EU crisis and the London [terrorist] attacks. Both 
leaders agree that European modernization passes through a renewal of the social model 
and the empowerment of the Lisbon Agenda and equally argue that the danger that 
terrorism represents also requires maximizing the Union‘s antiterrorism legislation, 
applying without restrictions the European Arrest Warrant and granting the police more 
facilities in the fight against this threat.   
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The Base of Shame (La base de la vergüenza) 15 February 2006 
The cry for the United States to immediately close the shameful jail in 
Guantanamo is general. After the Los Angeles Times’ revelation of the provisional report 
from five experts from the U.N. Commission for Human Rights, tomorrow in the 
European Parliament there will be a vote that also asks for the closure of this internment 
center and for the U.S. to respect international law and its own laws.  
 Guantanamo has become a beacon of shame. Although the U.S. has delivered a 
few dozen prisoners to their countries of origin, in this camp a few hundred prisoners 
have been kept without trial since the invasion of Afghanistan, in October 2001, in a legal 
vacuum which the European Parliament and diverse organizations have complained about 
various times. The U.N. experts consider that in some cases they practice torture and 
inhumane treatment, that prisoners‘ religious and sanitary rights are violated, or some one 
hundred prisoners on hunger strike are force fed. The members of the European 
Parliament recall that the law approved on the initiative of Republican Senator John 
McCain, detained and tortured in the Vietnam War, obliges the U.S. to ensure that no 
prisoner ―be subjected to cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment‖.  
The Bush Administration considers the U.N. experts‘ report to be based in 
―hearsay‖, because its authors have not visited the base. The experts claim that this 
possibility was rejected because only three of the five were given permission [to visit 
Guantanamo], and without the ability to talk to the prisoners. But they did have access to  
former prisoners and their families that are now in other countries.  
Guantanamo is not an isolated case. Its existence feeds the hatred that nourishes 
violent fanatics, like a horrendous display of the excesses of the so-called ―war against 
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terrorism‖. The same happens with the CIA flights that deliver prisoners that could be 
brutally interrogated in secret prisons in various countries, including Afghanistan. The 
U.S. could win in respectability and security if the internment center were closed and it 
gave those detained freedom, or at least, as the project of the European Parliament asks, 
they were judged in American territory with all of its guarantees ―and without facing the 
death penalty‖.  
 
Strategic Partners (Socios estratégicos) 20 June 2006 
The political relationship between Spain and the United States has experienced a 
marked improvement in the last months. The interview yesterday in Washington between 
Miguel Ángel Moratinos and Condoleezza Rice, reflected this. It is not a question of 
minutes, neither of gestures – although a joint press conference is welcome – but of 
interests and content.  
 Despite the disagreements regarding the Spanish withdrawal from Iraq and about 
the war itself, or having positions that do not coincide regarding Cuba – although the 
objective of a Cuban democracy would be shared post-Castro – the coinciding points 
increase: the Near East; Afghanistan, where, despite the deterioration of the situation, 
Spain, with NATO, is increasing its commitment; and the fight against terrorism. 
Moratinos even announced the willingness to cooperate more in the reconstruction of 
Iraq. However, it would be regrettable that, in deference to the ―partner and strategic 
ally‖, the Spanish Government did not insist that everything about the embarrassing CIA 
flights for the capture and illegal rendition of prisoners was brought to light.  
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It is a big change that the Spanish Minister says that ―we need more of the United 
States in Latin America‖, and that Spain should ―complement‖ this relation. Perhaps it 
would have been more correct to address it as a triangular vision: Latin America-Spain-
U.S.. Not for Madrid, or for Washington, or for Latin America would the extension of 
Chavez‘ power throughout the subcontinent be good. But in the analysis shared, it is 
necessary to go to the root of things and explain the new factors such as indigenous 
[movements] or the recuperation of sovereignty over resources. Moratinos often speaks 
of a ―new West‖ based in values before geography and that should include the Latin 
Americans that share them. Transatlantic relations should not only refer to the North 
Atlantic.  
 The fact that yesterday the Friends of Spain caucus was reactivated in the United 
States Congress, composed mostly of Republicans, is not a symptom of thawing, but of 
construction and advances that should be captured during the first visit of the Secretary of 
State to Madrid, before the end of the year, which Rice announced yesterday. The Courts 
should correspond with a similar forum whose construction Moratinos will ask for upon 
his return. When Spanish investments in the U.S. have increased 50%, when there are so 
many interlocking and shared interests, the stubbornness of understanding and the 
overcoming of disagreements has to be imposed, although neither Bush nor Zapatero 
seem to be ready, yet, to meet one day themselves.  
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The King and the Transition (El Rey y la transición) 26 December 2006 
 In a hopeful society, while extremely cautious regarding the Government‘s 
attempts for a final dialogue against ETA terrorism, the King‘s invitation to ―deploy 
every force that will permit us to reach, together, the unwavering objective of putting an 
end to terrorism‖ constitutes a spur to continue trusting and to not waiver in the endeavor, 
despite the obvious difficulties. The words from the Monarch are directed to the whole 
society, but those who, above all, should take note are the PSOE and the PP, whose 
divergences regarding the manner in which to reach this common objective are 
outrageous. Another year more, the King has referred to terrorism, not to regret fatal 
attacks, but to signal the duty of putting an end to terrorism within the law and the rule of 
law and remembering the priceless debt contracted to society by its victims.   
 It is justified that the King continues insisting in the necessity of calming political 
life and that the [political] parties work with an integrative spirit. His call, last year, to put 
an end to the climate of tension installed in political life fell on deaf ears: the same 
climate, murkier if possible, persists in the relations between the [political] parties. In 
rightfully prudent terms, Don Juan Carlos transpires, for whomever wants to understand 
it, the concern that this [political] party confrontation produces, far away from the 
willingness of compromise that made the transition [to democracy] possible.  
 As already a constant in his latest messages, the King insists in the achievements 
of democratic Spain in terms of stability, progress, and wellbeing. His perception of the 
evolution of Spanish society continues to be optimistic; from there his insistence to stay 
on the track that these achievements have made possible, which is none other than 
reconciliation and the common will to construct a Spain that is democratic, modern, 
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united, and respectful of its diversity under the umbrella of the Constitution. There is a 
new topic in the King‘s list of concerns: the environment. It is to be hoped that this 
concern is addressed by those who attack it with disorganized urban development and 
with intentional or unwise fires so that, as the King signaled, the progress of Spaniards 
does not end up jeopardized in the future.   
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